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There are two major perspectives on the political impacts of the Internet: one 
views the new medium as a democratizing power that will eradicate 
authoritarianism; the other views it as a force that will lead to domination or 
anarchy. This thesis argues for a mediationist perspective, proposing that the 
political impacts of the Internet are contingent upon a number of socio-political 
factors such as “ virtual censorship ”， t h e constraints exerted by the 
authoritarian institutions upon the cyberspace. Specifically, this is a study of 
online political communication (OPC) in China. The case chosen relates to 
discussions concerning the persecution of the Indonesian Chinese in 1998 in 
China's online public arenas. The impacts ofOPC are conceptualized as a series 
of results ranging from technological diffiision to exposure, from online 
expression to mobilization. Methodologically, the case study employs multiple � 
methods including document analysis, online participant observation, interview 
and frame analysis. The conclusions are: 1. Constraining factors are juxtaposed 
with incentive factors in the context where the political impacts of the Internet 
take place. 2. The Internet alters political communication in a process by which 
different mediating factors interact with each other. The result of interaction 
includes different effects, among which the effects in terms of diffiision and 
exposure are relatively strong, whereas those in terms of expression and 
mobilization are relatively weak. 3. On the whole, the political impacts of the 
Intemet on China are but limited democratization. These conclusions substantiate 
the concept ofmediation as a compliment to the existing literature. The theoretical 
limitations and methodological issues ofthis thesis are also discussed. . 
� � * 
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Abbreviations & Glossary 
BBS: bulletin board system, also called electronic bulletin boards. It is a system 
where messages by Internet users are stored and displayed chronologically 
in different categories, i.e. different "boards". Most BBS stations also allow 
users to send emails, talk to each other in chatrooms and vote for issues of 
common interests among users of the BBS communities. 
Boardmaster {banzhu): a low rank position ofIntemet regulators in BBS. They are 
responsible for the normal operation of an electronic bulletin board about a 
specific area of discussion. 
BPS: Bureau of Public Security, the local subdivisions of China's Ministry of 
Public Security. 
CERNET: China Education and Research Network. 
Chatroom: a kind of Internet service that allows users to exchange ideas and chat. 
The content of conversation is not saved automatically as in BBS. 
CHES[ANET: China Public Computer Network. 
C _ A G B N : China Golden Bridge Network. 
CMC: computer-mediated communication. 
CNNIC: China Network Information Center, the organization authorized by 
China's State Council to provide information services about the 
development of Internet in the country. 
CSTNET: China Science and Technology Network � 
Firewall: a technological device designed for the impediment of information 
transformation via Internet. If it is imposed on a network interface, 
information from a targeted website will be screened out. 
Ftp: file transfer protocal, a channel for large files such as software, sound files 
and visual images to be transfered through the Internet. 
Hacker: those who enter a computer network, disable its security systems and 
alter online documents or replace them with their own files. If a hacker 
succeeds to change content on a targeted website, we say the website is 
"hacked". 
Intranet: a kind of network technologies that record the online activities of all 
terminals in a given network. Usually it is used within the computer network 
ofacommercial organization. 
MEI: the Ministry ofElectronic Industry. 
MII: the Ministry of Information Industry. ‘ 
MPT: the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication 
MPS: the Ministry ofPiiblic Security 
OPC: online political communication. 
Post: a message displayed on an electronic bulletin board is called a post. If one 
.pub l i shes an article on a bulletin board, we also say s/he "posts" a message. 
Sysop: system operators, the technicians working in the national or regional 
computer network centers. They are managers of the virtual communities. 
Usenet: a function of the Internet that allows users to publish their emails publicly. 
•i 
iv 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
The Objectives ; 
The Assumptions 2 
The Case 4 
Methods 9 
The Conceptual Framework JJ 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Background 18 
Communication Technology as A Democratizer 18 
Democratizer or Something Else? 23 
The Concept of Mediation : 27 
The Mediationist Perspective 33 
it 
Chapter 3 China's Cyberspace 37 
China 's Nets and Netizens 40 
Bamboo Curtains Unfurled. 53 
Virtual Censorship vs. Mass Media Regulation: a Comparison 67 
Concluding Remarks 75 
Chapter 4 The Processes of Mediation 79 � 
Internet Audience and Their Exposure 80 
The Rugged Route from Exposure to Expression 88 
The Gap between Vlrtuality and Reality : PS 
Concluding Remarks J 08 
Chapter 5 The Consequences of Mediation 110 
Evaluating the Consequences UQ 
Selecting Online Arenas n3 
Data Gathering and Coding jjg 
Findings iS0 
Concluding remarks i47 
Chapter 6 Discussions 151 
Summary /5 j 
Methodological Issues i54 
»• V * * * * * * * • * * • 
‘Broader Implications 1^4 - _ 
Bibliography 159 
V 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The Objectives 
A prevailing expectation in the late 1990s is that the Internet is exerting powerful 
impact upon totalitarian and authoritarian countries and causing revolutionary 
changes in favor of democracy. Has the anticipated change taken place? If yes, 
how? If not, why? I explore China's online political communication (OPC) in 
search of the answers. 
Unlike the utopian and pessimistic approaches prevailing in existing literature, � 
this thesis contends that the Memet, or specifically, computer-mediated 
communication (CMC), has limited political impacts upon non-democratic 
countries since the effects occur only through the processes of mediation inside 
and outside the cyberspace. By mediation I mean the interaction between the 
facilitating factors in the democratization process initiated by the introduction of 
the Internet and the constraining factors, such as the censorship of OPC. For the 
argument of limited impacts and the mediationist perspective to be established, 
this thesis proposes a conceptual framework for the exploration of China's 
cyberspace and examines the factors, processes and consequences ofmediation in 
online discussions about the persecution ofethnic Indonesian Chinese in summer 
1998. The implications and limitations of the case study are also discussed. 
1 
The Assumptions 
This is a time when none of the fundamental concepts such as technology, 
democracy, society, human agency, politics and political institution are immune 
from challenges. Almost every basic notion for the study ofthe political impacts 
of technology is under the crossfire of postmodernists, post-structuralists and 
cyberpunk philosophers, to mention just a few. Little evidence suggests that the 
root-cutting critiques may be dispelled shortly. Moreover, the impediment to 
II 
defme the concepts is growing as the advancement of technology accelerates. 
Hence at the risk of being accused as conservative, I decide to start with a few 
assumptions, upon which the working definitions of the thesis are founded. In 
doing so, I try to circumvent the quicksand of profound debates about concepts � 
related to my incipient inquiry into the democratizing effects ofthe Internet. 
First�information technology (IT) is conceptualized as an instrument with an 
inherent scope of political influence. Comparing the Internet with the television 
for example, their technological attributes such as channel capacity, production 
cost, and interactivity allow the former to support a more democratic mode of 
communication than the latter. 
u ‘ 
Second�I regard technology as the analytical starting point of a series of causal 
relationships. The pro-democracy capacity ofthe Internet as an interactive, virtual 
and globally accessible means of communication is the first thing to acknowledge, 
although during utilization in a specific context, the potentialities of the new 
medium are often subject to modification, too. 
2 
The third assumption is that communicative democratization is necessary in 
authoritarian and totalitarian societies. The judgment does not imply that I 
advocate indiscriminant transplantation of any established "democratic" system of 
political communication into countries like China. Rather, democracy is 
understood as a set of institutional arrangements with large internal variations 
responding to the actual processes of public policy making and implementation in 
a given society. As long as the order of political communication in a non-
democratic country becomes less hierarchical, more open to different voices, or 
more likely to foster diverse opinions in both quality and quantity, there are 
desirable signs of democratization. 
� 
Because this is a case study of China, democratization is used in its broad sense that 
includes not only the "change toward greater popularization" but also 
"liberalization", i.e. the increase of"public contestation"(Dahl, 1971:6-7). Strictly 
speaking, limited liberalization and full democratization are different. Their 
distinctions have been articulated in the studies of political transitions worldwide 
(Whitehead, 1988:8-9) as well as the discussions of American telecommunications 
policy (Lenert, 1998). However, the tension between democratization and 
« . * 
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liberalization may be downplayed in the context of Mainland China, where the 
opening-up of the centralized political communication system entails 
popularization or contestation or both. Under these circumstances, liberalization is 
an integral part and a necessary preparation stage of democratization. It is for this 
reason that the two notions can be regarded as interchangeable in the case ofChina. 
3 
Another fundamental presumption that underlies this thesis is the role of human 
agency. Can technology determine its political outcomes? Or is it merely a neutral 
instrument, whose impact depends solely upon the will of the users? Again, these 
questions invoke endless discussion beyond the objectives of the thesis. At this 
initial stage of exploration, I assume that the technological attributes of a medium, 
the initiatives of human actors and structural forces in society are all significant 
factors in deciding the consequences. This middle-ofr.the-road position is 
necessary in that it allows us to examine the relative importance of different 
factors in actual contexts. It is especially so when the thesis is dealing with the 
largely uninvestigated terrain of politics and the new medium, Internet, in a non-
democratic country, Mainland China. ‘ 
The Case 
China is chosen to stand for non-democratic countries because it is probably one 
of the most telling cases due to its enduring communist rule and ongoing reforms 
to establish the market economy under authoritarian political control. As most 
countries that do not adopt popular election and open media systems, China has a 
relatively backward national economy. It is huge in size, accomodating nearly 
one-fifth of the world's population. These reasons set China as distinct from 
countries in North America and West Europe, upon which an overwhelming 
majority of current researches about the Internet is based. 
Moreover, China has acquired a sizeable nation-wide computer network with 
4 
linkage to the World Wide Web, a growing group of Internet users in millions, a 
multiplicity of public online arenas all over the nation as well as a systematic 
regulatory body of OPC. Since these encounters with the new technology are yet to 
appear in many other nondemocratic nations, China may be accepted as a good 
choice for the exploration ofhow the Internet may or may not be a powerful force 
ofcommunicative liberalization under authoritarian circumstances. 
Another advantage of studying OPC in China is that there have been political 
movements initiated on the Net. Thus after surveying the general characteristics of 
the nation's cyberspace, I can analyze actual incidents to formulate hypotheses 
and evaluate them empirically. The case I selected is how Mainland Chinese 
Internet users responded to the persecution of ethnic Chinese in the May riots of � 
1998 in Indonesia. Being the second occasion' when online political processes led 
to real-world mobilization in China, this case allows us to scrutinize the actual 
utilization of the new medium as an OPC instrument in the country. Admittedly, 
there are discussions about other political issues among Chinese netizens that 
deserve analysis. But the case of Indonesian riots is the most salient event in 
China's public online arenas during the period of data collection for this thesis 
from January 1998 to April 1999. After discussing the general development of 
- i 
Ihtemet in China and the nation's regulations against nonofFicial OPC, the second 
half of the thesis concentrates on the responses to the persecution of Indonesian 
‘China's first OPC event with visible influence in the real world took place in September 1996 following the 
Sino-Japanese territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Island. An assembly was held at Peking University as the 
result and protest letters from student organizations were handed to the Japanese Ambassy in Beijing. But the 
planned demonstration offcampus was abortive due to the intervention of authorities in the university and the 
government ofBeijing Municipality. 
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Chinese. The tension between the case of China and the case of Indonesia should 
be acknowledged. But the narrowing-down of scope is a common strategy 
employed in case studies and a necessary one in this thesis for the multiplicity of 
data to be included in the limited length and organized to illustrate mediation 
processes and evaluate the political impacts of the Internet. 
During 13-15 May 1998，Indonesia was engulfed by a wave of riots that caused 
severe damage to ethnic Chinese people living in the country. Rampant looting, 
reckless arson and brutal murder"were reported soon after the riots. Two months 
later, in early July, a more horrifying message leaked via the Internet and appeared 
in major international newspapers: hundreds of Chinese women were raped during 
the riots, and probably, as a result of pre-designed organized crime against Chinese � 
descendents in Indonesia. From Singapore to New York, from Malaysia to Hong 
Kong, from Toronto to Taipei, print and broadcast media on both sides of the 
Pacific Ocean gave lengthy coverage to the issue promptly. The only exception was 
China. 
The first editorial of People 's Daily concerning the persecution appeared on 3 
August 1998，nearly one month after it was published internationally. Until then, 
% *• 
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China's mass media rarely reported the sufferings of ethnic Indonesian Chinese 
during the May riots. Yet regardless of the silence in printed and televised news 
reports, large quantity of related narrative stories, photographs, comments and 
mobilizing appeals had been circulating in the country via the Internet for more 
than four weeks. After August 3，voices from the Internet were adopted 
6 
unprecedentedly by the mass media with the approval of CCP's Central 
Propaganda Division, leading to the first application for "legal" demonstration by 
university students in Beijing since 1989. Although the application was declined 
and the climax of the incident was not spectacular - only a protest of about one 
hundred students at the Indonesian Ambassy in Beijing - this was a critical event 




Case study is "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context" (Yin, 1994)，in which "the investigator has little 
% 
control over events" (p.l) and there are "many more variables of interests" Q).13). 
As a result, case study "relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing 
to converge in a triangulating fashion" {ibid.). It is especially so for the 
description and exploration of China's cyberspace since the impact of CMC on 
authoritarian rule has rarely been studied. And like other case studies, this thesis 
employs multiple methods. 
� To provide sufficient context for the case study, I first survey the^fleld of China's . 
* • 
cyberspace and identify the factors that may facilitate or thwart liberalization 
through the Intemet. Document analysis is used for this purpose. The first type of 
materials consists of news stories from newspapers and magazines such as Wired, 
Time, the New York Times, South China Morning Post, Asian Wall Street Journal 
and PC World in Chinese. They are used to portray the history and current state of 
7 
Internet in China. In addition, online materials including Chinese laws, 
governmental regulations, and statistical reports are incorporated for a deeper 
understanding of the incentives and constraints of democratization in the context 
of the field. The most useful documents come from http://www.cnnic.net.cn, the 
official website of China Network Information Center. Its latest report about the 
development of Internet in China, i.e. CNNIC Report of January 1999, provides 
many useful descriptive statistics. 
ti 
After identifying the mediation factors, I proceed to investigate the dynamic 
processes of mediation. In this part, document analysis and the interpretation of 
available data, though still useful, are inadequate. Therefore, I rely more on 
interviews and participant observation. I try to choose interviewees according to � 
their gender, physical location (in different cities or Qutside China) and position in 
the regulatory hierarchy of China's cyberspace (ordinary users or regulators). 
Nonpropability sampling is used and the sample size is not large due to limited 
time and resources. 
Two interviewees, a male in Shenzhen and a female in Zhengzhou, were selected 
via ICQ, the Internet chat software, using its find-a-random-chat-partner functioii. 
I 
Six subjects are from a virtual community located in Wuhan, which I joined since 
January 1998. Two of them, a male and a female again, are my childhood 
schoolmates now studying in Canada and the United States. They are included 
because external users play a crucial role in linking China's cyberspace with the 
rest of the world. We talked with each other both online and in the real world. The 
8 
third one is a boardmaster, i.e. a lower-rank regulator, in the virtual community, 
whom I know quite well but have never met face-to-face. The fourth one was a 
stranger to me. I invited him out for an interview when we were both online in 
August 1998. Another one is my undergraduate schoolmate working in the work 
unit hosting the Internet community, where she also served as a boardmaster. 
When I was in Wuhan during June 1998, she introduced me to an associate-
station-master or fuzhanzhang, who was in a position to know more about the 
operation and regulation of the entire virtual community. The interview took place 
during a dinner. /-
In another virtual community hosted by a university in Shanghai, I conducted a 
panel discussion in a chatroom, where I raised the issue about the Indonesian riots � 
to catch others' attention in November 1998. Three .unknown people, who were 
talking in the chatroom at the time，responded and discussed the topic with me. 
Except for the two interviews through ICQ, the subjects in mainland Chinese 
Internet communities are identified via convenient sampling. The interviews and 
the panel discussion with them were all held in Chinese. Except the unknown 
users in the Shanghai virtual community, all of them aged between 20 and 35 with 
college or higher level of education. Four of the eight informants have jobs, the 
other four are college students. Among them, three majored in computer science 
or telecommunications, one studied business administration, one studied 
architecture, and another, with a bachelor degree in English literature, was then a 
secretary in the foreign affairs office of a university. 
“ 9 
I made friends with many of the respondents in my one-year plus experience in 
Chinese Internet communities, including bulletin board systems, i.e. BBS stations, 
located at universities in Wuhan, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and 
Hefei. I also visited electronic bulletins and chatrooms hosted by commercial 
companies in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. A special website I frequently 
browsed for months was in Hunan Province. With technical news and a BBS, it “ 
was designed for the communication among Chinese hackers. Its 
academic/commercial host is unknown. In November 1998, overseas Chinese 
fT 
students at Massachusetts Institute of Technology established a BBS station, 
which attracts large number of users from the mainland. I have been its member 
since December 1998. In the Wuhan BBS, I also have the experience of working 
� 
as the boardmaster for two electronic bulletins, one for articles about Hong Kong, 
the other for the alumni of Peking University. All these experiences provide rich 
materials for my participant observation in China's cyberspace, which in tum 
greatly facilitate my exploration of the processes through which the democratizing 
impacts of the Internet take place. 
Finally, a frame analysis of OPC discussion about the Indonesian anti-Chinese 
riots is conducted to study the consequences of mediation. Articles about the issue 
were collected in late August 1998. The sources are two electronic bulletin boards 
in the Shanghai BBS. For the sake of comparison, I also analyze related reports in 
People 's Daily, the mouthpiece of CCP's Central Propaganda Department, and 
Lianhe Zaobao {United Morning Post) in Singapore. Discussions among Internet 
10 
users inside and outside China in the online Forum held by Zaobao Online, the 
electronic version of Lianhe Zaobao, are also coded. The coding scheme includes 
four dimensions. One is the basic information concerning the author of the article, 
such as his or her nationality, and the physical attributes of the article such as its 
length. The second dimension is the narrative issues, including looting, killing, 
rapes and organized crime in the reports about the Indonesian riots. The third 
dimension pertains to the expressions of personal attitudes and opinions. Four 
frames of attribution are identified, i.e. the essentialized nationalistic frame, the 
statist nationalistic frame, the retrospective frame, 'and the democratic frame. 
ff 
Finally, I also coded the mobilization messages that urge other Internet users to 
take political actions in cyberspace or in the real world. I will further explicate the 
coding procedure at the beginning of Chapter 5. 
% 
The Conceptual Framework 
Ever since George Owell's book, 1984, there have been numerous endeavors to 
address the relations between tyranny and technology, quite a few of which are 
devoted to imaginary delineation and conjectural explanations of how the new 
media may empower dictatorship. Though intrigueing and inspiring on some 
occasions, such an approach is not emphasized in this thesis. Rgither, my � 
discussion is empirically based. And the emphasis is on the outcomes of new 
communication technology in an authoritarian country. 
While mentioning outcomes, a crucial distinction has to be made between the 
� 
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technological outputs and the political impacts of communication technology^ 
Indeed the popular wisdom about the magical liberalizing power of the Internet 
rests upon the confusion between the two types of outcomes. By technological 
outputs I mean the direct and immediate results accompanying the introduction of 
communication technology, namely the existence of a set of technical devices, the 
provision of a series of information services, and the emergence of a group of users. 
These outcomes are physical since they do not include the scope and manner, in 
which the technology is utilizated. They can be even conceptualized as universal 
• ii 
outcomes of the new medium because devices, services and users are all 
ff 
indispensible conditions for the Internet to be claimed as existing in a certain 
society in a meaningful sense. Notably, there may be no political impacts at all 
even after the new medium are established technically, provided all the users 
% 
belong to the ruling elite and what they are exposed to or allowed to react 
politically are all in line with authoriatrian ideology in traditional mass media. 
However, under certain conditions, it is possible to transform the technological 
outputs of the Internet into democratizing political impacts. Analytically I specify 
the conditions and their respective democratizing effects as follows: (1) if some of 
the audience do not belong to the existing ruling elite, I say there is Diffusion 
• ‘ . 
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Effect since the audience includes people from a broader stratum of the society. (2) 
If the Internet imparts to the audience political messages either unavailable in the 
mass media or offering perspectives differing from the official angle, I say there is 
Exposure Effect. (3) There is Expression Effect in case diverse voices exist in 
2 The distinction between the technological outputs and the political impacts of technology is inspired by 
12 
online forums of the authoritarian country concerning the feelings, opinions, and 
attitudes of the users, which may not become public via traditional channels of 
political communication. (4) There is Mobilization Effect if the Internet can serve 
as a convenient and effective means to muster collective political action without 
the approval of the traditional power elite. It is in correspondence with these 
conditions that Internet users, a technological output of the new medium, may 
become political agents as OPC audiences, OPC communicators, and OPC actors 




Unlike technological outputs in a purely physical sense, the political impacts of 
the new medium are demographical, cognitive, attitudinal or behavioral. Being 
indirect outcomes of the technology, they are contingent upon the sociopolitical 
conditions of specific contexts. They have to be understood in relative terms since 
whether the impacts are democratizing or not relies on the difference between OPC 
content and the sociopolitical order in the authoritarian country. 
The terminological distinction between outputs and impacts and the proposal of 
the four types of democratizing effects offer a conceptual trajectory for the « « 
analysis of the political outcomes of communication technology. First, there has to 
be an Internet physically as a necessary but insufficient condition for the political 
impacts to emerge. Only then may the services provided by global computer 
networks increase users' exposure to political information, including content 
Dutton's differentiation between the outputs and impacts of public policy (1982:280). 
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formerly available only within a small circle of power elite. Subsequently, the 
expression of diverse political opinions, including those oppositional to the 
dominant ideology, may be made. And finally, political mobilization against the 
non-democratic political order may become more convenient and effective. Along 
this line of thinking, if the Internet is a powerful liberalizing force, then ordinary 
people, previously powerless in authoritarian communication systems, will be in a 
better position to watch, listen and read, to speak, write and argue. And finally, as 
a result of open exposure and free expression, they will take collective actions in 
altering the political conditions of the society. .' 
ff 
So far I have demonstrated the political outcomes of new communication 
technology as a sequence of effects with an ascending degree of participation from 
� 
exposure to expression to mobilization. However, happenings in the real world may 
not follow such a linear progressive order invariantly. Except the technological 
outputs of the Net, which are priori conditions for other outcomes, the four 
conditions for political impacts may not succeed one another consecutively. And 
effects at higher level of political involvement, such as mobilization, may lead to 
effects at lower level of participation, too. It is therefore necessary to stress that the 
sequential arrangement is merely an analytical framework to facilitate discussion. -- . » 
_ ‘ % 
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Notably, while exposure, expression, and mobilization are components of a 
complete process of political communication, diffusion is not. The decentralization 
of media usage in demographical terms should be deemed on the one hand as an 
extension from the physical outputs of the new medium rather than an integral part 
14 
of the ways in which the technology is utilized. Meanwhile, since all users are 
Intemet audiences as soon as they start to click and browse, the Diffusion Effect 
can be also conceptualized as a preparation stage of the three effects that lead to 
direct and substantial challenges to the existing authoritarian communication 
order. 
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Figure 1.1 The conceptual trajectory for the analysis of 
the political outcomes of the Intemet 
The trajectory from the introduction of the Intemet to the democratizing effects is 
the process of mediation as demonstrated in Figure 1.1. The existence of the 
technological outputs including the facilities, services and users provides a 
necessary but insufficient condition for media democratization, which depends 
more directly on changes triggered by IT in the Chinese society, the party-state 
institution and the patterns of political communication. It is important to stress 
that the political impacts of using new technology in an authoritarian country may 
include changes that serve the status quo of authoritarianism. And 
democratization occurs only when the political communication system becomes 
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more inclusive demographically and/or more competitive in terms of media 
exposure, opinion expression or political mobilization. 
The intricate contextual interactions, according to which the fmal political 
outcomes of the new technology are molded, constitute the most significant part 
of the mediation process, in which the complexity of causality ascends 
dramatically with the interventions of various factors and the interaction among 
them. In order not to get lost in the perplexity of multiple inter-relations, I assign 
it 
the following tasks to each of the chapters in this thesis for the aforementioned 
� 
conceptual framework to be substantiated both theoretically and empirically in an 
organized manner. 
� 
> Chapter 1 introduces the objectives of the thesis, its assumptions, the case, the 
research methods, and the general analytical framework. 
> Chapter 2 locates the argument of the thesis in the debate about democracy 
and communication technology. Existing literature is discussed to shed light 
on the concept of mediation and the mediationist perspective that set the 
conceptual tone of the whole thesis. 
- f . 
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> Chapter 3 surveys the background of OPC and CMC in China by 
documenting its historical, demographical and managerial aspects. Both 
liberalizing and constraining factors are identified. 
16 
> Chapter 4 examines the dynamic processes of mediation manifested in the 
responses of Chinese Internet users to the persecution of ethnic Indonesian 
Chinese during the May Riots of 1998 in Indonesia. On the basis of 
qualitative data, the mediation hypothesis is examined in terms of media 
exposure, opinion expression and mass mobilization. 
> Chapter 5 presents the findings from the frame analysis of OPC about the 
May Riots. Messages from three online political arenas are analyzed to 
evaluate the democratizing impacts of the Internet and the consequences of 
/r 
mediation. 
> Chapter 6 discusses the implications and limitations of the case study 
* 
theoretically and methodlically. I also make suggestions for further inquiry 
into the subject matter. 




Chapter 2 Theoretical Background and the Concept of 
Mediation 
While preparing for a class on Internet in MIT, Ludlow (1996:17) found that 
"most ofthe academic writing on cyberspace is just awful. It either reeks ofhalf-
leamed post-modem cant, or is a dense thicket ofbad sociology". To a significant 
extent, he made a pertinent critique. Although the Internet has been around for 
nearly a decade, solid academic consideration about the political influence of this 
1» 
new medium has just begun. Instead, the bulk of related discussions are carried 
ff 
out in the mass media, such as Time, Wired, the Economist, and the New York 
Times. And most frequently, they take for granted a positive connection between 
CMC and democracy, which has been a recent trend even among social theorists 
* 
(Schroeder, 1997). 
Communication Technology as A Democratizer 
Indeed the popular myth stressing the democratic aspect of technology is an aged 
assertion. Throughout the entire twentieth century, such an optimistic view, or 
"technological utopianism" (Segal, 1985), has been associated with airwaves, 
television screens, videos, cables, satellites, and is now related to the World Wide ^ • 
’ Web. This utopian viewpoint is taken by numerous scholars in various forms. 
To be sure, even in countries such as the United States, democracy is not perfect. 
How to enhance democracy is thus an enduring focus of public attention. And 
communication technology is frequently nominated as a plausible solution. "The 
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messiah is technology" - Laudon (1977) exclaims after reviewing the American 
dreams of democracy in connection with the telephone, radio, television, 
computer and other inventions of modem communications. This view is shared by 
many as the technologies allow us "to respond quickly to every ripple of public 
opinion" (Grossman, 1995:4), and more importantly, to "undo the damage done to 
politics by the old media" and hail "a rebirth of democratic life" (Tsagarousianou, 
1-998:5). 
I* 
Tsagarousianou's characterization reflects a long-standing popular belief. More 
r 
than a simple democratizer, technology is a remedy for the political diseases, to 
which its earlier forms have made certain contributions. The relationship between 
communication technology and democracy is therefore not linear but curvaceous, 
% 
and our age lies fortunately on an ascending slope or on the turning point towards 
a bright future. Marshall McLuhan is probably the earliest and the most prominent 
advocator of this view. In his The Gutenburg Galaxy (1962)，he describes how the 
printing machine alienated human beings and how the electronic media might 
bring back our dream of a plural and equal way of social life, bearing a mark of 
his previous identification of"new media as political forms" (1954). His vision is 
shared later by Toffler (1980)，Naisbitt (1982)，Becker and Scarce (1983), Barber 
� - '* 
(1984), and Hollander (1985), all of whom hold less interest in pre-electronic 
media as McLuhan does and come up with more "updated" arguments 
discrediting the conventional broadcasting industry as a whole. With a sense of 
sarcasm, Quirk (1992:113-141) refers to this optimistic school of thoughts a 
"ftiturist ethos" in his treatise "The Mythos ofthe Electronic Revolution". 
� 
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Paradoxically, the futurists have retreated into history as the debate about 
technology and democracy proceeds into the 1990s. Calling someone a futurist in 
academic dialogues is not necessarily a compliment today. Yet this does not mean 
that technological utopianism has disappeared. Instead, it takes on new forms at 
an amazingly accelerating speed. Teledemocracy, cyberdemocracy, electronic 
democracy, citizen technology, civic networking projects, civil society networks, 
new sanguine terms are mushrooming, especially in tandem with the emergence 
1« 
of the Internet. This penchant for neologisms indicates the prevailing acceptance 
ff 
of CMC as a natural warrant of "Jeffersonian information policy" (Kapor, 1993). 
But more likely, it results from the practical needs of the politicians and the 
businessmen. While A1 Gore is remembered as the initiator of the "information 
� 
superhighway" and Ross Perot the advocator of the "electronic town hall", a great 
multitude of people in the computer and telecommunications industries have been 
proposing new applications or new rules for the democratic uses of technology. 
They contend that applying the new media to politics is not only feasible but also 
desirable because the technologies they promote bring decentralization, pluralism, 
equality, efficiency, or in short, the exact fulfillment of perfect democracy.‘ 
- • ‘ 
Again, these mistiques are not new. Decentralization and the propensity of the ‘ 
new media towards political equity were discussed even before the time of the 
futurists. In his book published in 1970，Between Two Ages, Brzezinski has 
already enunciated the compatibility of technology in the trend of "greater 
devolution of authority" (pp. 258-265). The decline of central power is further 
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elaborated by Meyrowitz, who points out two ways for the electronic media to 
affect social hierarchy. First, "[t]hey change the skills needed by authorities and 
high status individuals (and thereby they often change those who can fill such 
roles)，,. And meanwhile, "they change the overall balance of power between 
leaders and followers" in favor of political equality (1985:161). 
Yet one thing deserves attention among the advocates of decentralization. Few of 
them regard the movement towards equality as a total abolishment of all political 
I* 
centers and the restoration of egalitarian society. Instead, what they emphasize is 
ff 
the metabolism of the "centers" or the survival of the fittest in the information era. 
It is in this sense that decentralization is not acentralization. And the sustenance 
of some traditional centers, such as the United States, plus the emergence of some 
X 
new powers, such as Microsoft, have led people to criticize the myth of 
decentralization, which I will discuss in more detail in the next section. 
Another expectation accompanying new communication technologies for long is 
the potentialities for the new media to foster a better form of politics that reflects 
the opinions of every citizen in an accurate and efficient manner, or as it is called, 
"direct democracy". This anticipation is shared in works of the futurists such as 
». • * 
Toffler (1980), Naisbitt (1982) and Hollander (1985), who i g u e that technology • 
will drastically reduce the distance between political leaders and ordinary people. 
As a result, the system of representative democracy becomes obsolescent. So is 
the monopoly of the "experts" in lobbying the decision-makers. Direct democracy 
seems to be closer than ever in the 1990s. Equipped with the world's most 
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advanced national information infrastructure, the Americans are claimed as "on 
the verge of giving (our) politicians a devastatingly accurate radar system that will 
tell them unambiguously just which way the crowd is milling."' The Internet, 
together with other telecommunication inventions, have thus rendered America 
into "a democratic system that is vastly increasing the people's day-to-day 
influence on the decisions of state" (Grossman, 1995:3). 
The alleged effect of the media in pluralizing political life was salient more than 
1« 
two decades ago when Boorstin (1978) argued that technology has an increasing 
r 
impact of diversification on society. Pool takes a similar stance regarding new 
technologies as stimulants of diversity in his book, Technologies of Freedom 
(1983). And with special reference to the Internet, Rash (1997) accepted the 
� 
legacy when he describes how the Internet may open the political landscape to 
new parties, new ideas and new interests due to its infinite channel capacity and 
« 
low production cost. 
"The Computer as a Democratizer" is the title of a chapter in Hauben (1996)'s 
"netbook" published online, indicating the author's belief concerning the political 
impacts of the Internet. After introducing how the Usenet helps the "Netizens" 
realize democratic ideals, he argues that the political mission of computer 
networks also involve "those dedicated to the hard fight against tyranny". The 
logic of inference from the scope of westem democratic countries to the rest of the 
world is not a big leap. Now that technology can enhance democracy in the 
3 Koppel, T. "The country may be moving". The New York Times. 1 July 1994. 
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United States, why it cannot do the same thing in other nations? This echoes a 
theme advanced by an Intermedia special report in 1997. "What is significant in 
the changes that are brought about by new communication technologies is", the 
editor writes, "that the traditional centers of control are withering way". And the 
"medium, the message and the audience" are "interacting and merging to become 
parts of civil society，’*. Imbued with a similar assumption about the irreversible 
force of the Internet, Taubman draws a specific conclusion concerning China's 
efforts to curb the Net. "Despite the intentions of regimes like the CCP, their sway 
1» 
over the ideational and organizational character of domestic affairs will be 
� 
diminished as a result of the Internet" (1998:268). 
Democratizer or Something Else? 
% 
Plausible and popular as it is, the conceptualization of communication technology 
as a forceful instrument of democratization is not without its opponents. In 
existing literature, critiques are mostly generated in three aspects, i.e. domination, 
anarchy, and the partial modifications of the powerful impact hypothesis. 
An opposing view against technological utopianism is that the advances of the 
media -lead not to democracy but to the opposite of democracy: domination. The 
� • « 
founder of this school of thinking is Harold Innis, who contends that "[t]he 
conditions of freedom of thought are in danger of being destroyed by science, 
technology, and the mechanization of knowledge" (1964:190). And this trend is 
accelerating because of the increasing global dominance of Westem civilization, 
4 Intermedia (Special report). "Introduction". December 1997，25(6), pp. 4-5. 
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which embodies commercialism, imperialism and expansionism. Frankfurt School 
scholars Horkheimer and Adomo direct their critiques of technology and the 
alienated modem culture in a similar orientation. While talking about how the 
assembly line and the production of needs are connected, they assert that the 
"technological rationale [that] is the rationale of domination itself (1973:121). 
This is true with the media, because the "culture industry" has become an integral 
part of the mass industrial system of modem society. 
it 
Along this line of thinking, Luke pointed out that "the means of communicating 
/r 
information become critical tools for producing power and privilege for those who 
own, control, or manage them, who are at the same time using these cultural 
circuits to extend their domination over others" (1989:12). An echoing voice is 
% 
Herbert Schiller's worry about the ever-increasing gap between the information 
haves and the have-nots. He criticizes that the recent brainchildren of 
communication technology have seriously precipitated social, cultural crises in the 
United States. And it is in this sense that he doubts the information superhighway 
may be the "latest blind alley" (1996). 
A more crystallized reprimand can be found in Neil Postman's book, Technopoly. 
i -
In this book, the author traces how technology merged with traditional culture in 
the symbiosis of "technocracy" until the twentieth century. But unfortunately, 
technocracy has developed in the recent decades into the overwhelming 
"totalitarian" force of technopoly that is "redefining what we mean by religion, by 
art, by family, by politics, by history, by truth, by privacy, by intelligence" and 
2 4 
what we will need in the future (1992:48). 
Except the possible result of domination, communication technology is also 
criticized as conducive to disorder and chaos. Unbridled modes of CMC such as 
flaming, pirating and information overload have been blamed for a long time. In 
his book Data Smog, Shenk asserts that "The electronic town hall allows for 
speedy communication and bad decision-making" (1997:137) because the ‘ 
flooding information in cyberspace is not a facilitator but a burden for users to 
I* 
make informed decision. The excessively large amount of data and the human 
r 
incompetence to make sense of them may be explained partly by the immaturity 
of technology and partly by the users' lack of experience in dealing with the new 
media. Yet there is another reason. Unlike the press and the broadcasting 
� 
technologies, the rise of Internet is accompanied by an unprecedented flourishing 
of anarchist ideologies in the name of the absolute order of information freedom. 
Using the keywords, "freedom" and "manifesto", I searched the Internet using 
Yahoo on March 15, 1999. 5751 homepages containing both keywords were 
identified. Most of them are devoted to subverting accepted social, economic, 
political, religious, aesthetic, and sexual orders. Some of these manifestoes are 
also available in printed form, for example those by Barlow (1996) and Garflncel 
_ ^ ‘ 
et al (1996), who announce that the commercial rules concerning intellectual 
property right should be subjected to total destruction. 
In a Wired article, Kinney writes that "although originally founded by 
government ... the Internet's decentralized co-operative structure has been, 
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ironically, the closest thing to a functioning large-scale anarchist society that 
human culture has ever seen" (1995:94). This argument enjoys high popularity not 
only because the surging anarchist ideologies have caught public attention. 
Moreover, it should be understood against the background that the cyberspace is 
usually conceptualized as a "virtual" world out of state power, which is only 
meaningful in "real" environments. While discussing consumer protection law in 
the Global Information Infrastructure, Gl6dring comments that "[c]yberspace has 
no physical location, and by design, is dispersed and exceedingly difficult to 
it 
control. This presents some ^ significant potential dangers for democracy." 
(1997:333). 
Another argument in disagreement with the optimistic view towards new media � 
holds that the democratizing effect of technology is not a predetermined or 
inherent attribute of the technology. Being contingent upon the user, the 
communication activity and the specific context, the actual outcomes of 
technology are usually a complex of various effects, which may not be in favor of 
democracy. It is in this sense that Vig (1988:25) argues that although technology 
"enhanced some forms of political participation" such as "organized activist 
groups promoting particular interests or causes", it also reduces "the effectiveness 
1 -
of mass participation through traditional channels such as political parties", bi 
doing so, new communication technology not only "undermines representative 
processes" and brings direct democracy closer than ever, but also "contributes to 
political fragmentation and alienation" {ihid.). 
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Ifjuxtaposed with each other, the views of "technological utopianism" and those 
emphasizing domination and anarchy as inevitable consequences of technology 
constitute a binary opposition. Between the two ends of the spectrum, there lies 
the third approach stressing the limited political impacts of new media under the 
constraints of users, activities, and contexts. From this viewpoint, democracy is 
neither exclusively blessed nor doomed with the introduction of the new 
technologies such as the Internet. Rather, the outcomes have to be studied 
analytically with regard to different aspects of politics, different groups of the 
users, different types of communication activities, and different contexts. This is 
the position adopted in this thesis. 
After reviewing literature on a similar topic in 1987, Arterton (1987:24) concludes � 
"[n]either side of the debate over teledemocracy, however, has much systematic 
evidence to support its assumptions about the potential of telecommunications 
media for strengthening political participation". The reason is that the relationship 
between politics and technology is not an either/or question. It should be 
approached with more analytical flexibility and sensitivity to variations during the 
actual processes in the applications of the new media. An appropriate way to pose 
the question should therefore be at first a how question, to which there may be 
. » 
— *-
multiple replies worldwide. And in an empirical context like the case of China, it 
is possible to proceed to investigate the question why. 
The Concept of Mediation 
As for the political impacts of the Internet, the first thing I have to acknowledge is 
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its technological propensity towards liberalization especially in comparison with 
the mass media. The networks are globally accessible. The services are interactive. 
The production cost is low. The channel capacity is infinite. And the virtual mode 
of communication makes it easier for ordinary users to obviate traditional 
sociopolitical control and real-life punishments against "subversive" or "harmful" 
speeches and publications. These attributes of the technological outputs of the 
Internet are undeniable. • 
u 
Yet when political impacts are concerned, there exist at least three probabilities 
that may not be determined by the democratizing attributes of the new technology 
alone. First, the existing power elite may respond to the challenges posed by the 
Internet with new measures, which may soften authoritarian rule to certain degree. � 
Second, the technology may harbor some characteristics that are not unanimously 
liberalizing and there may be disagreements or even contradictions among its 
potential functions as instruments of political communication. Third, the 
discrepancies and tensions among the latent roles of the new medium may very 
likely grow in the actual processes of utilization. Subsequently, using the Net in an 
authoritarian context may give rise to a complexity of consequences including 
both the pro-democracy acculturation of users to the global "virtual" environment » ^ 
»_ » 
of information lasses faire and the anti-democracy adaptation of the Memet to the 
local "real" world governed by the authoritarian countries. The concept of 
mediation is therefore proposed to account for the possibilities and capture the 
dynamic, interactive and dialectical relations between the Internet and its practical 
uses, out of which the political outcomes of the new technology take shape. 
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Mediation refers to the actual utilization of new communication technologies in a 
given society that gives rise to new means of audience exposure, opinion 
expression and political mobilization, which operate in neither complete defiance 
of nor total compliance with the existing order of political communication. 
Although this thesis focuses on Internet in China, this does not mean that 
mediation only takes place when computer networks are established in 
authoritarian countries. As the summation of intermediary processes from 
technological outputs to political impacts, mediation occurs as for other media and 
in countries with other types of political system. Certainly this case study may not 
be able to present the panorama of mediation processes in other media and other 
countries. Yet the basic assumptions of the mediation concept are reflected: the � 
political impacts of IT are not destined but contextual, not unidirectional but two-
way, not revolutionary but moderate. And the overall outcome is partially 
democratizing and partially pro status quo, leading to limited liberalization. 
Mediation came into English from the Latin word, mediare, with multiple 
meanings, among which two senses are accepted today: one is "a means of 
transmission", the other is "interceding between adversaries" (Williams, _ » 
• - � » 
1985:204). One way to make use of these denotations in this case study is to 
conceptualize the pro-democracy propensities of the Internet and the 
sociopolitical constraints imposed by authoritarian governments as opposing 
adversaries. And mediation is the continuous contact, interaction and 
reconciliation between them. Thus, mediation as a means of transmission points to 
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the transplantation of the decentralized mode of online communication into 
nondemocratic countries as well as the extension of the authoritarian forces into 
the cyberspace simultaneously. It is two-way incorporation between 
democratizing technology and nondemocratic political economy in the making of 
a new political arena in the cyberspace. 
More specifically, the concept of mediation has three meanings. First, the 
technological attributes of the Internet with their democratizing propensities are 
Juxtaposed with countervailing factors such as the responses of the ruling elite in 
the context where the new medium meets the old political order. Second, the 
incentive factors and constraining factors interact with each other during the 
processes in which the political impacts of the Internet take place. Third, the � 
consequences of promoting OPC in non-democratic countries may not be a single 
set of clear-cut effects in favor or disfavor of democracy. Rather, since there may 
exist outcomes that do not support communicative liberalization in the actual 
applications of the technology, the political impacts of the Internet may very 
likely turn out to be mixed, circumscribed and even contradictory with each other. 
For these reasons, mediation is not the conceptualization of a single phenomenon 
or a single process but an abstraction of multiple phenomena and processes in the 
• » » 
empirical context of OPC. It is inclusive. It reflects a "key characteristic" of 
information technologies (IT) and their impacts, which is "ambiguity" (Frissen, 
1997). It contains internal tensions and a certain degree of uncertainty that suits 
case studies, which usually encompass a multiplicity of variables over which the 
researcher have little control. 
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On a more abstract level, the process of mediation between the democratizing 
technology and the authoritarian polity resides in the aspect of globalization 
concerning political communication. CMC is transnational. Democratization 
through OPC, however limited, refers to the cyberspatial penetration of political 
information across geographical boundaries to reach the formerly isolated 
audiences in the authoritarian nation-states. And if possible, the standardized 
provision of political information may foster standardized patterns of public 
deliberation and collective political action according to the Westem model of 
liberal democracy, as in other globalization processes centered to the West, the 
English-speaking countries, and ultimately, the United States (Hall, 1991). 
Meanwhile, nation-state is losing its control over information transmission to � 
regional and global entities of culture and communication (Howell, 1992; Won, 
1993), which indicates "the end of national communication systems" (Carey, 
1998)，or more specifically, the merge of national political arenas into a huge 
domain ofpolitical communication. In this grand process of political globalization 
accompanying the advances and spread of IT, the Intemet is just the latest catalyst 
following Radio Free Europe and CNN. There has been so many technological 
objects launched over head and buried underground, linking offices and 
一 - » 
households worldwide into a mass-mediated sphere for the circulation of political 
messages. The peculiarity of the Intemet is to extend the globalization of political 
communication networks not only tangibly but also intangibly into the virtual 
world of the cyberspace. 
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However, globalization is full of "disjunctures" in several dimensions including 
the diffusion of technology due to "the indigenization of global forces" in the 
"technoscape" and "mediascape" (Appadurai, 1990). Without adjusting to local 
needs, imported media content may not attract audience attention, as reflected by 
audience selection of TV programs according to their preferences in Taiwan (Lee, 
1980). Even after exposure, the process of interpretation is under the continuous 
influence of local factors such as traditional culture (Katz and Liebes, 1985). The 
Intemet is especially liable to be localized due to the convergence of the producer, 
the audience, and the distributor in the technology. Moreover, since mid-1990s 
many third world countries have shifted their role of communication policy “from 
that of a protective guardian" to "one of a supportive sponsor for cultural 
production" (Wang, 1997) by various means including using the Net to maintain � 
and promote local "collective consciousness" (Loo and Beng, 1998). This recent 
background suggests that nondemocratic institutions are also capable of exerting 
their influence upon the application of the Intemet in the geographical regions 
they currently dominate. 
The twofold nature of globalization, as encapsulated in Braman's notion of 
"interpenetrated globalization" (1996)，points to the essence of the mediation � ;, • 
concept that highlights local authoritarian forces as not only resistant but also 
constitutive to the globalizing processes of technological difiusion and 
democratization. The local space of political communication is not vanishing as 
the global space stretches by means of the Intemet. The cyberspatial political 
sphere emerging in authoritarian countries is not a terrain to be conquered by the 
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mass-mediated spaces, global or local. Instead, it is a new domain for them to 
interact. And mediation is the conceptualization of the interactions at the interface 
between the existing spaces. 
The Mediationist Perspective 
An alternative perspective is discernible when the concept of mediation is 
contrasted to the opposing views towards the political impacts of new 
1« 
communication technology in nondemocratic countries (see table 2.1). Unlike 
r 
both sides of the debates, the mediationist perspective does not conceive the 
political nature of IT as pre-destined. It holds that the political functions of new 
media are contingent upon the contexts of social utilization, in which the 
% 
relationship between technology and politics is interactive. Changes towards 
liberalization accompanying the introduction of new technologies are deemed as 
not radical and inexorable but moderate and reversible. They affect merely parts 
of the authoritarian communication system and some of the political processes 
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Comparative The utopian The pessimistic The mediationist 
dimensions perspective perspective perspective 
> The Pro-democracy: Anti-democracy: Not pre-
political equality, monopoly, anarchy, determined; 
nature ofIT efficiency, fragmentation, etc. contingent upon 
diversity, etc. actual social 
utilization 
> The causal Unidirectional: technology changes Two-way: 
relationship politics and the modes of political technology 
communication; existing political interacts with 
institutions are passive and fragile. politics; existing • 
institutions are 
..viable to respond. 
> The Inexorable and radical Reversible and 
intensity of . moderate 
influence 
> The scope The entire system and every process of Only parts ofthe 
ofinfluence political communication in a given system and some 
society are affected. processes are 
affected. 
> The The conquest of one (democracy or The duet of � 
political nondemocracy) over the other opposing effects; 
outcomes . limited 
democratization 
Table 2.1 The mediationist perspective and the debates on 
democratization through IT 
The mediationist perspective resembles to certain extent the critiques on 
technological determinism from the angle of human agency, which argues that 
"[i]t is the individual and not the invention that determines the use to which it is 
put (Allen, 1957:18)."The greatest similarity the mediationist and the humanist 
approaches share is that both are less rigid in conceiving the nature of IT and 
more flexible in considering factors other than technology itself. However, there 
are some distinctions. On the one hand, some advocates of human agency totally 
negate the political capacity of the new media and declare that technology is 
nothing but "neutral instrument". This differs from the mediationist perspective, 
� 
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which acknowledge that new communication technologies, especially the Internet, 
have distinct technical attributes that may facilitate democratization. Attributes 
such as interactivity and accessibility, though insufficient to bring about 
democracy by themselves, should at least be understood as comparatively more 
liberalizing than the mass media. 
On the other hand, the mediationist perspective emphasizes not only the volition 
of individual users but, more importantly, the viability of existing institutions of 
political communication in authoritarian countries to respond to the pressure of 
democratization posed by the new technology. Human agency at the individual 
level is an important factor. But in order to bring about political alterations, they 
have to operate and therefore be conceptualized within the structural constraints � 
that are either pre-existing in the social, economic and cultural context of the 
given society or imposed by the authoritarian political institution. 
Thus, the alternative perspective provided by the mediation concept is founded 
not on the denial of the existing perspectives but on linking their values and 
subsuming them in the observation and analyses of actual processes in which the 
technology is utilized. Although the pro-democracy attributes of the technology 
should be emphasized, their presence does not dismiss the significance of the 
constraining factors. Although the phenomena caused by the introduction of the 
new medium should be examined, the pre-existing context for the utilization of 
the new medium needs to be acknowledged, too. Thus by considering multiple 
factors and processes, the mediationist perspective, as a holistic approach towards 
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the subject matter, is a conceptual bridge in the debates about technology and 
democracy. 
The mediationist perspective serves to facilitate analysis. Although a 
comprehensive evaluation of the political outcomes is indispensable, the bulk of 
this thesis relates to the factors, processes and consequences of mediation. The 
perspective embodies empirical complexities since only after the multi-faceted • 
field of China's cyberspace is surveyed extensively can I ;^educe the factors and 
processes of mediation into a couple of hypotheses to be evaluated in the later 
chapters of this thesis. Moreover, the comparative approach is emphasized 
because the concept of mediation points to the medium status in terms of the 
political impacts of the Internet upon a given society. The "limited effect" is only � 
meaningful when "strong effect" and “null effect" is brought into consideration. 
In this thesis, political communication outside China's cyberspace and party 
propaganda directly controlled by the Chinese authorities are employed as 
comparative references for the assessment of the democratizing effects in online 
public arenas among ordinary Chinese Internet users. The OPC processes and 
consequences in terms of exposure, expression and mobilization will be gauged 
«. • » 
respectively. To facilitate comparison, I use online content in different websites 
concerning the same political issue. And the selected OPC arenas are coded to 
evaluate how they differ or concur with each other as for their content similarity, 
message quantity and content diversity. 
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Chapter 3 China's Cyberspace 
In contrast to voluminous discussions about the Internet and politics in westem 
countries is the conspicuous inadequacy of similar concerns in less democratic 
countries. As for China, so far there have been merely four pieces of academic 
work about the impacts of the new medium upon its political communication 
system. One of them is written by an oversea Chinese student (Li, 1990), 
examining how mainland Chinese students in the United States used CMC to 
i) 
facilitate their pro-democracy activities in 1989. Although the essay was 
� 
informative and the activities of the Chinese students were indeed aiming at 
affecting politics in China, it does not show the application of the technology may 
have any concrete impacts upon the system of political communication in the 
% 
country. Instead, whether the students' usage of computers led to the weakening 
of China's authoritarian rule remains questionable. 
A second study by a graduate student at Columbia University relies almost 
exclusively on existing documents (Taubman, 1998). It makes a plausible 
argument that CCP is facing a great dilemma of policymaking posed by the 
democratizing tendency of the Internet and its prospects as a powerful drive for 
economic-development. Yet'the author assumes the "built-in incompatibility � 
between nondemocratic rule and the Internet" (p.256) and fails to document the 
actual processes of democratization among mainland Chinese Internet users. 
The third research is conducted by two assistant professors of political science in 
the United States (Hill and Hughes, 1998). Basing on a content analysis of 2355 
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Usenet messages, they test the democratization hypothesis of the Internet in 41 
countries including China. 41 Usenet discussion groups are selected to stand for 
each country respectively. Using the percentage of anti-government messages as 
the dependent variable, the authors construct a model including several predictor 
variables such as the nation's population, GDP, total number of Internet domains 
(representing the country's level of Internet development) and the nation's 
democratization index (including measures of partisan competition, electoral 
participation and the ratings of nations for political freedom). After running a 
1» 
multivariate test, they reach ^ the conclusion that “ [t]here must be a true 
relationship between democratization in a nation and the likelihood that someone 
will post an anti-government message directed at that nation's government" 
Q}.106)\ Remarkably, China lies exactly on the regression line of their analysis, � 
which means China can be perfectly predicted in their model Q). 105). 
Since I was skeptical of the operationalization of the research, I ran a small test in 
socio.culture.cn, the Usenet chosen by the authors to stand for online political 
communication (OPC) in China. A total number of3633 messages were identified. 
Sorted by date, they extend from January 19 to March 4, 1999. 202 of them are 
selected using systematic sampling (sampling interval=18). Following, the 
procedures specified in the book (p. 102)，I coded the origins of the Usenet 
messages basing on the email addresses of the sources. N o message was from 
Mainland China, whereas most of them were posted by people in North America 
‘Interestingly, when they analyze OPC concerning domestic politics in America, Hill and Hughes are much 
more conservative in concluding "people are merely moving their age-old interaction into a new realm" 
(1997:25). 
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(87.1 o/o)6. And none of them is written in Chinese. This means what the authors 
analyzes is not how the new medium leads to democratization in China but how it 
may allow people outside the country to criticize the Chinese government in a 
place where few people in China can access. The relationship between 
democratization and posting anti-govemment messages in Usenet is therefore far 
from established as China is concerned because the effects of the new medium are 
largely on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. 
u 
Internet systems in China do, not support Usenet since "the communication 
volum[e] is too large" and the network administers "can't afford [for] about 500MB 
volum[e] each day”，. As a result, few people in China have access to the Usenet. 
This indicates a methodological deficiency shared by the previous researches � 
about OPC in China, namely inadequate understanding of actual situations in 
China's cyberspace. This shortage is best overcome in the fourth study (Huang, 
1997), which was a paper presented in the 1997 convention of the Association of 
Education for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication. 
The research conducted by Edgar Huang combines field observation and 
interpretive content anaylsis of messages in bulletin board systems. The fieldwork - -
was carried out in 1996 in four Chinese commercial BBS stations. An America-
6 Breaking down the sources by nation yield following results: the US (166)，Canada (10)，UK (8), Australia 
(4), Singapore (3), Taiwan(2), France (2), Malaysia (2), Germany (1), Denmark (1), Hungary (1), Japan (1), 
Indonesia(l). 
7 The quotations are from the "Internet" board ofbbs.mit.edu�where I posted the question "why China does 
not have Usenet?" to solicit answers, bbs.mit.edu is an electronic bulletin board system operated by oversea 
Chinese students at the Michigan Institute of Technology in November 1998. It accommodates Chinese 
Intemet users both inside China and worldwide. 
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based ISP was included for comparative purposes. It is found that, pressed by 
various "discussion rules" and the "webmaster's consorship" in domestic arenas, 
Chinese Intemet users seldom engage in "hard topic discussions" about 
democracy and other political topics. However, when they attend the oversea BBS, 
they tend to talk more about democratic development in China. 
Huang's approach is bottom-up. He first examines the BBS messages, 
representing communication patterns among ordinary users, and then attributes 
“ 
the lack of OPC to political censorship. This analytical trajectory is appropriate 
for Huang's study, which attempts to identify online censorship as a potential 
obstacle for the Intemet to democratize China. But it is not sufficient for this 
chapter aiming at a systematic overview of mediating factors in China's � 
cyberspace. Therefore, top-down institutional approach is also employed to 
survey the utilization of the new medium within the socio-political context of 
Mainland China. In doing so, I attempt to investigate the background and current 
state of CMC and OPC in China including not only BBS but also http, ftp, email 
and other channels of Intemet communication, not only ordinary users but also 
technicians, regulators, online services and network facilities in a nationwide 
infrastructure. -
- ' ‘ 
_ - U * 
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China's Nets and Netizens 
"Surmounting the Great Wall, walking towards the world" 
China's first contact with the Intemet started on 20 September 1987 when Qian 
Tianbai, known as China's "first man of the Intemet", sent an email from Beijing 
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Applied Computer Technology Institute to Karlsuhe University in Germany 
through the China Academic Network (CANET). The first email ever sent from 
Mainland China was short: "Surmounting the Great Wall, walking towards the 
world" {yueguo changcheng, zouxiang shijie)\ 
Using international long distance telephone line as its channel, CANET was slow, 
expensive and unreliable. In March 1993, the Institute of High Energy Physics 
(IHEP) of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) established a dedicated data 
ti 
channel linking up to the Line^ Accelerator Center at Stanford University. The 
capacity was 64Kb, more than ten times faster and cheaper than that of the 
CANET'). Meanwhile, a project named "the National Computing and Networking 
Facility of China" fNCFC) was under way with funding from the World Bank and � 
several units of the State Council. It lasted from October 1989 to April 1994, 
when more than 30 research institutes and two universities in the Zhongguancun 
area ofBeijing were directly connected to Intemet terminals located in the United 
States. Unlike CANET and IHEPnet, the server of NCFC supported not only 
email exchange but also TCP/IP, which means all major Intemet functions such as 
http, ftp, telnet, gopher and WWW, were then available in China'". 
NCFC is the ancestor of today's China Science and Technology Network 
(CSTNET) operated by China's Academy of Science with an international 
* Qian, Tianbai. "The development of Intemet in China" (Intemet zai zhongguo de fazhan). Beijing: 
Computer World (jishuanji shijie). pp. 131. 
9 Qian, Hualin. "China Science and Technology Network". Published online in December 1997 at 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/jb/9711/cnnic-53.htnil. 
'"Qian, Tianbai. "The development of Intemet in China" (Intemet zai zhongguo de fazhan). Beijing: 
Computer World Qishuanji shijie). pp. 132. 
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interface of 4Mb bandwidth". Since April 1994, several universities in China have 
also obtained access to the Intemet. They are interconnected in the China 
Education and Research Network (CERNET) under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Education. Its interface bandwidth with the global network is 8Mb'^ Although 
starting early, CSTNET and CERNET are designed for academic research and 
education rather than public access in the society at large. 
In January 1995, China established its first direct commercial links to the Intemet 
1» 
with two dedicated lines, one,from Beijing and the other from' Shanghai, both 
connecting China with the United States". The lines were jointly operated by 
Sprint, an American company, and China Telecom, a subordinating unit of the 
former Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. The linkages belong to � 
CHE^IANET, which presently possesses 123Mb international bandwidth or 86 
percent of the nation's total international connection bandwidth'\ The other 
publicly accessible computer network, with 8M256Kb international bandwidth", 
is CHESfAGBN (China Golden Bridge Network) constructed by Jitong, 
representing the interests of the former Ministry of Electronic Industry. Although 
the Ministry of Post and Telecom and the Ministry of Electronic Industry were 
merged into the Ministry of Information Technology in 1998，CHINANET. and 
.� . 
r _ �_ ‘ 
CHESfAGBN are kept apart in order to maintain market competition, in a highly 
limited manner though. According to the No.l95 Ordinance of the State Council 
“CNNIC Report. January, 1999. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/99'cnnic/p 1 .htm. 
'2 Ibid. 
13 Wilson, H.W. "China Logs On to the Intemet". The Economist. 7 January 1995. p. 27. 
'^CNNIC Report. January, 1999. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/99'cnnic/pl.htm. 
''Ibid. 
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in 1996, CSTNET, CERNET, CHEMANET and CHWAGBN are the only 
nationwide "interconnecting units" {hulian danwei) with state permit to have 
direct linkage with the global computer network. 
Domestic Users and Their Activities 
The demographics of Chinese Internet users deserve our attention because the 
netizens are the actual agents participating in China's online communication 
processes. However, there had been no official organ responsible for statistical 
1» 
reports about the development 9 f Internet in China until 3 June, 1997, when China 
Network Information Center (CNNIC) was established under the State Council's 
Informationization Office {xinxihua bangongshi). Since then, CNNIC has 
conducted five nationwide surveys and released the results online. Table 3.1 � 
summarizes some basic content of the surveys concerning the total number of 
users, online computers, domain names in China, and the total bandwidth for 
connection with the global Intemet. 
Total number of Total number of Total number of Total bandwidth for 
users online computers domain names* international connection* 
Jan. 1996 40,000 6,000 - --
Oct. 1997 620,000 299,000 4066 25.41 Mb 
Dec. 1997 670,000 330,000 5100 -
Feb. 1998 820,000 400,000 6450 . .-
Jun. 1998 1,175,000 542,000 , 9415 " 84.64 Mb 
Dec. 1998 2,100,000 630,000 18396 143.25 Mb 
* Some data is missing in the reports. 
Table 3.1 the development of Intemet in China 
A notable feature in the short history of Intemet in China is its academic uses at 
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the early phase of development and later commercial impetus as a compelling 
drive of growth. At its commencement, the new medium is designated, built and 
operated to bring convenience to a small circle of scientists and then economic 
profits to the owners of the networks. Subsequently, the national infrastructure is 
quickly expanding and the size of users is growing at an amazing speed. As 
shown in Table 3.1，at the end of 1998 there are 2.1 million Internet users in 
mainland China, which accounts for 0.56% of the nation's urban population and 
0.17% of the nation's total population. The proportion is puny. But the growth rate 
i> 
is dramatic, with the total number of users more than tripled from December 1997 
to December 1998. 
The latest CNNIC Report'^ published in January 1999 summarizes the results of � 
the survey ended on31 December 1998. To describe whom the netizens are, I also 
make use of another online survey conducted by Sohu'% a website established by a 
Chinese network expert graduated from M.I.T., which happened to be the second 
most popular domestic website in China'*. Both surveys use volunteer sampling by 
linking the questionnaires to established commercial and academic websites. The 
sample sizes are 22177 and 2227 respectively. Figures from China Statistical 
Yearbook (1998) and The 1% Sampling Tabulation on the 1995 Population Census 
~ _ » 
’ ofPR China (1997) are also listed for the purpose of comparison. — 
16 Ibid. 
17 Accessible at http://168.160.224.208/survey. 
'* CNNIC Report. January, 1999. Accessible at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/99'cnnic/p 1 .htm. 
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Nationwide CNNIC Report Sohu Report 
Statistics (Januay 1999) (March 1999 ) 
Age (%) 
Younger than 20 34* 10 14 
20-35 29* 80 74 
Olderthan35 37* 10 12 
Gender (%) 
Female 49** 14 16 
Male 51** 86 84 
Education (%) 
Below college level 75** 11 13 
-College&higherlevel 25** 89 87 
Average monthly salary (yuan) 784** 1389 1307 
Geographical concentration (%)*** 7.9** 49.1 44.5 
1» 
* 1% Sampling Tabulation on the 1995 Population Census ofPRC{X991). Beijing: 
China Statistics Press. 
** China Statistical Yearbook (1998). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 
*** The proportion of population living in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong 
Province. 
Table 3.2 the demographics of China's Internet users 
� 
As Table 3.2 demonstrates, netizens in China are predominantly male, young and 
with college or higher level of education. Their average income is nearly twice as 
much as that ofthe non-users. And geographically, they are highly concentrated in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong Province. 
These statistics may not be surprising. In the country where information flow has 
been centralized to the power elite, the users of the new technology would overlap 
- ~ 
» . 
significantly with the upper part of the social strata. Regulatory, economic and 
cultural channels exist for the political economy in the nonvirtual space to be 
transformed into the cyberspace. ISPs and users are required to register either 
directly with public security officials or indirectly through the network service 
providers. And as will be specified in the following sections, ISPs and users may be 
4 5 
deprived of their access to the Intemet due to "misconduct" that violate state 
regulations. 
Another effective filter is the economic threshold. Before March 1999，staying 
online for thirty hours a month costs approximately 250 yuan. Compared with the 
low income level of China, the high rates meant that "using the Lntemet in China 
was 30 times more expensive than in the United States，，''. Online services in 
Intemet Cafes are even more expensive. In Beijing in summer 1998，the price for 
I* 
surfing was 30 yuan or 3.6 American dollars per hour. On 1 March 1999, the 
Chinese government announced a price-cut by fifty percent in the hope of 
attracting more users. However, I was told in my interviews with users in 
Shanghai and Wuhan that most ISPs were sticking to old rates. And in my visit to � 
Beijing in May 1999，I found the Intemet Cafes were charging the old price, too. 
Intemet access is also constrained by cultural factors, including the language 
barrier and the necessity of computer literacy. According to the CNNIC Report, 
the third and fourth most disappointing aspects of the Intemet to Chinese users are 
"there is inadequate Chinese information" and "too much technical knowledge is 
needed"^". Consequently, people with college education, especially those majoring 
- - u 
in computer science and telecommunications, become the group that is most ready 
to embrace the Net because they are more familiar with English and computer. 
The Intemet is therefore far from something that entails nothing but a personal 
4 6 
computer, a telephone line and a modem, as it is often proclaimed by the 
technological utopianists. In order to acquire the technical devices and put them 
into use, one has to overcome various hindrances in the Chinese context such as 
economic thresholds, cultural/educational requirements, and users' geographical 
location. By contributing to the stratification of the Chinese society, these factors 
concomitantly constrain the scope of diffusion in terms of the technological outputs 
of the Intemet. And subsequently, the political impacts are circumscribed, too. 
u 
Certainly, the development of China's cyberspace is still in its infancy. And it is 
probable that the available statistics reveal but the earliest sketch of the picture 
concerning the dissemination of the new medium. Yet the existing data as presented 
in Table 3.1 and 3.2 nevertheless indicate a rapid growth of Intemet in China. � 
Although the scope of diffusion has not reached a point that is either comparable 
with developed countries or remarkable as part of China's population, its velocity 
has been close to explosive especially among young, educated male in large cities 
of the country. 
The fast growth rate is comprehensible. Under tight control over information flow, 
China's media environment and its political communication institutions in 
• -
particular have been one of the most closed systems through out the world. Thus the 
opportunities to obtain alternative messages online and to make friends across 
national boundaries in cyberspace are magnetic especially among the younger 
generation with the economic and educational capacities necessary for the 
”"China Cuts Phone, Net Rates". Wired. 1 March 1999. 
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opportunities to be realized. The attraction is fortified by other technological 
attributes of the Internet, which empower domestic users to search banned political 
content and participate OPC with little danger ofbeing punished in the real world. 
As a result, the democratizing potentials of the Internet are endowed with its special 
charm since they are in large discrepancy with China's existing system of political 
communication. This is an unneglectable incentive factor arising contextually that 
facilitates democratization in terms of the Diffusion Effect, albeit its relations with 
other effects including exposure, expression and mobilization remain uncertain. 
fT 
% 
- - • 
• . — 
2" The top two most frequent complaints are "online speed is too slow" and "the price is too high". 
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Location Search News Free Chat Bulletin 
Engine Email Room Board 
Tech- Politics 
nology 
Yahoo U.S. * * * * * 
www.yahQQ.cQm 
Netease Guangzhou * * * * * * 
www.netease.CQm 
Sohu Beijing * * * * * 
www.sohu.com 
163 Post Office GuangZhou * * * 
www.163.net 
Capital Online Beijing * * * * * 
www.263.net • 
GB Chinese Yahoo U.S. * * * * * 
gbchinese.yahQO,com 
SinaNet Beijing * * * * * 
vvww.srsnet.com “ 
Shanghai Online Shanghai * * * 
www.online.sh.cn , 
Microsoft U.S. * * 
www.microsoft.com 
Yeah Search Guangzhou * • * 
www.yeah.net 
Hotmail U.S. * 
www.hQtmail.com 
China PC Weekly Chongqing * 
www.cpcw.cQm 、 
Chinabyte Beijing * • * * * 
www.chinahyte.com 
Shenzhen online Shenzhen * * * * 
www.szQnline.net 
188 Post Office Jinhua, * 
www.188.net Zhejiang - -
Yin Hai Wei Beijing * * * * � 
www.ihw.com.cn 
China Intemet Corp. Hong Kong * * * * * 
www.china.com 
CNNIC Beijing * 
www.cnnic.net.cn 
Eastcape Beijing * * 
www.ea5>t.net.cn 
China Central Television Beijing * 
www.cctv.CQm 
Table 3.3 Services provided by popular websites in China" 
Table 3.3 presents the top twenty popular websites in Mainland China and the 
kinds of services they provide. This table is compiled by the author basing on the 
twenty most popular websites in the CNNIC Report of January 1999. Except 
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English Yahoo, Chinese Yahoo, Microsoft and Hotmail, all other sixteen websites 
operate inside China. Seven of them locate in Beijing, four in Guangdong, 
showing that Intemet services are also geographically centralized. Most of the 
websites have search engine that aids users to find the kind of information they 
need. Other services include providing news, free email, chatroom and bulletin 
board. Technological news and free email services are of special strength in 
attracting users. Hotmail and 188 Post Office maintain their position in the top 
twenty list by providing no other service but free email. China PC Weekly and the 
M 
CNNIC website make similar ^ achievement by offering only detailed technical 
information in Chinese. 
As for the motivations of online activities, the CNNIC Report mentions that 95 � 
percent of Chinese users get online in order to seek information. Most of them 
specify that their purpose is to use email (94%) and download software (77%). 
Meanwhile, 35 percent of the users play games and enjoy the entertaining content 
in the virtual world, whereas 42 percent of them exchange ideas with others in 
places such as chatrooms and BBS stations. 
http ftp BBS (Usenet) Chatroom email . 
Mass< : ‘ yInterpersonal 
communication ^ ~ ^ S S ZX ZX ^communication “ 
• Figure 3.1 the position of BBS in relation to other Intemet applications 
Among all kinds of Intemet applications, BBS is of special value for OPC in 
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China because of its position between the mass mediated and the interpersonal 
modes of communication. Different online services can be arranged in a scale 
extending from http homepages and ftp to BBS and Usenet to chatroom and email 
(Figure 3.1). At one end of the scale, http homepages and ftp servers are most 
similar to broadcasting stations that are one-to-many and capable of storing large 
amount of data for a long period of time. In contrast, email is mostly an 
interpersonal channel used to deliver smaller amount of information from one user 
to another. Although currently, few mainland Chinese Intemet users participate in 
I* 
Usenet discussion groups, many of them exchange their ideas in chatrooms and 
BBS systems. The difference between these two services is that information in 
chatrooms are usually updated continuously, whereas BBS is an asynchronic 
mode of communication, which means the opinions of different users can be � 
accumulated to form a collective voice. The identity of each user in a BBS is also 
relatively stable since the user names have to be matched with their respective 
passwords, which is not required in most chatroom. It is in these senses that the 
BBS stations are most suitably called "virtual communities" in the Chinese 
context. 
External Users 
A special group of users that must be identified are those who join China's online 
communication processes from outside the mainland. The majority ofthis group is 
oversea Chinese who hope to contact their old friends and keep up with the latest 
happenings back home. Many of them grew up in China but are now studying or 
working abroad. Some users from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore also enter 
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China's cyberspace as ordinary members of the virtual communities. Since these 
external users live outside the mass media system controlled by CCP, they often 
bring unavailable information to users within the nation and therefore play an 
indispensable role in linking China's cyberspace with the rest of the world. 
Subsequently, these people are more likely to win grassroots support in the 
elections of boardmasters. During my participation in various Chinese Intemet 
communities since January 1998，I have worked as the boardmaster for two 
bulletin boards. I also have made friends with other boardmasters who are 
»* 
physically outside China. 产 
There is another group of overseas users who have received large amount of 
exposure in international mass media recently, namely those who uses Intemet to � 
subvert the rule of the Chinese party-state, at least in the "virtual" world. A form 
of their online "pro-democracy" activities is sending emails with overt anti-CCP 
content to the domestic users. The most famous example is Da Can Kao, or VIP 
Reference, edited by Chinese dissidents in the United States and sent to tens of 
thousands of users in the mainland, each time from a different email account in 
order to circumvent China's national firewall. Some of the "subversive" emails 
contain instructions how users inside China can seek detour to visit websites 
� - • 
banned by the national firewall. More aggressively, some hackers even attempt to 
break into computer network systems owned by the Chinese party-state. They are 
organized in groups such as the Cult of the Dead Cow, the Yellow Pages and the 
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Hong Kong Blondes^'. Due to their attacks in cyberspace, several websites 
sponsored by the Chinese government have been hacked by external invaders. For 
instance, China's Center of Human Rights was defaced twice in December 1998 
and January 1999. The hacked homepages contain sharp criticisms on CCP and 
the Chinese government. One of them displays a slogan in large font: "Boycott 
China!" 
In whatever form, the participation of external users should be conceptualized as 
I* 
activities that purposively or subliminally synchronize China's cyberspace with the 
virtual space outside China. It is this special group of agents enabled by the 
accessibility and interactivity of the Intemet that connects the OPC processes ofthe 
nation with those of the world. Without these people at the periphery of China's � 
computer networks, the new medium must have been less open than today and 
more manipulated by the Chinese party-state. The existence of external users as 
part of the nation's cyberspace is therefore another incentive factor that eases the 
course towards democratization. 
Bamboo Curtains Unfurled 
Deregulation is the catchword in the telecommunications industry towards the end 
i - 一 
of the century, whereas the Intemet is an exception. Although still in its early stage 
of development, the regulation of online communication has been growing 
worldwide in recent years especially against pomography, hate speech and the 
invasion of privacy (Mayer-Schonberger and Foster, 1997:235). A good example 
21 Hesseldahl, Arik. "Hacking for human rights?" Wired. 14 July 1998. 
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is the Communication Decency Act of the United States in 1996，which outlaws 
the distribution of materials such as child pornography and profanity via the Net. 
Advocacy for the establishment of international regulatory bodies of CMC basing 
on the consensus among nation-states can be also heard (Johnson and Post, 1997; 
Mayer-Schonberger and Foster, 1997). And in addition to these efforts stressing 
the Global Information Infrastructure as an entirety, there are also national 
• regulations in the name of protecting domestic culture andA>r ideology in 
countries such as France, Germany and Singapore, among which China is the 
1» 
most prominent in resisting legislatively, technologically and administratively. 
Formal Regulations 
China's regulation of the Internet started in January 1993, before the country was � 
exposed to the full range of online services and the commercial linkage was 
approved. So far there have been three regulations issued by China's central 
government concerning Internet usage. The most important one is the Temporary 
Regulation for the Management of Computer Information Network International 
Connection passed in the 42nd Standing Convention of the State Council on 23 
January 1993". This regulation was formally announced on 1 February 1996 and 
verified on 20 May 1997. Detailed Implementation Measures for the Temporary 
*• < * 
Regulation" were issued on 8 December 1997. According to the Regulation, the 
Chinese government adopts "the principle of overall planning, unified standard, 
stratified management, and advance in development" towards international 
network connection (Item 4). No units or individuals are allowed to establish 
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direct international connection without state approval (Item 6). All direct linkage 
with the fetemet must go through C ^ A N E T , CfflNAGBN, CERNET or 
CSTNET, the first two of which are commercial enterprises and the other two are 
non-profit organizations (Item 8, Implementation Measures). License is required 
for any unit to provide Internet access to users (Item 8) and for the users to obtain 
the access (Item 10). "Harmful information" that is either "subversive" or 
"obscene" is forbidden (Item 13). Punishment measures are also specified in 
monetary terms (Item 14,15). 
it 
r 
The second regulation is the Ordinance for Security Protection of Computer 
Information Systems issued on 18 February 1994 by the State Council. It stresses 
that the responsible institution of Internet security protection is the Ministry of � 
Public Security (Item 6)，which is entitled to "supervise, inspect and guide the 
security protection work", "investigate and prosecute illegal criminal cases" and 
"perform other supervising duties" (Item 17). The Ordinance led to a subsequent 
regulation endorsed by the State Council and issued by the Ministry of Public 
Security in December 1997, namely the Security Management Procedures in 
Internet Accessing. In addition to further specifying the "harmful information" 
mentioned in the Temporary Regulation, the Management Measures also lists the 
- » 
— five kinds of "harmful activities" including: “(1) intruding computer information 
network or make use of network resources without authorization; (2) canceling, 
altering or adding functions in computer information network without 
authorization; (3) canceling, altering or adding data and application software for 
“Accessible at httpV/www.gznet.corWserassociate/mynews/lawl.htm. 
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the purpose of memory, processing or transmission in computer information 
network without authorization; (4) intentionally producing, disseminating 
destructive software such as computer virus; (5) other activities that are harmful to 
the security of computer information network" (Item 6). 
Another result from the Ordinance was the revision of China's Criminal Code in 
March 1994. Related provisions include: "Section 285: Whosoever, in violation of 
State regulations, intrudes into a computer information system involved in State 
M 
matters, construction of the national defense or advanced technology shall be 
punished by imprisonment or detention of three years or less. Section 286: 
Whosoever, in violation of State regulations, deletes, alters, adds, or disturbs the 
operation of a computer information system so that it cannot operate properly, � 
shall, in serious cases, be punished by imprisonment or detention of five years or 
‘less; in especially serious cases, imprisonment of five years or more may be 
imposed". 
It was reported that the Ministry of Public Security has established its computer 
investigation unit since 1996，which has processed over a hundred crime cases 
related to CMC until July 1998". Educational materials have been published and 
、 - • 
distributed to 170,000 police offices in Public Security Bureaus of the provinces 
and cities for the control over computer networks". 
“Accessible at http://www.gznet.comy'serassociatey'mynews/law2.htm. 
“"Computer security in China". Washington: East Asian Executive Reports. 15 July 1998. pp. 10-11. 
“Ibid. 
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In addition to the regulations issued by the State Council and the Ministry of 
Public Security, various managerial measures are also formulated at the level of 
the four major networks. CHESfANET, CHmAGBN, CSTNET and CERNET all 
have announced their own regulations that either reiterate or substantiate the 
requirements of "public security" according to the unique features of the networks. 
For instance, in the Management Measures of CHINAGBN's Public Multimedia 
Information Services^ % it is stipulated that, while using the GBNet, it is prohibited 
to "produce, view, disseminate and announce harmful information that disturbs 
1« 
social security and contains obscene content"(Item 16). "National security 
regulations must be strictly complied". Minor offenders may have their license 
rebuked and serious ones will be handed to organizations of public security (Item 
17). � 
Because Intemet chatrooms and electronic bulletin systems are particularly liable 
to become public forums of OPC, specific regulations are issued either by national 
network authorities or local community managers to maintain the online political 
order. CERNET's Regulation of BBS Management" provides that "the content of 
services in BBS systems shall be limited to the scope of academic exchange, 
which is mostly concerning science and technology. No service is allowed for 
‘ non-academic content.,'(Item 2) And when there is an "emergent situation", 
system operators should "report immediately" and "resolutely delete the articles 
with political problems" (Item 5.1). "When the emergency is out of control, 
network centers in every region must immediately shut down the telnet and http 
26 Accessible at http://www.gb.com.cn/Chinese/information/fg3.htm. 
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interface linking up to the BBS system where the emergency occurs" (Item 5.2). 
Another example standing for cyberspace communities operating under 
commercial circumstances is the Community Basic Law ofNetease^% a website on 
CHn^ANET located in Guangzhou, which is the most popular website in the 
country according to the latest CNNIC report. The Community Basic Law 
stipulates that "citizens in the community must not talk or behave in violation of 
all regulations issued by CHINANET (Item 23). “If a discussion board contains 
1» 
anti-revolutionary, pornographic, personal attacking or other illegal articles, the 
community of Netease has the right to delete the board" (Item 32). "Those who 
overtly disseminate obscene, pornographic and anti-governmental speeches and 
opinions will have their user accounts suspended temporarily or deleted � 
permanently in serious occasions"(Item 38). 
The national firewall and Intranet technologies 
As been specified in the regulations, network connection with the external world 
is monopolized by the state. According to CNNIC report of October 1997, China 
had no more than 25 direct international lines^'. Upon these connection lines, 
China imposes what Wired magazine calls "the world's largest firewall" or."the 
Great Firewall"'", that blocks access to certain websites with "harmful 
information" and screens online content by targeting at words such as "June 
“Accessible at http:// bbs.whnet.edu.cn. 
2* Accessible at http://club.netease.com /law.htm. 
2» Among the 25 international connection lines, 16 are in CHmANET, 4 in CERNET, 3 in CSTNET and 2 in 
C _ A G B N . 
�u Mckay, Niall. "China: the Great Firewall". Wired, 1 December 1998. 
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Fourth", "Dalai Lama" and "Taiwan". Actually, the national firewall is not too 
grander a project with respect to the small number of cross-border connection 
lines operating under state monopoly. Since the firewall blocks mostly the http 
and www websites outside China, it can be penetrated through ftp and email. And 
most importantly, firewall software and devices do not allow the authority to 
recognize who the offenders are. 
The really menacing technical measures taken by the ,Chinese government is 
therefore not the selected blockage of information from outside but the 
construction of the China Wide Web since 1996. This project includes the 
application oftechnologies such as identity check, encryption and proxy servers to 
CMC in China. Most importantly, it enables China's Intemet regulators to trace � 
virtually all online activities of a targeted network terminal, including surfing, 
chatting and email exchange. These technologies are mostly used for internal 
communication in commercial companies, especially multi-national corporations. 
But China is now applying them to the entire nation. It is these Intranet 
technologies that helped China's cyberpolice to catch Lin Hai, the recently 
imprisoned network entrepreneur in Shanghai, and Hao Jinglong and Hao 
Jingwen, ,who broke into a bank computer network in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, 
"~ » t 
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and was sentenced to death''. 
Why China can implement the regulations with advanced network security 
technologies so quickly? A decisive but usually overlooked reason is the imports 
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of such technologies from the United States. For instance, the Sun Microsystems 
obtained a US$15 million deal to build the Intranet backbone of the China Wide 
Web in December 1996". And in January 1997, the Bay networks of California 
won a bid over other American computer companies, such as 3Com Corp and 
Cisco Systems, to provide another multi-million dollar infrastructure for the China 
Wide Web". The contractor standing for the Chinese authority is China Intemet 
Corp., which is controlled by China's Xinhua News Agency. 
it 
It may be unfair to accuse these American companies of selling firewall and 
Intranet technologies to China so that the cyberpolice can use them for political 
purposes. The deals are first of all alleged as targeting at network crimes like 
online pirating that disturbs commercial order. Moreover, were there no such � 
technology reassuring the skepticism of high-level party leaders, China's 
construction of the Intemet might have been in a slower pace, and ordinary 
Chinese people must have to wait longer to have access to the Web. 
Obviously, there is a dilemma in the global diffusion ofIntemet technology, which 
is not purely an instrument of political democratization. On the one hand, political 
consideration is not the only or most important factor in the transactions. More 
- ：• ‘ -
often than not, commercial benefit is the predominantly influential goal. This is 
especially so when the commodity is Intemet technology, upon which American 
legislators have exerted little control. On the other hand, what Intemet means is 
” Reuters, 28 December 1998. 
“Coale, Kristi. "China Shines Intranet Contract on Sun", Wired, 2 December 1996. 
•“ "Bay Networks wins CWW Bid", South China Moming Post, 21 October 1997. 
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not a single technology that favors the free flow of information. Rather, it is a set 
of technologies including those protecting stability and order. This dualistic nature 
of the medium should be stressed. Most inventions of communication enjoy a 
short period of "absolute freedom", after which technological control mechanisms 
are developed and imposed. The Intemet seems to be no exception. 
Another implication of the defensive technologies is that the notion of 
"deterritorialization" (Frissen, 1997:115) arguing for the ,total negation of spatial 
factors in the conceptualization of the cyberspace, does not apply for China and 
perhaps other authoritarian countries at large. The global computer network is not 
"seamless" as it is usually claimed. Technologies such as firewall and encryption 
software have brought to the cyberspace conspicuous boundaries, especially � 
political ones, which only a few privileged users and those with adequate 
technical sophistication can get across. Network security technologies thus help 
build for the implementation of China's formal Intemet regulations a 
semipenetratable protection membrane, which is fortified by the hierarchical 
structure of the regulatory agencies. 
- • 
- - : ^ . 
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The Hierarchical Structure of Regulation 
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Figure 3.2 the hierarchical structure of regulation 
Internet regulations stipulated by the Chinese party-state are not merely formal 
deterrence with technological supports. For every cyberspace community all over 
China, there is also a hierarchical system of regulators (Figure 3.2) because this is 
; 
the place where political content is most likely to emerge and accumulate. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the Ministry of Public Security and its subordinate bureaus 
— t-
in the provinces and cities. According to regulations issued by the State Council, 
the policemen are the most superior guardians against the "inappropriate" uses of 
the Internet. In this thesis, they are called cyberpolice, who obtain more power 
recently with the construction of the China Wide Web. 
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Under the shadow of the cyberpolice, there lies the entirety of China's Intemet, 
which is, first of all, managed by the national network centers of the Intemet 
oligarchies. Although with different sizes, these four networks are 
administratively parallel to each other. Each of them has several subnets in 
different regions that control networks in the provinces and the cities in the case 
of CHDSfANET and CHENAGBN, or networks in universities and research 
institutes in the case of CERNET and CSTNET. In the network centers of the 
subnets, some technicians get directly involved in the daily maintenance of 
cyberspace communities. These people are called "system operators" or simply 
"sysops". In Chinese, they are also called “zhanzhang” (station-master) and 
“fuzhanzhang” (associate-station-master) because they assume the most sustaining 
and visible power of administrative control in the virtual world. They can choose, � 
install or uninstall, and modify the platform on which CMC is going on, the 
screening software and the blacklist of "inappropriate" keywords. They can also 
punish the community members who have violated the regulations by various 
means in cyberspace. The sysops and other administrative officials in national and 
regional network centers are the technocrats at the middle of the Intemet 
regulation hierarchy. 
- - 二 
Most sysops are technicians at the lowest bureaucratic level of the regional 
network centers. In CERNet and CSTNet, a common practice is to assign a young 
teacher/researcher of Intemet technology to be the station-master, while all other 
sysops are graduate students majoring in computer science or 
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telecommunications". Being members of the regulatory body in terms of both 
physical location and monetary rewards, they should be seen as an interest group 
different from ordinary users. Their subordinate relations with the state distinguish 
them from the lowest rank of regulators in cyberspace: boardmasters {banzhu). 
Boardmasters are the regulators who are responsible for "cleaning" messages on 
one or a few electronic bulletin boards. Unlike the sysops, boardmasters are not 
necessarily members of the network centers. Like ordinary.users, most of them use 
pseudonyms to log in. This means an external user can be a boardmaster within the 
Great Firewall until real-life identification is required in May 1999. Another 
significant feature distinguishing boardmaster from sysop is that the former is 
electorate whereas the latter is selectorate. Most of the boardmasters are winners � 
of online elections, in which ordinary users vote via the Internet. Subsequently, 
their source of legitimacy is from ordinary users rather than the higher ladder of 
the hierarchy. Boardmasters and ordinary users are netizens in China's public 
OPC arenas. 
The regulatory hierarchy is more than a cluster of post and rank. As in real-world 
institutions, human beings in China's cyberspace are tied to certain dutie^ and 
. - � . ‘ 
subject to constraints. The cyberpolice is expected to supervise the technocrats 
and the netizens as well as the online OPC content and penalize disobedient 
actions. The technocrats shall follow instructions from the cyberpolice and use 
various means, including technological ones, to prevent users in their networks 
“Information was collected in an interview with an associate-station-master conducted in June 1998. 
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from accessing prohibited websites and expressing harmful information. The duty 
of the netizens is but one command: no trespassing upon the forbidden 
cyberspaces in their Intemet exposure and online expression. 
If the duties are not performed, there is a system of punishment mechanisms 
directed both at the technocrats and the netizens. The cyberpolice must be also 
subject to certain check from the State Council and the CCP Party Center. But this 
is not specified in any regulation. The announced means qf punishment and those 
I observed as a member of the regulatory hierarchy include: 
A. Penalties exercised by the cyberpolice upon the technocrats 
% 
1. Real-world personnel punishments: the sysops and responsible administrators 
who fail to meet the political standards are censured, fined, removed from 
regulatory positions andy'or subject to administrative sanction. 
2. Temporary suspension of network connection: the websites or the virtual 
communities carrying forbidden OPC content are shut down for a period of 
time, when the technocrats are required to remove the inappropriate content. 
� This mechanism is also employed for the purpose of prevention. For instance, 
* . 
every year in early June, most BBSs hosted by universities are denied network 
connection for a week or so due to the anniversaries of the massacre in 1989. 
3. License revocation: Serious violation leads to the revocation of license to 
provide Intemet services. As the result, the responsible website or virtual 
community is closed sine die. So far there is only one such case, which is the 
•. 
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Untitled BBS station ofPeking University (Beida weimin BBS zhan). This BBS, 
formerly renown for zealot political discussions, has been closed for nearly 
three years since September 1996 when it mobilized a nationalist protest 
movement against Japan regardless of official objection, 
B. Penalties exercised by the technocrats and boardmasters upon ordinary netizens 
1. Message eradication: sysops and boardmasters erase^ the articles containing 
undesirable content without using any other punishment mechanisms. The 
regulator may not even contact the offender. But this is nevertheless a form of 
punishment transmitting a lucid negative feedback to the responsible netizen: 
what you wrote is not acceptable in this online arena. Message eradication is the � 
most widely used means of virtual censorship., 
2. Temporary/partial suspension of membership: if infringement is committed by 
the same netizen repetitively, the sysops suspend his/Tier access to the virtual 
community for a certain period of time. Or in some minor cases, the 
punishment is temporary suspension of some network applications such as 
voting, posting articles and chatting with other users. Boardmaster can also 
punish those who express harmful information by denying their right ta post 
_ t 
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articles on the bulletin board sAie is in charge of. 
3. Cancellation of membership account: in the most serious cases, the offender's 
membership account in a virtual community is removed. Although it is 
stipulated that the technocrats shall hand severe violators to public security 
offices, never does this happen according to the reports I collected and my 
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experience in China's cyberspace. Most netizens use pseudonyms when they 
really want to challenge the authorities on the Web. The gravest punishment is 
thus to eliminate the virtual existence of the offender. 
The formal regulations, the regulatory hierarchy and the mechanisms of 
punishment constitute what I call virtual censorship, which is a set of measures 
aided by network security technologies for the purpose of maintaining control 
over OPC in accordance with the existing authoritarian order of political 
II 
communication. It is censorship because the means of domination, as have been 
mentioned and will be discussed further, are less rigid, suppressive and 
manipulative than the ways in which the party-state controls the mass media. It is 
virtual because the control mechanisms are implemented mostly in cyberspace and � 
equipped with digital instruments for the pmposes of prohibition, supervision and 
punishment. Although traditional real-world means are also employed to assist the 
transplantation of existing hegemony into the realm of OPC, the utilization of such 
methods like the invalidation of ISP license or criminal charges against individual 
users happens infrequently and functions mostly as deterrence against deviant 
online activities. Therefore, China's system of political control over OPC should be 
conceived as relying directly upon the virtual mode of communication- and 
indirectly upon the dominance of political power in the actual space. 
Virtual Censorship vs. Mass Media Regulation: a Comparison 
Virtual censorship is the totality of measures taken by the authoritarian power elite 
to prevent the technological attributes of the new medium from fostering an 
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autonomous terrain of political discussion and giving rise to a series of 
democratizing effects that may threaten the political order in the real world. From 
the angel of democratization, it is an undesirable part of the emerging virtual 
reality, or "a simulation of existing realities" and "the creations of a new reality" 
(Frissen, 1997:113), that attempts at rendering boundaries in the cyberspace and 
those in the nonvirtual space congruent. In this regard, it is a series of defensive 
actions taken by the nondemocracies to protect "their portion" of the cyberspace 
from being merged and synchronized with OPC systems they cannot control. 
Given the "information sovereignty" of the nation-states is not taken for granted 
in the virtual world and cyberspace is assumed as a territory without boundaries 
by nature, virtual censorship can also be conceived as an array of aggressions that 
contaminate the virgin land of OPC with real-world authoritarian politics. � 
Considering China's consistent state monopoly over the media, it is of little 
surprise that it tries to extend its rule into the realm of CMC. Yet a comparison 
between the nation's regulation of mass media with that of the new medium may 
allow us to see more. 
The genesis of regulation 
There- is a remarkable difference between virtual censorship and mass media ； 
regulation with regard to their genesis. In the history of the People's Republic of 
China, the press, radio and television have been controlled by the authorities since 
the very beginning of their operation. However, there was no formal rule for the 
Intemet from 1986 to 1993, a period longer than the six-year history of China's 
regulation of the Intemet. This was partly due to the medium's immaturity before 
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1993 and partly due to its limited scope of influence that was restricted to a few 
scientists at the time. 
Media ownership 
As for ownership, China's Intemet Access Providers (IAPs), i.e. the four national 
networks, are similar to mass media as being monopolized by the State. However, 
private ownership of Intemet Service Providers (ISPs) is allowed. And Since 
December 1998，CHIMANET and GBNET, have been reforming to establish non-
ff 
official ownership as a response to Premier Zhu Rongji's call for the split between 
public offices and their enterprises". If the separation is successful, the state 
ownership of the Web will be significantly reduced. 
、 
Meanwhile, personal computers and modems also constitute an indispensable part 
of the Intemet. These facilities are possessed by party-state offices, commercial 
organizations as well as households and individual users. The dispersion of media 
ownership in regard of network terminals is most conspicuous. And unlike 
television sets and radios, computers with network connection allow individuals 
to engage in the processes of symbolic production and message dissemination in 
‘ ^ • 
addition to information consumption. _ -
> « 
The manipulation of media content 
China's mass media have been known as the "mouthpiece" of the authorities. By 
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controlling media ownership, the nation's powerful ideologists govem the 
personnel system in media organizations and establish strict censorship 
mechanisms such as "stratified checks" {ceng ceng shen pi) to ensure that the 
publicized political content advocates the party line. However, the cyberpolice is 
not entitled to appoint and dismiss managers in the national networks. Neither is 
there a vertical relationship from the Central Propaganda Division to the ISPs 
concerning what should be exhibited online. Freed from the burden of 
"propaganda tasks", the sysops and boardmasters can be more dedicated to pursue 
commercial or professional goals. In this sense, the present" proliferation of 
apolitical information in China's cyberspace, though not fully supporting 
democratization, is nevertheless a progress in comparison with the manipulated 
political facade of the mass media. � 
Moreover, due to the technological attributes of the Intemet, ordinary netizens are 
allowed to speak out in the forums hosted by nonofficial ISPs. Technical detours 
bypassing the regulatory obstacles are also possible in case the user has more 
computer literacy. 
The invisibility of the Party 
- - i. , • 
Another difference is the role of CCP. So far the "Party press" like People 's Daily 
is still monopolizing the mass-mediated political arena of the nation. In contrast, 
CCP's portion of the Web is trivial. So far there is nothing that can be called a 
“"China Telecom at crossroad, new uncertainties". Asia Pacific Telecommunication. 1 January 1999. 
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nationwide "Party Net". Even if technically there are some "Party ISPs", they are 
few in number and feeble in influence. Meanwhile, different from the penetration 
of CCP in the mass media system, Party groups are not established at least at the 
lower levels of the regulatory hierarchy. 
The conceivable decline of the Party as a direct regulator of media content in 
cyberspace means that the authoritarian control over CMC in China depends more 
on the Chinese government. State ownership of both IAPs and ISPs is 
overwhelming. Regulations of the Internet are issued by the State Council rather 
than the Central Propaganda Division. The enforcement relies on various 
government officials rather than the cadre system of CCP. Additionally, legal 
adjustments were formulated and announced as the state regulation of the Net � 
began, whereas the mass media are still suffering form the lack of stable 
regulation. 
The distinction between the Party and the State is meaningful in the analysis of 
virtual censorship since government officials are supposed to be more 
professional and ideologically less committed. An intriguing comment is that 
Beijing's attempt to block foreign websites is but a strategic ritual employed by 
the technocrats to satisfy the hard-liners'^ This is possible since government 
agencies do have interests different from party organs. However, it is nai've to 
regard the State as an autonomous regulator totally separated from the CCP, which 
may still have an "invisible hand" at work, although there is no explicit indication 
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of its role in the alleged measures of Internet regulation. 
The efficacy of the regulations 
Virtual censorship may not be as effective as mass media regulation because of 
the following reasons. First, the efficacy of punishments is reduced by the 
virtuality of CMC. Chinese journalists in mass media organizations face real risks 
if they hope to deviate from the Party line, whereas their counterparts in 
cyberspace face mostly virtual ones especially when “ they use pseudonyms. 
fT 
Although China announced some real-world means for virtual censorship such as 
the invalidation of ISP license and criminal charges against offenders, the actual 
utilization of such measures is infrequent. Real-word punishments thus function 
% 
mostly as potential deterrence rather than direct penalty like message eradication, 
which hurts only the virtual existence of the netizens rather than their tangible life. 
Second, there is no visible reward system to encourage users to comply with the 
rules or sysops to improve their "network security work". The hierarchical 
structure of regulation is held together by a series of negative feedback from the 
cyberpolice to the technocrats to the netizens. Yet there seems to be no channel for 
positive feedback the other way round. Incentives are an important part of 
institutional constraints, hi China's mass media industry there are various incentive 
mechanisms such as the election ofbest news stories and bestjoumalists. But so far 
this aspect is underdeveloped in virtual censorship. 
36 Ibid. 
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Third, different from the relatively standardized implementation of central policies 
in the mass media, the actual implementation of virtual censorship varies greatly in 
different geographical regions, at different administrative levels, during different 
period of time. For instance, message eradication is usually more frequent and 
strict in websites located in Beijing, the nation's political center, than in other 
parts of the' country. In distant provinces such as Yunan, it was reported that the 
registration of Intemet Cafe had not been put into practice until recently". Virtual 
censorship also tightens up when the date of June 4'^  impends and the National 
People's Congress is under way, while it is loosened for the rest of the year. 
Meanwhile, there is resistance from lower-level technocrats. Many sysops are 
reluctant to follow the instructions of closedown during the sensitive dates. In my � 
interview with a sysop, my informant even disclosed some technical tricks he 
used to keep the BBS station open to ordinary users but look like closed when the 
cyberpolice supervises it. The uneven implementation of Intemet regulations 
therefore results in freer OPC and the reduction of actual censorship in remote 
areas, at lower administrative level and during periods when the political 
atmosphere is relatively open. 
- - _ 
Admittedly, new facilities, new staff and new methods are employed to tackle the 
new space. But comparing with political control over the mass media, China's 
censorship over the Intemet is still primitive. The regulatory structure of Intemet 
regulation is less developed, the implementation processes are less predictable and 
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the institutional constraints are less confining. The reduction of gatekeepers' 
manipulative power is clear. 
Virtual censorship Mass media regulation 
Genesis > Regulation began after 7 > Manipulation started from 
years of academic usage. the very beginning of 
operation. 
Ownership > State-owned IAPs > Ownership of all media 
gradually opens up. organizations and facilities 
> Individual and non-official for production and 
“organizations are allowed transmission of media 
to own CMC facilities content belongs 
including those for ISP exclusively to the party and 
after registration. the state. 
Media content > No nationwide "Party Net" > The "mouthpiece" of CCP: 
and the limited influence of the burden of "propaganda 
ISPs owned by CCP tasks，， 
> No "propaganda task" > "stratified checks" before 
> Post-publication censorship publication 
The regulatory > less hierarchical and > more hierarchical and 
body centralized centralized � 
> more technicians and > more propagandists and 
professionals - ideologists 
Party power > Invisible: the Ministry of > Visible: the Central 
Public Security as the Propaganda Department as ^ 
highest regulator. the supreme commander. 
Efficacy > Uneven implementation at > Relatively standardized 
different time in different implementation 
localities > Reward/punishment 
> No reward system mechanisms established 
|> Penalties less confining |> More constraining 
Table 3.5 the comparison between virtual censorship and 
mass media regulation in Mainland China 
• ‘ . 
The above table demonstrates the differences between virtual censorship and mass 
media regulation in Mainland China. Although the regulation of OPC aims at 
maintaining political control in the new medium as in the old ones, the 




technological geography of the cyberspace is different. Subsequently, control 
mechanisms loosen up with decreasing efficacy in comparison with the 
manipulation of traditional mass media. In China, this is a new mode of media 
control that serves authoritarianism in cyberspace. 
Concluding Remarks 
The Intemet has taken part in China's political processes. Since 1993，the 
regulation of the new medium has involved national policymakers, police officers 
r 
and governmental administrators in the major networks. In addition to the 
regulations, the power elite has also employed the Net as their propaganda 
apparatus by creating websites for traditional mass media (e.g. CCTV and the 
、 
People 's Daily) and the provision of other information about the party and the 
state (e.g. Government Online Project accessible at http://www.gov.cn). Such 
attempts for the monopolization of public arenas are less overwhelming in 
cyberspace than in the mass media. Yet they should not be entirely ignored". 
"Surmounting the Great Wall, walking towards the world." In retrospect, China 
has taken a route of Intemet development deviating from the anticipated political 
mission of the new medium. The Chinese authorities have employed legislative, 
administrative and technological measures to safeguard their claim of online 
“ S i n c e this thesis is devoted to the exploration of OPC patterns among the netizens, I do not focus on the 
efforts of the Chinese authorities to use the new medium as their extended mouthpiece in cyberspace. The 
online propaganda is in lack of influence. Most of them replicate the traditional paper-based mode of 
communication. The new medium is therefore deprived of its interactivity and accessibility. And there is little 
communicative democratization regarding the propagandist materials put online by the CCP and the Chinese 
government. 
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public arenas" by constraining OPC, imposing censorship, and transforming the 
Intemet to serve their interests. Formal regulations are enacted. The Great 
Firewall and the vast Intranet are established. Regulators in the hierarchical 
structure of regulation are trying to further exclude users that are politically 
unreliable and contents that are ideologically undesirable. All these measures of 
virtual censorship are implemented to constrain the liberalizing effects of the 
Intemet so that people will- use the new medium in the hegemonic modes of 
exposure, expression and mobilization as if they are still in the old local space of 
political communication. , 
Moreover, there are various contextual constraints arising from the actual 
diffusion and utilization of the new medium in the authoritarian country with � 
underdeveloped social economy. The economic and educational thresholds 
prevent the less wealthy and less educated, especially those who do not live in 
large cities, from using the Intemet. The surfing speed is slow due to insufficient 
bandwidth and other deficiencies in the developing national information 
infrastructure. And when the user attends OPC, sAie may also be confined in 
terms of exposure and expression due to surveillance in the work unit or in terms 
of message interpretation due to the mass media environment, which may serve as 
» 、 
i 
a basic system of references. These factors are called contextual constraints 
“ I refrain from using the term public sphere since it is the "space of social life determined neither by market 
nor by the state" (Calhoun, 1992:2). At this point of exploration, it is too early to claim that China's 
cyberspace are determined or not determined by any factors of influence. Thus I adopt the notion of public 
arena advocated by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988), which emphasizes the competition among different political 
issues and social problems for public attention. Comparing with the ideal of public sphere, this notion is more 
flexible and suitable for the empirical analyses of OPC discussions. Moreover, the public arena concept can 
be employed in a modified manner as the site where mediation takes place, where the incentive and 
constraining factors compete for influence the consequences of mediation. 
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because they root in the pre-existing local political economy of the authoritarian 
society and surface prominently when the Intemet spreads and becomes an 
instrument of political communication. Unlike virtual censorship, they are not 
constraints imposed deliberately and systematically by the Chinese party-state 
institution for the purpose of curbing OPC. 
The Mediation Factors 
Facilitating factors Constraining factors 
> The technological potentials > Virtual censorship (formal 
(accessibility, interactivity, virtuality, regulations, technological measures, 
etc.) and the hierarchical structure of 
/ , 
regulation) 
> The contextual incentives (the > Contextual constraints (economic 
discrepancy with mass media, the threshold, educational requirements, 
opportunity to attend public arenas, to geographical location, unsatisfactory 
interact with external users, to infrastructure, work unit 
organize collective action, etc.) surveillance, suppressive mass � 
media environment, etc.) 
Table 3.6 The mediation factors in the field of China's cyberspace 
As summarized in Table 3.5, the constraining factors in the mediation processes 
should be conceived as juxtaposed with the pro-democracy attributes of the 
Intemet as two sets of opposing forces that jointly influence the final political 
impacts. In principle, the new medium is globally accessible and interactive, 
allowing users to be involved in CMC as both audience and producers. And the 
- u ‘ • 
digitized virtual mode of online communication reduces the real-world risks for 
the users to trespass the formal rules of OPC set by the state. Although these 
attributes may be absent in some cases (e.g. CCP's online propaganda), they 
nevertheless give rise to a series of unique services ranging from email and ftp to 
online arenas, where ordinary netizens can discuss politics publicly, interact with 
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external users and organize collective action. Being alternatives to the mass-
mediated political communication system controlled by the Chinese authorities, 
these services carry special charm among the Chinese netizens. This is another 
side of the coin when the technology enters the context. Moreover, the contextual 
incentives for the new medium that facilitate democratization also reflect the 
volition of the individuals as opposite to the structural constraints from the polity, 
the economy and the society. 
%i 
The new medium is still ,expanding and exerting more pressure on the 
authoritarian regime. But a concomitant phenomenon is equally conspicuous: 
China has changed the Net before the Net subverts it. The local institution of 
media control is still viable in reacting to the technological challenges and shaping � 
the landscape of China's cyberspace per se, which is also under various contextual 
constraints. These factors that may impede democratization are interacting with 
the facilitating factors and mediating the political impacts of the Intemet. 
Although the actual processes of interaction are yet to be delineated and the 
democratizing effects to be assessed, at least the relevant factors has been 
identified. Considering the opposing forces at work, it is reasonable to suspect that 
China's cyberspace behind the Great Firewall is more decentralized than the 
nation's mass media, yet meanwhile, more centralized than the alleged structure 
of the Intemet as a freenet. 
., 
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Chapter 4 the Processes of Mediation 
The history and reality of China's Internet demonstrate two opposing forces in the 
field where mediation takes place. On the one hand, there are constraining factors 
that impede the democratization through the Internet including technical, 
contextual, demographic constraints and virtual censorship. Meanwhile, the 
incentive factors such as the technological attributes of CMC, the distinctive 
charm of OPC in non-democratic countries and the participation of external users 
u 
may facilitate democratization. 
� 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the on-going interplay of these opposing 
forces during the processes of mediation. Online documents, participant 
% 
observation and interview data are used to illustrate the processes. The processes 
to be analyzed are audience exposure, online discussion and mobilization, or the 
three specific processes leading to the democratizing effects of the Internet. Under 
actual circumstances, there is always interplay between constraints and incentives 
in the configuration of each effect. How the Internet may or may not lead to 
democratization thus does not depend on the power balance of the opposing forces 
in the course of mediation as a whole. Instead, it is first of all molded at the level of 
the three processes, in which the two sides of influential :factors interact with each 
other. The visibility of democratizing effect may therefore vary in the three 
processes of mediation. And since the interactions are contingent upon the context 
of OPC about the specific political issue in concern, concrete cases need to be 
brought in. 
7 9 
The most important case employed in this study is the responses of Internet users 
in China to the persecution of Indonesian Chinese in 1998, which contains 
valuable data in terms of exposure, expression and mobilization. Never has there 
been any similar situation in China's cyberspace when a movement initiated from 
OPC could trigger such a plethora of responses, peaceful or militant, organized or 
haphazard, in cyberspace, mass media and real life. Complemented by 
observations and documents concerning other events, this case offers a good 
opportunity for the scrutiny of mediation processes in OPC among the Chinese 
Internet users. , 
Internet Audience and Their Exposure 
、 
As long as there is Internet, there must be some users. They can be technicians, 
regulators and people accessing the Net from anywhere. The first thing all ofthem 
do to participate in CMC is to be exposed to online content. In this sense, all users 
are Internet audience. Hence I include discussions of the Diffusion Effect as part 
of the process leading to audience exposure. As a result, there are two relevant 
questions to be considered. One is, what proportion of Internet audience does not 
belong to the ruling elite? The size of non-elite users is representative of the 
二 Diffusion Effect. The other is how can users be exposed to content that is 
alternative to the official ideology? The Exposure effect, as part of the 
democratizing impacts of the Internet, is possible only when the circle of Intemet 
users is not restricted to the privileged elite in the party-state or the online content 




Computer&telecommunications 26.1 17.4 
Students 16.4 20.9 
Research & education 12.6 9.8 
Factories & enterprises 11.9 11.0 
State, party organs & social 8.1 8.6 
groups 
Finance 6.0 7.7 
Social services 3.6 3.2 
Hygiene, sports & social welfare 1.9 4.8 
Others 11.8 14.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Table 4.1 The occupations of Intemet users in mainland China 
t* 
� 
Drawn from the CNNIC Report and Sohu Report again, I compile Table 4.1 to see 
the occupational traits of the Chinese netizens. If the sector of "state, party organs 
and social groups" is taken as representative of the existing power elite, it can be 
% 
claimed that more than 90 percent of China's Intemet users are located outside the 
ruling bureaucracy. The largest two groups are students and computer and 
telecommunications technicians, who account for nearly 40 percent of the total 
number of users. Such a remarkable Diffusion Effect should be acknowledged 
with two reservations. First, it is necessary to always keep in mind that the 
diffusion of the new medium touches merely a tiny proportion of the CMnese 
population. The significant Diffusion Effect within the limited circle of Intemet 
� users under the circumscription of various demographic constraints is not so 
• 
magnificent if it is viewed as part of the larger picture of the entire nation. And the 
difftision patterns as shown above may change as the technology continues to 
spread in a larger scope of the society. 
On the other hand, using “state, party organs and social groups" to represent 
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China's ruling elite can be criticized as a shorthanded solution. It may lead to 
either underestimation, since there may be cadres of the party-state in other 
categories, or overestimation, because not all members of the "social groups" 
should be counted as part of the power elite. Moreover, since the ruling elite refers 
to those who enjoy the privileges of political communication for the discussion of 
communicative democratization in specific, the above-mentioned 
operationalization is surely inadequate. Such a deficiency may be inevitable as 
long as the surveys are not conducted by those who care about user demographics 
u 
as important indicators of the political effects of the Intemet. ‘ 
Acknowledging the qualifications, I nevertheless hope to stress that the distribution 
of Intemet audience beyond the boundary of the ruling elite is conspicuous. The � 
two surveys are generally confirmatory with each other as for the patterns of 
diffusion. Despite the potential sources of error, it is quite improbable that all 
respondents for each occupation in Table 4.1 are party-state cadres. And there are 
categories like "students", which are very likely to include no member of the 
existing power elite. It is thus acceptable to contend that the Diffiision Effect has 
taken place in China. The scope in which the technological outputs of the Intemet, 
including the devices, the services and the users, are dispersed has been well 
- 二 ‘ 
beyond the traditional boundaries. 
The major implication of the Diffusion Effect is that previously most of the current 
netizens did not enjoy the access to a multiplicity of information that is 
comparable to the online resources open to them now. The national firewall was 
8 2 
not built until 1996. Even today, it does not blackout all websites that are not 
sponsored by the party-state. The firewall can be penetrated by reconfiguring 
users' Intemet browser. Moreover, email, ftp and electronic bulletin boards 
facilitate cross-border information flow effectively. According to my interviews 
with domestic users, many of them first heard of the anti-Chinese atrocities in 
BBS stations and online chatrooms in July 1998. I saw several BBS messages 
containing ftp server names that direct audience to startling images about the riots 
such as dead bodies and women being raped. A friend emailed me from Beijing 
%i 
asking me to give him website addresses related to the riots. I replied, and he tried , 
the http addresses. Although the connection was denied since the websites were 
banned, it nevertheless demonstrated that email could easily transmit OPC 
information beyond the firewall. Moreover, the promptness of the email exchange � 
is also indicative of the special charm of the new medium, which are more likely 
to be used for the acquisition of political news unavailable in the mass media. 
Considering these relatively uncontrollable forms of CMC, I have reasons to 
believe that the online resources of political information are richer and more 
diverse than the centralized political content in China's mass media. 
So there is certain Exposure Effect, too. Yet I have to admit various constraints 
• • . 
that reduce the medium's universal accessibility in principle to selected exposure 
in reality. As having been portrayed in the previous chapter, the spread of the new 
technology has been restricted by economic, educational thresholds as well as the 
national regulatory measures such as state monopoly of IAPs and the requirement 
for ISPs and individual users to register. Subsequently, the diffusion of Intemet 
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exposure, though beyond the boundaries of the ruling elite, is far from covering 
the entire society. And in terms of online content, it is relatively more pluralistic 
than China's mass media but at the same time far less so in comparison with the 
global Intemet because of the national firewall and other means of virtual 
censorship. 
National firewall is the first filter for the control of exposure to OPC content from 
abroad. So far, the Chinese government has never disclosed their list of banned 
M 
websites and their rationale in deciding what should be banned. For a long time 
after the national firewall was built up in 1996, most Chinese newspaper websites 
outside the mainland have been blacked out with three exceptions: Ta Kung Pao 
and Wen Wei Pao, the two CCP-sponsored newspapers in Hong Kong, and Lianhe � 
Zaobao, the mainstream press of Singapore. Being the only non-official Chinese 
online newspaper that was directly accessible from the mainland, Lianhe Zaobao 
played an unsurpassable role in informing Chinese Intemet audience of the riots in 
Indonesia in the middle of 1998. Many domestic users told me they read news 
reports in Lianhe Zaobao either directly in its website or indirectly in BBS 
stations, where many Zaobao articles were frequently reposted. 
_ 二 ‘ • • 
In summer 1998，many new sites were set up by oversea Chinese for the May riots. 
Since the friend who requested http addresses from me failed to access these 
newly created homepages, it is reasonable to doubt that China's strategy of 
denying connection to "harmful" external websites is to block blacklisted websites. 
Rather, it may be a universal ban of all external addresses, complied with selective 
8 4 
exposure to the permitted sites^. 
Strangely, my friend in Beijing told me in December 1998，that he could visit the 
homepage of Apple Daily, a popular newspaper in Hong Kong, which often takes 
a critical stance against the Chinese authorities. When I was in the mainland 
during January 1999，I also get connected to the homepage, while other major 
Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong and Taiwan remained inaccessible. Lifting the 
ban on Apple Daily well exemplified the irrationality and arbitrariness of Chinese 
t* 
technocrats in their operation of the firewall. 
Aside from confinements imposed by China's Intemet regulatory bodies, users' 
access to political information is also influenced by the context of their work units � 
(dan wei). 50% of Chinese users surf the Net in their offices<'. My personal 
experience in Beijing reveals that work unit is not a good place for viewing OPC 
messages, which may put the audience in a vulnerable position among colleagues. 
As a result, some would wait until nighttime when others do not watch them. This 
phenomenon is so popular that I heard complaints about some work unit shut 
down network server at night and allocated quotas of surfing hours to different 
offices, which further restrict audience exposure as an important realrWorld 
« ‘ » � _ • * * contextual constraint. 
"Another constraining factor is the slow network speed in China. By the end of 
4G This inference needs to be confirmed by sources in the operating organ of the firewall. If it is true, the 
technical constraints imposed by the state over OPC is more severe than expected. 
'^ CNNIC Report, January 1999. Accessible at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/99'cnnic/p 1 .htm. 
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1998, he nation's total bandwidth for international connection is no more than 
143M256Kbps'S whereas the total number of users has soared to 2.1 million. 
Using CNNIC data of January 1999 again, I figure out that the average time for a 
user to stay online is more than 6.73 hours per week, which means the average 
number of users accessing the Intemet concurrently is 64063. Dividing the total 
international bandwidth by the number of users online, the average extemal 
bandwidth for each user is 1.7Kbps. In other words, in order to view the 80Kb-
large homepage of the Chinese University, the user has to wait for about 50 
fti 
seconds, provided it is not a "rush hour" and the network is operating at full 
capacity. This speed is slow. Consequently, as shown in the CNNIC Report of 
January 1999, network speed is the most prevailing complaint among China's 
Intemet users. 92 percent of the survey respondents expressed their discontent in � 
this respect, which was another obstacle for them to access online content. 
The exposure to OPC information also depends on whether the users are 
interested in OPC at large or the OPC topic in specific. When I raised a question 
about the Indonesia riots in an interview via ICQ, my informant, a man working in 
Shenzhen, responded "[I] don't like that topic". He said it was "boring" and he did 
not care. Admittedly, in any country at any time, there are people who do not care 
- ‘- ‘ -
about politics. However, it is worthwhile to mention that political indifference 
among Chinese users is probably precipitated by the unsatisfactory technical 
"reality, virtual censorship and various contextual constraints, and the slow 
network speed. 
42 The campus network of CUHK is linked to the rest o fHong Kong with a bandwidth of 140Mbps, which is 
86 
Finally, the crucial role of extemal users in transmitting political news into 
China's cyberspace must be stressed. As has been mentioned previously, oversea 
Chinese users were the first to inform domestic users of the persecutions against 
ethnic Indonesian Chinese using email, ftp and the electronic bulletin boards. 
However, the function of extemal users in broadening the horizon of domestic 
Internet audience should not be understood as a pure vehicle free from personal 
prejudices. In many cases, they add their comments to the messages they deliver. 
t* 
Even as mere gatekeepers, they can only transmit news stories that they think are 
credible, comprehensible and important. For instance, although various kinds of 
online articles about the May riots in international mass media were posted in 
Mainland Chinese bulletin boards, an issue about the credibility of the � 
photographs was continuously suppressed in domestic arenas. In July 26, an 
Indonesian human rights worker posted an English article in Lianhe Zaobao's 
online forum pointing out that most of the photos depicting raped Chinese women 
actually existed before the May riots in websites condemning the torture of East 
Timor women. The homepage addresses were specified. Editors at Zaobao also 
translated this message into Chinese. A few rebuttals appeared in the Zaobao 
forum attempting to deny the credibility issue. However, such information cannot 
’ be found in domestic Internet communities, probably because extemal users 
regarded it as an irrelevant problem. 
In short, the Internet is of no doubt increasing the power of the Chinese Internet 
nearly equal to the international connection bandwidth of the entire China. 
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audience vis-a-vis the state, although the basic structure creating user dependence 
on the sociopolitical context of the nation remain largely unchanged. Cyberspace is 
still too slow, too expensive, and too technically specialized for ordinary Chinese 
to access. Yet nevertheless, the Exposure Effect is remarkable since the dispersion 
of users has gone far beyond the boundary of the existing power elite and the 
available content of online political information have been much richer than in the 
mass media of the nation. “ 
II 
The Rugged Route from Exposure to Expression 
After being exposed to online information that differs from CCP's political 
propaganda, the next stage for the Intemet to exert its democratizing impacts is to 
% 
encourage users to express themselves. Online expression should be analyzed since 
it not only reflects the ways in which users interpret the OPC messages they have 
seen. More importantly, it allows users to take part in public opinion processes in 
cyberspace and set the stage for the users to be mobilized to exert their influence on 
politics in the real world. 
The technological attributes of the new medium should be stressed again as for the 
Expression Effect, to which the special attraction of ‘the technology also makes 
significant contributions. Of little doubt, the Intemet facilitates a more accessible 
and interactive form of communication than the mass media insofar as it "puts 
cultural acts, symbolizations in all forms, in the hands of all participants" (Poster, 
1997:234). In most Chinese BBS communities, responding to an existing article is 
as simple as replying an email. And as a result, a long thread of dialogues among 
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different users can be accumulated chronologically and displayed publicly as a 
collective creation. Another distinctive feature is the virtuality of CMC. No matter 
what one browses, no matter what one says, the only trace sAie leaves are digital 
signals that can be either completely removed or identified with uncertain 
corresponding party in the real world. Although Intranet technologies enable 
China's cyberpolice to trace the online activities initiated from a targeted terminal, 
technically they have little chance to affirm that the terminal was used constantly by 
a single user. 
t* 
r 
In cyberspace communities where users have their membership account, it is 
possible to determine which articles are posted by the same person, whose user 
name is shown on each message sAie writes. However, few people would disclose � 
their real names in their membership account. I once logged in using a user name 
that was exactly the pinyin spelling of my name. On quite a few occasions, my folks 
in virtual communities laughed at my "simplemindedness" in showing my real 
name in the membership account. My parents also urged me to change to another 
user name since they saw my views about China's politics in a BBS community. 
Finally, I adopted a pseudonym in the virtual space as everyone else does. The shift 
did give me a psychological relief and I felt freer than previously when expressing 
•“ - ' 
my own opinions. 
Despite the liberalizing technological attributes and their special charm emerging 
contextually, most Intemet audiences in Mainland China are still reluctant to speak 
up. And even if they do, what they say may not necessarily differ from the dominant 
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ideology transmitted by the party's propaganda apparatus. There may be no better 
example than the prevalent nationalistic discourse^' in China's cyberspace. Even 
before the Indonesian riots broke out, virtual communities in Mainland China have 
been imbued with nationalism, or the officially glorified "patriotism", against Japan, 
America, and other "western imperialist countries". Those who support the 
independence ofTibet and Taiwan have been severely criticized as traitors. 
In the case of the Indonesian riots, several users referred to local Indonesians as 
|泰 
"the aboriginal", "inferior race" or even "thugs" and "animals" who deserve total 
elimination. Li contrast, the image of Chinese was "diligent", "kind" and "smart”. 
In an article posted in the Readers' Forum of Indonesian Affairs at the website of 
Lianhe Zaobao, a mainland Chinese user expressed himself in English, "You k n o w , � 
sometimes I'm really proud of [being] a Chinese, like you, Really!!! So tough and 
wise are dragon's sister and brother!" And in several other occasions, those who 
expressed discontent or criticism of Chinese nationalism was vehemently 
condemned by other "patriotic" users collectively. In the Zaobao Forum, quite a 
number of articles written by mainland users criticized not only the Indonesian 
mobs and the Indonesian government but also Chinese users outside China for not 
beirig as nationalistic as they were. According to articles in the Shanghai BBS, a 
user showed his indifference to the riots in a chatroom. Dozens of zealot patriotists 
were irritated. They cursed the guy with filthy language and threatened to destroy 
“ T h e relationship between nationalism and dominant ideology in China is kind of ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the integrity ofthe Chinese nation is a component of communist indoctrination in Mainland China. On 
the other hand, the party-state always have to reiterate that "loving China means nothing but loving the 
socialist China" in fear ofunfettered nationalistic pursuits that may jeopardize their rule. Nationalism thus has 
obvious overlap with the dominant ideology advocated by China's propagandists, while it also has its own 
； 
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his email account by sending email bombs to him. 
Rampant nationalism in China's OPC forums may not be surprising. Being an 
important source of legitimacy for the Chinese party-state, nationalism has been 
one of the most fundamental underlying discourses of China that is continually 
reproduced by mass media, periodically flamed up by diplomatic events, and 
deeply internalized among the ordinary people. "All public arenas have political 
biases that set the acceptable range of discourse in that arena" (Hilgartner and Bosk, 
I* 
1988:71). As for online discussion of the Indonesian riots in China, nationalism is , 
the “acceptable range" due to the tradition of dorminant political discourse in the 
real world. 
% 
The predominant position of nationalistic expressions in online forums can also be 
explained by other factors, namely the virtual censorship and the resulting online 
political culture. Virtual censorship, as a set of regulatory measures taken by the 
Chinese government to domesticate the online arenas, creates an environment that 
is apolitical or even hostile to OPC discussions on the Memet. First of all, there 
are "cyberspacial" measures — meaning the platform configurations of cyberspace 
communities are deliberately designated so that users' attempts to maintain a 
sustainable sphere of political dialogues will be hampered. Among fhe several 
BBS stations and a few public chatrooms I visited, most display slogans such as 
"no political content is welcome" in their main page. BBS stations all have a 
"rules" board where national regulations and rules set by the sysops ofthe virtual 
autonomy, which is a potential challenge for the political status quo since it is not completely contained and 
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community are displayed. Most importantly, there is no board or chatroom 
designed specifically for the expression and exchange of users' political opinions, 
whereas most cyberspacial resources are allocated to discussions on technical 
topics, sports, love affairs and entertainment. 
The absence of OPC boards on political issues may change the way online 
political communicators interact with each other by forcing OPC to be 
intermingled with other content irrelevant to political issues. If one wishes to 
\* 
express his or her political opinions, the choice of board is always uncertain. The 
� 
article may be posted on the board where the user most frequently accesses, or in 
the place where the user encounters an article related to his or her view. In the 
former occasion, the board can be one about a university or a city; whereas in the 
、 
latter case, political expressions are usually publicized on the boards about news. 
For instance, in a BBS located in Shanghai, the Peking University Alumni Board 
and the International News Board are the arenas where most discussions about the 
Indonesian riots exist. In both boards, political expressions about the topic have to 
be mixed up with descriptive accounts and discussions about other topics. A result 
ofthis mixture is that abrupt, emotional catch phrases are more likely than lengthy 
comments and careful reconsideration of previous statements to dominate OPC 
forums. ‘ 
The deletion ofpolitically undesirable messages is another frequently used method 
of virtual censorship. Sometimes, those who published "harmful" messages may be 
therefore domesticated within the party-state institution. 
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punished in the Intemet community. He or she may lose the right to "post", i.e. to 
express themselves on the electronic bulletins. Or in serious occasions, the user 
may have his or her membership account suspended. In the OPC processes about 
the Indonesian riots, no evidence shows that any user in mainland Chinese BBS 
systems was punished in cyberspace because of inappropriate expressions. 
However, deletion of undesirable articles still went on. The exact number of 
messages being removed is unknown. Yet on 3 August 1998 soon after China 
expressed its temporary support for the condemnation of the riots, a user wrote in a 
1» 
Shanghai BBS that "Thank God, the deletion of articles have ceased". 
fT 
Two weeks later, after the small-scale protest in Beijing was expelled, I posted my 
comments on a board for which I served as the boardmaster. “The Chinese 
、 
government fears popular protest against the Indonesian authority," I wrote, 
"because both of them found their rule on bloody suppression of dissidents, the lure 
of economic development, and the excuse of maintaining stability." The article 
disappeared when I logged in several hours later. I put up a message requesting 
explanations for the deletion of my post. But the second post with my request was 
removed again. No single clue of explanation could be found even in the form of a 
private email to me. The articles must have been deleted by the sysops who kept 
surveillance on the board since they were the only people who had the right to~ 
delete posts in the board except me. 
In some BBS such as “Shuimu Qinghua,, at Qinghua University, automatic deletion 
software is installed. It has a list ofkeywords such as ‘‘protest’，，"June Fourth" and 
9 3 
“1989”. If an article contains anyone of the keywords, it will be automatically 
removed. Unlike national firewall, which narrows down the spectrum of audience 
exposure, this screening device reduces the scope of both audience exposure and 
opinion expression. However, users have started using homophones of the 
keywords to obviate the automatic filter. For instance, "protest" (you xing) can be 
typed in as "young star" fyou xing), which the screening software does not 
recognize but other users can understand. Fortunately, Chinese language is known 
for multiple homonyms sharing the same sound. This facilitates users to voice their 
ii 
comments about politics in China's cyberspace despite the automatic deletion 
r 
software, reflecting the struggle between individual agency and the suppressive 
force of the structure. 
、 
Another way to block users' channel to express themselves is to shut down the 
electronic forums. The shutdown can be applied to the entire Intemet community, 
meaning the website is delinked with the Intemet in the way the former Untitled 
BBS ofPeking University is punished. In a less severe manner, the BBS system or 
some of its "sensitive" boards is set in the read-only mode, which allows users to 
read the online content but denies their expression in the BBS. 
Virtual censorship has its observable impacts not only on the online content but 
also on users' perception of OPC as a dangerous game that may bring harm to 
oneselfas well as to the entire virtual community. In my interview with a graduate 
student in a BBS located in Wuhan, the respondent expressed his skepticism 
towards other's attempt to probe into his activities about political affairs. When I 
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asked him where he first saw news report about the Indonesian riots, he replied 
with two questions, "Are you a student? How come you seems to be from the 
intelligence bureau {diaochaju de)T Very clearly, he was afraid that disclosing his 
OPC experiences might do harm to himself. 
Another example illustrating the deterrence of virtual censorship is a long prose 
about the author's personal experience in June Fourth. This article was originally 
published in a BBS in Shenzhen and later reposted in several BBS stations all 
»> 
over the nation. In the first paragraph, the author wrote, 
r 
I had planned to say nothing, mostly because this may endanger the survival 
of this net in Shenzhen. Now that I have read so many articles, and I am 
going to take a job and leave this BBS, I feel I have to speak out. Hopefully 
boardmasters and stationmasters can keep this message fbr one or two days � 
so that everyone can read it. If some public security comrades see this 
message, please show mercy. Tum a blind' eye to it, and stationmasters will 






To this user who would have ajob and lose access to the Internet Q3r0bably from a » ^ 
university), all possible punishments to himself in cyberspace are not deterring. r 
Nor was he irritated by the expectation that his article would be cancelled in a 
much shorter period of time than articles about apolitical topics. Yet he was still 
worrying that public security officials may order the shutdown ofthe BBS. In this 
case, the user's concem for the survival of the virtual community becomes an 
obstacle to be overcome before free expression of personal opinions is attained in 
9 5 
cyberspace. 
The institutional suppression of alternative voices takes place through the absence 
of formally established forum for interactive discussions of political affairs and 
the computerized or manual purge of oppositional ideas on the bulletin boards. In 
doing so, the co-optation of cyberspace communities by the ruling authorities is 
•facilitated. And the reluctance to discuss politics in cyberspace has become a 
shared culture that encompasses various types of users, because the fear for 
%t 
surveillance and punishment endangers large number of users and the shutdown of 
ff 
the Intemet community affects the interests of everyone. A defensive ritual as 
illustrated in the previous quotation is to start with an apologetic tone: "I had 
planned to say nothing", "I'm sorry I have to mention the Tiananmen incident" or 
、 
“I hope what I say does not menace the existence of this BBS". This kind of 
expression reflects the contrition the author has to go through in expressing 
personal opinions. 
However, to those who attend several online communities and those who log in 
from outside China, the deterrence of punishment to the users and the related 
communities becomes less significant. Thus, alternative voices and anti-CCP 
^ « • 
arguments can still be heard from time to time."Yet those who dare to challenge 
the established order tend to dramatize what they say. More often than not, their 
•way of expression is passionate and irrational. While discussing the Indonesian 
riots, a popular comment is that China should take a tougher position against the 
Indonesians. Basing on this general ingroup consensus, some went on to suggest 
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that China needed to send armies to the country in order to take revenge. "All 
Indonesian pigs should be killed," one wrote on an electronic bulletin "and 
Indonesian women should take care." 
To this group of audacious users, serious political dialogue is less important than 
the construction of political spectacles, echoing to what Murray Edelman (1988) 
has described. OPC, the presumable tool of democratization among the Chinese 
public，thus becomes prone to degrade to an instrument of entertainment for 
II 
personal excitement, collective catharsis and the attraction of public attention. 
During the climax of online condemnation of the Indonesian riots, someone 
established a site in altern.org calling for the purge ofall Chinese in Indonesia. This 
site was replaced with an appeal for the killing of all Indonesians e v e r y w h e r e , � 
allegedly the result of"hacking" by some "smart and patriotic" Chinese user. The 
-•• 
network administer of altern.org finally clarified, "the two versions ofthe site came 
from the same IP address, using the same password. No hacking, no magicJust the 
same disturbed guy." Although this is a rare form ofexpression that seldom occurs, 
it nevertheless indicates the liability for OPC to become a paradise of extremists 
rather than a forum where users can discuss political affairs rationally. 
fc I 
Drama is one of the major principles for the selection of specific topic in public 
political arenas (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988:61). The dramatization trend may 
confirm the popular stereotype among Chinese netizens that only some "crazy" 
people, who have little respect to objective truth and the integrity of the virtual 
communities, will be enthusiastic about OPC. This may in tum reinforce the 
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collective bias against political discussion in China's cyberspace exacerbated by 
various measures of virtual censorship. Moreover, the climax of online discussion 
concerning a specific issue is often followed by the rapid decline of the issue 
"because ofits diminished dramatic value" (Jbid., p. 62). 
In sum, although the interactivity and virtuality of CMC encourage user expression 
as a result of exposure to online content, there are numerous hurdles for audiences 
to offer their comments on current affairs via the Intemet, especially when their 
it 
attitudes differ from China's existing dominant ideology. Virtual censorship and the 
subsequent online political culture further impede smooth elevation of the users 
from mere audience to political communicators. And the capability ofthe Intemet 
to foster a free forum of political discussion in China is significantly reduced. � 
The Gap between Virtuality and Reality 
The role ofthe Intemet in mass mobilization is an extension from its function as a 
publicly accessible forum of political discussion. Since accessibility to the 
Intemet and the freedom of online political expression are both restricted by 
various constraints in the sociopolitical context of CMC in mainland China, the 
mobilizing capacity of the Intemet will inevitably be confined, foo. 
Correspondingly, there have been discernible boundaries concerning what 
segment of the population can be mobilized, to what degree online appeals may 
sound credible and forceful, and how the processes have to rely on existing 
political discourse, if there is Mobilization Effect at all. 
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Yet mobilization in cyberspace contains some features that are not required during 
the processes of OPC exposure and expression. It is first an action beyond any 
individual user. Viewing online content and expressing oneself do not necessarily 
involve other participant, whereas mobilizing messages are targeted at the 
behavioral changes of other people. Therefore, a second characteristic of online 
mobilization is its requirement of mutual trust among the communicators, a sense 
of collective unity surpassing the kind of confidence that supports online 
expression of political opinions. Moreover, appeals in cyberspace not only call for 
“ 
other people's actions on the Net but in some cases real-world reactions are also 
fT 
required. Obstacles in real space rather than cyberspace render OPC mobilization 
a process under unique constraints. 
、 
The uniqueness of mobilization process is accompanied by special considerations 
in the part ofthe OPC actors. From a rational choice perspective, users may make 
their decisions concerning their reactions to mobilizing messages on the basis of 
three evaluations. (1) Whether the appeals are logically persuasive? Answers to 
this question certainly vary when different users make the judgment. Yet the 
decisions may also be influenced by the pro-establishment regulations and 
cyberspacial settings in China as well as the subsequent unfavorable political 
- � ‘ 
culture among the netizens. (2) How much is the potential cost to the involved 
person and/or his virtual community? The mechanisms of punishment against 
.individual offenders and against virtual communities should be both considered. 
The mobilizers' sense ofbelonging to the cyberspace communities may also affect 
the perceived cost of engaging in online mobilization. (3) At what odds the 
•’ 
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proposed actions may succeed in attaining the political goals? This is the greatest 
impediment to OPC mobilization in China because the hindrances include those 
locating in the real world where non-democratic authorities still maintain 
dominance. 
In China, the scarcity of political movements mobilized by the Intemet^ 
demonstrates how difficult it is to transform public opinions on the Net into 
collective actions in reality. After thirteen years of development since 1986, the 
t* 
Intemet has only fomented, as a relatively independent force ofmobilization, two 
� 
small-scale public protests. One is the condemnation of the May riots in Indonesia, 
for which over a hundred college students gathered in front of the Indonesian 
embassy in Beijing on 17 August 1998. Police officers and cadres from 
% 
universities dismissed the protesters after they delivered a T-shirt with their 
signatures to Indonesian diplomats. The other is triggered by the dispute over 
Diaoyu Island in autumn 1996. An anti-Japan assembly was held on 17 September 
1996 in Peking University. The gathering was in preparation for a larger 
demonstration to be held at the Japanese embassy. However, teachers in charge of 
"student ideology work" {xueshen sixiang gongzu6) in each department came to 
take their students away. Those who were not students in the university were 
detained. The first demonstration fostered by the Intemet in China was aborted. 
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The two collective actions resulted from online political mobilization share some 
similarities. Both instances were in the name of nationalism, targeting at the 
"enemies" of the great Chinese nation. Both gatherings in the real world were 
preceded by heated discussions in cyberspace, especially in BBS communities. In 
the case of the Diaoyu Island incident of 1996，the most important virtual 
community was the Untitled BBS of Peking University. By then, China's 
regulation of OPC had been barely put into practice. The Untitled BBS hosted half 
I) 
a dozen specialized boards for political discussion about topics such as Sino-
� 
American relationship, Sino-Japanese relationship and the Taiwan problem. 
Although the virtual community has been closed for about three years, a former 
member of the Untitled BBS still told me in a chatroom interview that he 
% 
cherished the memory of warm political discussion in the BBS. 
In both cases, the Intemet was not the only medium that has impact upon the 
political actors. Though cyberspace may be the first place where banned political 
information started to circulate, other forms of mediated communication were also 
employed. The editorial of People 's Daily on 3 August 1998 lifted the taboo of 
Indonesian issue and allowed China's mass media to play a temporary role in 
mobilizing the>eople until the Public Security Bureau of Beijing Municipality 
• 44 Notably, the Intemet played a facilitating role in mobilizing the recent demonstration of faluengong 
exercisers and the anti-Nato protests. Yet it is hard to argue that the Intemet played the most important and 
indispensable role in these incidents as in the anti-Japanese and anti-Indonesian movements. The quasi-
religious organization offaluengong with its own rules and disciplines might be the most fundamental source 
of its mobilizing force among the exercisers. Other means of communication like pager and mobile phone are 
also utilized to muster collective force of political action. As for the anti-Nato protests, the larger portion of 
the mobilizing job was done by mass media and the organizational forces of the party-states especially 
officials in universities and work units. On the contrary, both the anti-Japanese movement and the anti-
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refused students' application for legal protest on 15 August. In an article posted in 
the Peking University Alumni Board ofthe Shanghai BBS, a man was reported to 
be so infuriated after reading reports about the riots in Beijing Youth Daily that he 
threw stones at the Indonesian embassy and was arrested. In the anti-Japan 
movement of 1996, journalists in Beijing also participated in the OPC processes 
about the Diaoyu Island incident. Some of them reported the online discussions 
informing not only the ordinary people but also the authority of political power of 
the new medium. Being aware of potential "instability", the party-state quenched 
it 
the protest at length. The mass media may therefore serve either a positive or 
/r 
negative function for the process of OPC mobilization. 
"Big letter posters" {da zi bao) and "small letter posters" (xiao zi bao) also 
、 
deserve our attention. Before the gathering in 1996, small letter posters displaying 
anti-Japanese slogans or calling for attendance in the assembly could be seen on 
the campus of Peking University in public bulletins and the entrances of student 
canteens. Before the government denied students' right to protest in August 1998， 
big letter posters including petitioning messages covered bulletin boards at the 
center of the university. Although official veto of students' application was 
declared on the 15'^  and campus policemen in Peking University were on patrol «, * 
i 
duty to prevent mobilization messages from being posted on campus, small letter 
posters were still functioning. On the evening of the 16*, many students found 
Xeroxed A4 paper on the walls along the corridors of their dormitory building. 
The message was but one sentence: "Tomorrow moming, seven o'clock, South 
Indonesian movement must have been impossible without the Intemet since they relied much less upon forces 
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Gate, muster! {mingzao qidian nanmen jihe!y' This message also appeared in 
various BBS communities throughout China. 
As shown in the two cases, it seems to be easy and natural for "small media" like 
the posters to form cross-media symbiosis with the bitemet in the mobilization 
process, while the role mass media play depends more on the official stance. 
‘ . 
Yet even with the aid of traditional media, online mobilization in both movements 
it 
was seriously handicapped by the demobilization forces of the party-state. In 1992, 
ff 
the Chinese government has formally deprived its people of the freedom of 
assembly, protest and demonstration by issuing the Implementation Ordinance of 
Assembly, Protest and Demonstration of the People Republic of China. The 
% 
ordinance provides that all collective political actions in China, if not directly 
organized by the work units, must apply for approval of public security organs. 
Among several restrictions, it is stipulated that the application must bear the name 
of a "responsible person" together with sanctions from the person's work unit. 
This regulation basically puts citizens' constitutional right to assemble, protest 
and demonstrate at the mercy of work units and the government. And as a result, 
there have been few applications for "legal" demonstration; since the chance to be 
“ ‘ , • 
- 二 • ； 
in the real world than the recent demonstrations. 
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approved is quite slim '^. Being "illegal" according to the Ordinance, collective 
political actions like the assembly in 1996 and the protest in 1998 can be dispelled 
by the police with or without force. 
It can be figured out basing on the CNNIC Report of January 1999 that currently 
more than 400,000 Internet users in China are college students. They are quite 
visible both as netizens and as the segment of the population that are most likely 
to hold demonstrations. Therefore, the demobilizing forces in universities should 
ti 
also be underlined as an important real-life hindrance for the Mobilization Effect 
ff 
to be attained. Every university in mainland China has a system for "student 
ideology work" {xuesheng sixiang gongzuo) that usually comprises a deputy-
president of the university, a vice-chair from each department, numerous t eache r s� 
in charge of the classes {banzhuren) and student cadres in CCP and the 
Communist Youth League. In key institutions with political influence such as 
Peking University, there is also an intensively staffed troop of campus police 
{xiaoweidui). In the 1996 and 1998 cases, the campus police and all levels of 
student ideology workers expect student cadres were engaged in the processes of 
demobilization. The campus police watched public bulletins on campus and 
detained participants in the assemblies if they are not students in the university. 
i 
The vice-chair of departments and teachers in charge of the classes did the 
persuasive job to magnify the perceived deterrence. And the deputy-president of 
45 The recent anti-Nato protests in major cities of the Mainland China are exceptional cases. Leaders of the 
party-state, officials in universities and cadres in work units were in consent with the students and other 
demonstrators to express their discontent towards "westem imperialism". Thus the authorities were involved 
to facilitate and even organize the mobilizing processes. Granting approval to applications for protests in this 
situation is part of the top-down efforts to meet bottom-up appeals, which has no parallel in terms ofpopular 
political movement since 1989. 
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Peking University appeared both times in the student assembly urging participants 
to "consider the serious outcomes" in a more authoritative tone -^. 
Realistic obstacles are so effective in limiting the Mobilization Effect of the 
Intemet that both of the collective actions initiated in China's cyberspace were 
seriously constrained under the authoritative power of the work unit and the 
government. The cases of the anti-Japanese and anti-Indonesian demonstrations are 
not mere history. They also reduce the perceived validity of OPC as an 
II 
autonomous force of political mobilization at present and perhaps in the future. 
/f 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the state apparatus is almighty in 
preventing all non-official political actions of Chinese netizens, who can now 
react beyond the real world in the virtual cosmos. 
、 
There are several ways to mobilize in cyberspace including requesting users to 
sign online petition letters, vote in online opinion polls and send messages to 
friends, political figures or public offices. More aggressively, some may ask users 
to engage in destructive actions against political opponents by sending email 
bombs or even hacking the websites of the opponents. In terms ofobjectives, such 
actions in cyberspace are akin to real-life reactions in that they are also means to 
- ：. » 
purposefully pressure for alteration of political arrangements in the real world. 
However, since they occur in cyberspace, traditional demobilizing forces imposed 
by the state no longer hamper users' responses. Meanwhile, higher requirements 
46 Information concerning the assembly in 1996 was collected when I was a student in Peking University. 
Information about the protest in 1998 was from online descriptive articles written by participants in the 
protest. 
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of technical skills and computer literacy are demanded. 
OPC processes concerning the Indonesian riots in 1998 offered a good example of 
online mobilization. Soon after news stories from abroad appeared in mainland 
Chinese BBS communities, appeals for online reactions also emerged. Some 
asked users to visit homepages newly created for the condemnation of the riots. 
Some showed names of ftp servers carrying photos about the riots and urged users 
to view them and disseminate them to their relatives and friends. Some listed 
II 
email addresses of political leaders in Indonesia, the United - States, the United 
r 
Nations and related international organizations so that users could email them. In 
some BBS messages, standardized petition letters were also provided. Users can 
simply cut and paste the content into their emails. More aggressively, there were 
、 
appeals for repetitively sending long emails to major organs of the Indonesian 
government in order to block up their email servers. A BBS message mentioned 
some software named "crazy mail" that sent letters repetitively to a targeted email 
address, while hiding the address of the sender at the same time. Proposals for 
sending email virus or "email bomb" could be seen, too. 
The most radical online reaction is hacking, i.e. sneaking into a targeted Intemet 
- � • 
management system, disabling its network security devices so that homepages 
displayed on the websites can be amended or replaced with anything the invaders 
• want to put up. Soon after Beijing expressed its temporary support signaled by the 
August 3 editorial of People 's Daily, there appeared BBS articles asking users 
with enough technical know-how to hack Indonesian websites. IP addresses of 
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Indonesian websites were listed for Chinese hackers to attack. A few websites 
were created to host talks about hacking skills and cooperation in deciphering 
passwords. According to an BBS post, an Intemet Cafe in Gongqincheng City, 
Jiangxi Province, started to provide free services for "those who are able to hack 
Indonesian websites". Successful hackings were reported on electronic bulletins 
with technical procedures specified. BBS articles celebrating the successes of 
revenge in cyberspace also appeared. On 13 August 1998, an official in Jarkata 
protested that more than a dozen of websites owned by the Indonesian 
•t 
government were hacked in the previous week by an organization called "Chinese 
if 
Hackers". Some of the homepages were pasted with horrible photos. Others were 
totally destroyed. 
% 
"To serve the country, students have nothing but the pen they hold as a 
cutting knife!" Fortunately, we have wisdom, we have computer, we have 
Intemet! ... Let's attack cities and seize territories in this world of the 
networks, and deal a head-on blow on the inferior mobs who dared to belittle 
China and disgrace Chinese! 
“書生報國無他物’唯有手中筆做刀！”還好，我們有智慧，我們有電 
腦’我們有Intemet ！ ？讓我們在這網絡的世界中攻城掠地，給膽敢輕 
視中國、污辱中國人的劣等暴民以迎頭痛擊！ 
~ From The Manifesto of Chinese Hackers*� 
« • • 
• » 
Aggressive online responses ta the Indonesian riots may have set k precedent in 
the history ofChina's Intemet since there was no report of similar phenomenon in 
the anti-Japanese movement of 1996. Nationalist zeal was so intense among 
domestic Lntemet users, whereas collective action remained seriously checked by 
47 Accessible at http://203.207.226.117/nettechyPubmBS_default.htrn 
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the state in reality. Consequently, virtual reactions became a release of political 
libido among the Chinese users. Such outlet guarantees no rationality. In some 
cases the responses could be blind. For example, one of the several hacked 
Indonesian websites was hosted by a non-official travel agency promoting 
Indonesian food and scenic spots. A homepage introducing Indonesian geography 
located in the National University of Singapore was also included in a list of 
websites to be attacked. Even the hacking of official Indonesian websites may be 
unreasonable at a closer look. Does the damage of governmental networks mean 
II 
that the mobs were punished? What if ethnic Indonesian Chinese were persecuted 
� 
again and they needed the Intemet to inform their government? None of these 
questions was discussed in the BBS communities and electronic chatrooms I 
visited. During an interview, I raised these questions to a boardmaster, who had 
% 
been my friend in cyberspace for six months. “I don't think it was wrong," he 
replied, “to have that kind of outlet {fa xie fa xi'e)”. The virtual reactions may thus 
serve as not only an alternative way of online mobilization but also a distraction 
that gives vent to the momentum of realistic collective actions, hi this sense, they 
deepen the gap between public opinion in cyberspace and organized action in the 
real world. 
• ：•‘ 、 _ 二 ‘ 
Concluding Remarks 
By imposing virtual censorship and other constraining forces upon the operation of 
•the Intemet, the Chinese government shapes the sociopolitical structure in which 
users are located, and in tum affects both the content of audience exposure and the 
manner of expression and mobilization. Despite explicit Diffusion Effect and 
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notable Exposure Effect as well as the technological incentives for free discussion, 
regulatory constraints have shaped an online political culture conducive to either 
political indifference or the dramatization of OPC expression. And during the 
process of expression, dominant social discourse like Chinese nationalism often 
surfaces, which further reduces the likelihood for the Intemet to host alternative 
voices and subsequently its Expression Effect. 
The greatest obstacles exist in the process of online mobilization for collective 
ii 
actions in the real world, where the demobilization forces of the party-state 
� 
remain powerful. Reactions in cyberspace may function like realistic collective 
political actions to some degree, and as a result, they have been widely adopted by 
the Chinese netizens. Yet while obviating realistic hindrances, online political 
actions are prone to be irrational and entertaining. Virtuality, which facilitates free 
expression, may in this sense distract users' attention and impede mobilizations 
for real-world actions. In short, the net effect is less positive in the process of 
mobilization than in online political exposure and expression. 
‘ . - � ‘ 
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Chapter 5 The Consequences of Mediation 
Evaluating the Consequences 
An empirical basis is necessary for the evaluation of the end products of 
mediation in terms of their democratizing impacts. In this chapter, the 
consequences of mediation are represented by the relatively static online content 
in China's cyberspace, taking the form of articles published on popular online 
It 
political arenas such as the BBS systems. The focus on electronic bulletins does 
not mean other modes of OPC on http homepage or through ftp and email do not 
embody the political impacts of the Intemet. The reason is that few homepage 
located in China could carry non-official news coverage and opinions about � 
political issues expressed by ordinary Intemet users. And although as tools of 
interpersonal communication ftp and email are less controlled by China's Intemet 
regulators, they are less accessible to the general public and the researchers as 
well. 
Articles posted in China's virtual communities, or the "posts", should be 
conceptualized as indications of multiple changes resulted from the mediation 
- � ‘ 
processes for or against democratization. Some of them are news reports and 
editorials cut and pasted from foreign websites. Some are comments expressing 
emotions, attitudes and opinions resulted from OPC exposure. Still some others 
contain mobilizing signals that request actions in the part of other users. And 
oftentimes, vestiges of two or three of the mediation processes may constitute a 
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single post. It is therefore necessary to formulate a set of hypotheses based on the 
processes so that the outcomes can be evaluated in a more analytical way so that 
the overall conclusion about the consequences can be drawn. 
As have been discussed in the previous chapters, the existence of OPC articles in 
China's cyberspace result from the interplay between the incentive factors and 
constraining factors in the processes of mediation. .It is thus reasonable to 
anticipate limited democratizing impacts as the overall political impact ofthe new 
t> 
medium since both sides of the opposing forces play a certain role in shaping the 
ff 
final consequences. More concretely, I expect that Exposure Effect, Expression 
Effect and Mobilization Effect will all be visible to some extent but at the same 
time confined and shaped by the sociopolitical forces of the authoritarian regime. 
、 
The Diffusion Effect will not be evaluated again since the dispersion of Intemet 
usage in the Chinese society has been demonstrated evidently. Because the three 
processes of mediation involve different interactions between the incentives and 
constraints, I shall hypothesize that the degree of democratization impacts is the 
highest in exposure and it descends at the stages of expression and mobilization 
when the involvement and of individual users and the party-state both increase. 
_ The degree of democratization impacts as a yardstick for the evaluation of online : 
’ . � — 
political content consists of three dimensions. The first one is contextual 
divergence, i.e. whether articles in cyberspace arenas have surpassed the 
boundaries of China's political propaganda (in exposure), dominant ideology (in 
opinion expression) and state policies (in mobilization). The second dimension is 
content diversity, i.e. how many kinds of voices concerning a specific topic co-
lli 
exist with each other in a certain OPC forum. They can be either different 
narrative issues about the related event or expressions of various personal 
opinions or distinct mobilizing messages. The last criterion is the quantity of 
alternative messages. Since the total number of articles in the OPC arenas may 
vary, message quantity should better be signified by the proportion of a special 
type of articles in the entire forum. Contextual divergence, content diversity and 




In this chapter, I only examine how the OPC patterns in China's cyberspace are 
influenced by virtual censorship, including formal regulations, technological 
confinements and administrative measures such as message eradication in the 
% 
bulletin boards. Evaluating the efficacy of virtual censorship can be regarded as 
adequate for the conclusions about the consequences of mediation to be drawn 
because the constraining and incentive factors are exact opposites of each other. 
Whether the democratizing effects are strong, weak or limited can be known as 
long as the effectiveness of virtual censorship is specified. 
Certainly, it is within the confinements of other constraining factors that the 
- � ‘ 
evaluation of the political impacts of the Intemet, or the mediation consequences, 
is reduced to the examination of the effectiveness of virtual censorship. 
• Limitations persist and therefore should be acknowledged with regard to user 
demographics and contextual constraints. Yet I conceive the constraining factors 
other than virtual censorship as the circumscribing forces that draw a boundary for 
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the democratizing impacts. In other words, they are not treated as components 
directly involved in the shaping of the OPC patterns during exposure, expression 
and mobilization. This strategy is adopted in part because raw statistics about user 
demographics are unavailabile in part because the focus of the present chapter is 
upon the liberalizing effects within the online political arenas, whose existence is 
of course within the circumscriptions of the contextual and demographical 
constraints. 
1» 
Selecting Online Arenas 
For the sake of evaluation, I compare OPC articles in a BBS community in 
Shanghai (the Shanghai BBS) with those in two other websites, one representing 
China's official propaganda, the other representing OPC results free from t h e � 
processes of mediation inside China. The articles all concem the Indonesian riots 
in May 1998. The two BBS boards include one about international news (the 
News Board), where the discussion of the Indonesian riots may be fostered most 
naturally since this is the place in the virtual community designed for the 
dissemination of international news. The other one is the Peking University 
alumni board (the PKU Board), which was the largest board in the Shanghai BBS 
-in summer 1998 containing more than three thousand posts about various tGpics«. 
The News Board and the PKU Board represent the totality of discussions about 
the Indonesian riots in Shanghai BBS in particular and in China's cyberspace at 
large. The expectation is that online content in Shanghai BBS shall be more 
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diverse than China's official propaganda in cyberspace but less so in comparison 
with the external OPC forum. 
Admittedly, using two boards in the same BBS to stand for OPC outcomes in 
China can be suspected as being biased. There are hundreds of BBS stations in the 
country. And since the Shanghai BBS is hosted by a university, its 
representativeness of virtual communities at commercial websites may also be 
doubtful. However, the Shanghai BBS has its unique value in several aspects. 
ti 
First, with a total number of more than 30,000 registered members in summer 
� 
1998，it is the largest virtual community in China that can be accessed from 
outside the mainland. The most populated virtual community in China is Shuimu 
Qinghua BBS at Qinghua University in Beijing. But the BBS was closed in 
、 
January 1998 to external users including those in Hong Kong. The Shanghai BBS 
thus becomes the best available source. 
Large number of netizens in the BBS leads to a second feature of the virtual 
community, i.e. participants are from all over the country. Unlike the press or 
broadcasting stations, most Intemet communities are accessible globally, or in the 
case of China, at least within the national firewall. Yet I have visited BBS stations 
• » 
— 一 
where there are only a few attendants talking about affairs in their universities or 
research institutes, which means technical accessibility of BBS stations will not 
invariably allow every BBS to draw the attention of users nationwide. Only when 
48 Students at Peking University is a special group of users since they do not have their own BBS since 1996. 
As a result, they have to attend BBS at other institutions and get organized in the PKU boards in the BBS 
systems nationwide. 
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the virtual community has a multiplicity of users and large number of articles 
concerning various topics can it attract more participants from a larger 
geographical region in the vast nation. The Shanghai BBS is such an attractive 
place. Attending it for nearly a year, I have encountered users from across the 
country in the virtual community. 
That a university hosts the BBS may not be too serious a threat to the 
representivity of the data for the evaluation of OPC discussions concerning the 
II 
Indonesian riots. In the Shanghai BBS, I also met numerous people who were not 
fT 
students. And since the online processes triggered by the riots took place mostly 
in June, July and August 1998，student users in the virtual community might be 
less dominant than usual, since it was the period of final examinations and 
% 
summer vocation. Certainly, those who remained on campus during the vocation 
might have more time to spend in the virtual communities. Yet since students in 
universities were the most active group in the OPC processes especially during 
online mobilization, the focus on them may be justified for the evaluation of the 
consequences of mediation in the case of the Indonesian riots. 
The website standing for mainstream political propaganda in China is the 
electronic ’ version of People 's Daily% the formal online publication of CCP 
Central Committee. It may be readily accepted as the ideal type of least 
• democratizing effect because it presents exactly what is published in the 
newspaper and technically there is no arrangement in the website for readers to 
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respond and have their opinions displayed online. The content is highly 
manipulated by the propagandists. The mode of communication is one-way 
indoctrination. The purpose is to promote mainstream ideology of the ruling elite. 
And the website is no more than a mouthpiece of the party-state in cyberspace. 
The one representing external websites is the Readers' Forum (Zaobao Forum) 
about Indonesian riots at Zaobao Online^<>, the website of Lianhe Zaobao in 
Singapore. It is chosen because, during the period of online discussions about the 
ii 
Indonesian riots, it was the only site providing news in Chinese, which is not 
ff 
sponsored by CCP or registered with the Chinese government but directly 
accessible from within the national firewall of China. Zaobao Forum supports 
only GB Chinese, the computer coding of Chinese characters used in the mainland 
% 
but incompatible with BIG5 Chinese coding used in Hong Kong and Taiwan. As 
a result, large number of mainland netizens participated in the Forum, while few 
people in Hong Kong and Taiwan would attend. In an email the author received 
from Mr. Zhou Yuan, the manager of Zaobao Online, it was estimated that Zaobao 
is “the most popular overseas online newspaper in China". And "quite a number 
of our articles are posted by other Intemet outlets every day". As for the Zaobao 
Forum about the Indonesian riots, Mr. Yuan said that "approximately half of the 
- � * 
posts are from Mainland China", "letters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan only accounts for about 20 percent". The Zaobao Forum therefore 
.has its distinct value in providing Chinese users with an arena largely free from 
China's formal, managerial and technical constraints or a “special OPC zone". 
•*9 Accessible at http ://www. peopledai ly.com.cn 
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Certainly, the conceptualization of Zaobao Forum as an ideal state of OPC must 
be qualified. There are more external users in the Forum than in the Shanghai 
BBS. And technically, I cannot isolate all Mainland Chinese participants solely on 
the basis of the messages displayed. Moreover, regulation also exists in Singapore, 
which is but another authoritarian regime. (This might be the reason why Zaobao 
Online is not blacked out by Chinese regulators.) And as disclosed by Mr. Yuan, 
not all posts from the users were published in the Forum. Those with no 
II 
substantial content but one slogan or two and those containing foul language or 
ff 
personal attack were not displayed. Although in his email, Mr. Yuan did not 
specify whether there was any political criterion, there was no single article in the 
Forum criticizing the Singaporean government or the country's patriarch, Lee 
Kwang Yiu. 
However, the value of the Zaobao Online can be ensconced in three aspects. First, 
it is the most popular external news website among the Chinese netizens. 
According to the CNNIC Report of January 1999，Zaobao Online is the second 
most favorite electronic newspaper in China, following People 's Daily. These two 
online newspapers are the only websites with paper-based daily equivalents 
among the top 6CL most favorite websites, which include no other electronic 
newspapers, within or outside China's Intemet firewall. 
Second, although Singapore also censors online content, the criteria adopted by 
^ Accessible at http://www.asia 1.com.sg/cgi-bin/cweb/gzb.p 1 
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editors at Zaobao Online do not aim at safeguarding the polity and ideology of 
Mainland China. There is no rule forbidding users criticizing the Chinese party-
state. Nor is there any punishment mechanisms deterring users' free expression or 
urging editors' to keep OPC content from entering the Fomm. On the contrary, the 
establishment of such a forum is by itself an encouragement for the netizens to 
communicate with each other about the political events. And as can be recognized, 
there are numerous posts in the Zaobao Forum blaming CCP or the Chinese 
government for inappropriate policy-making written by not only oversea Chinese 
II 
but also users from within China. 
ff 
Among American and European scholars, Singapore and China are frequently 
referred to as adopting the same "prevention model" or "the most extreme version 
% 
of governmental and political control over the nets" (Rash, 1997:161-163). This 
generalization is meaningful when countries in the West are employed as the 
I 
comparative reference. Yet it should not be carried to the extent that the internal 
variance between Intemet regulations in the two nations is completely ignored. In 
April 1999, SingNet, the state-owned telecommunications monopoly of Singapore 
made a public apology for intruding into its subscribers' personal computers in the 
name of "virus scanning"". A college student discovered the intrusion. She called 
_ ^ ‘ 
the police for help and disclosed information to Ae mass media. SingNet was 
forced to apologize publicly that "we should have informed the subscribers in 
advance". This event, albeit reflecting the patriarchal role of Intemet regulators in 
Singapore, nevertheless illuminates that the Chinese-style virtual censorship is not 
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established in this country, where the authorities at least show certain respect to 
users' privacy after the intrusion was made public. If happening in Mainland 
China, it is impossible to press the cyberpolice or network administers to make a 
similar apology because their surveillance on the nationwide Intranet has been 
buttressed legislatively with no check on their power. 
There may be no single online arena completely open to diverse messages without 
any discrimination. Technicians taking care of forums in cyberspace may most 
tt 
likely serve as gatekeepers acting in accordance with their existing ideologies. 
r 
Thus a perfect comparative reference without any form of abridgement may be 
non-existent. And as for discussions about the Indonesian riots in specific, the 
limitations of the Zaobao Forum are outweighed by its popularity among 
mainland netizens, its unique position external to the Chinese political institution, 
and the absence of virtual censorship as imposed to public arenas in China's 
cyberspace. 
Data Gathering and Coding 
Online discussion of the Indonesian riots could be divided into four periods. The 
first one was during and shortly after the riots in'May 1998. In this period, only a 
few articles about Indonesia mentioned the misfortune of ethnic Chinese. Most 
news reports were about student demonstrations in Jarkata, the resignation of 
Suharto, and the riots that affected the country in general, leading to a morsel of 
51 Sessor, S. "SingNet apologizes for virus scanning". Asian Wall Street Journal. 7 May 1999. 
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online discussions in China's Intemet communities. The second period started in 
the middle of June, when the atrocities against Indonesian Chinese were first 
reported in major international media. On June 17, the first post reporting the 
persecutions including organized rapes of Chinese women appeared on the PKU 
Board of Shanghai BBS. More similar reports emerged in China's virtual 
communities from then on and accumulated to form a growing tide of OPC in 
terms of not only exposure but also expression and mobilization. A few 
newspapers in China also covered the same issue, such as Beijing Youth Daily on 
ii 
July 24，five weeks after the posting of the first reports about anti-Chinese 
� 
persecutions in the Shanghai BBS. But reports in China's mass media during this 
period were scanty. None of them were pasted into the virtual communities. The 
common concem and shared emotions among the Chinese netizens snowballed in 
% 
a manner largely independent from traditional mass media in the country. 
The formal intervention of official media was on August 3，when People 's Daily 
issued an editorial denouncing Indonesian mobs. This editorial was cut and pasted 
from the website of People 's Daily to numerous Mainland Chinese virtual 
communities and even the Zaobao Forum. At this phase of development, the 
interaction between the Intemet and the mass media was intense. Since the party 
- ‘ 
一 » » 
and the state took an apparently supportive stance, Intemet users and non-users 
alike were both involved. Chinese hackers launched attacks against Indonesian 
• websites. Students in Peking University started to apply for a legal demonstration 
on August 17. But the application was declined on August 16. And the small-scale 
protest was not very successful due to the demobilizing measures of the state. This 
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was the beginning of the fourth period, when the Indonesian issue suddenly turned 
out to be a problem menacing China's "social stability". Mass media became 
silent. Related posts in virtual communities were purged. And in late September, 
the topic seemed to be obsolescent and nearly forgotten according to my 
observations in the BBS. 
The analytical focus of this chapter is on the second period when OPC had 
become sizable before the admixture of the elitist propaganda apparatus and the 
%* 
Intemet. I do not concentrate on the first and last periods, since there were too few 
fT 
online articles due to either the lack of attention concerning the Indonesian riots in 
China's cyberspace or the paralyzing measures of virtual censorship such as the 
deletion of articles in BBS communities. Posts in the third period is not coded for 
、 
the evaluation of mediation consequences since, most articles about the riots 
posted between August 3 and 17 were removed before I could print hard copies of 
them. Moreover, it was also difficult to isolate the effects of mass mediated 
messages and gauge exactly what the Intemet had brought about in this phase of 
online interactions. 
A total number of 433 articles on the websites of Shanghai BBS, Zaobao Online 
、 . • -
and the People's Daily were published in the second period of the OPC processes 
stimulated by the persecution of ethnic Indonesian Chinese. All of them were 
.printed in the middle of August 1998 before the student protest was dispelled on 
August i7th. Among them, 132 were from the News Board, 44 from PKU Board, 
254 from Zaobao Forum, and 3 from People 's Daily. One of the articles published 
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on the website of People 's Daily was a statement of China's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs expressing “deep concem" about the situation of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia. Another one was about a meeting between Chinese and Indonesian 
diplomats during an ASEAN conference, when Indonesia's Minister of Foreign 
Affairs regretted that "some Chinese were also attacked (in the riots)，，. The third 
one was a report published on Global Time {Huanqiu Shibao), a subsidiary of 
People 's Daily, which is accessible on the same website. All the 433 articles were 
coded in the following six aspects. 
1« 
� 
I. Basic information about the article and the author, including 
(1) the arena where the articles is posted, i.e. News Board, PKU Board, Zaobao 
Forum or People 's Daily; 
% 
(2) the name of the user who posted the message; 
(3) date of posting: all articles in the BBS automatically display the date when 
they are posted; messages in the Forum are also arranged in a daily order; 
(4) The language of the article: whether the article is written in Chinese, English, 
or both. 
(5) Whether the user is inside or outside Mainland China: Most BBS articles show 
the IP addresses of the authors, indicating which country they are physically « • 
’ located. Many users in the Forum also disclose where they live in their self-
introductions or inscriptions. These traits make it possible to know whether 
they are domestic or extemal users. BBS articles displaying no IP address and 
those in the Forum without explicit indication of the authors' residence are 
coded as "unspecified". 
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II. Physical clues of writing styles, including 
(1) Length: the number of Chinese characters or English words in an article; 
(2) The number of complete sentences in an article: a complete sentence here 
means a syntactic structure containing a subject, a verb and an object; 
(3) The number of exclamation marks in an article. 
III. The type of articles, including 
ii 
(1) Exposure: if an article contains descriptive account of the Indonesian riots and 
fT 
related events as responses to the riots, it is coded as an "exposure" article. 
Most posts in this category are from journalists, witnesses of the events or 
persecuted Chinese Indonesians. 
(2) Expression: a "comment" message is an article, in which the author expresses 
hisAier personal feelings, attitudes and opinions concerning the riots. 
(3) Mobilization: if an article requests other users to have any specific behavioral 
response as a reaction to the riots, it is a "mobilization" message. 
IV. Narrative issues in exposure messages, including 
(1) Rape: whether an article refers to the raping of Chinese women or other forms 
of sexual harassment during and after the May riots in Indonesia; 
(2) Looting: whether an article refers to aggressive actions of Indonesian mobs 
causing the damage of the ethnic Chinese's property, such as looting and 
arsoning; 
(3) Killing: whether an article mentions the death of Indonesian Chinese resulting 
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from the riots; 
(4) Organized crime: whether an article describe the persecution of ethnic Chinese 
as an organized crime, including the intervention of Indonesian military and 
police forces, the training campaign of riotists, and monetary rewards 
encouraging anti-Chinese atrocities. 
V. Attributive frames in expression 
%* 
Personal emotions, general attitudes and various opinions are all possible content 
ff 
of OPC expression about the Indonesian riots. Only the frames of attribution are 
coded in part because other forms of expression like users' emotions and feelings 
are either too ambiguous or too individualized to be generalized into a few 
categories, in part because attribution is the most important part of public opinion 
formation. By blaming a certain group of people for the riots, attribution provides 
not only substantial targets of criticism that facilitate coding but also a procedural 
bridge linking cognitive changes in exposure with proposals for behavioral 
responses in mobilization. Since an overwhelming majority of users' comments is 
nationalistic, I divide them into two categories. 
V • ^ . 
(1) Essentialized nationalism: As borrowed from Edward Said's Orientalism 
(1978)，this is nationalism in its most original form, i.e. the exaltation of 
nationhood as the only ultimate political value whose importance outweighs 
that of any other principle. An article belongs to this frame if it stresses the 
blood tie between ethnic Chinese in Indonesia with other members of the 
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Chinese nation as the "descendents of the dragon", and their cultural and 
historical integrity. As a frame of attribution, it blames all non-Chinese people 
in Indonesia including the Indonesian State for the persecution of ethnic 
Chinese. As a result, those who cooperate with or hesitate to punish the 
Indonesians, including Beijing, Singapore, the United States or the United 
Nations, among others, may all be criticized. There may be several historical 
associations such as Nanking massacre during the Japanese invasion, the purge 
of Jews in Nazi Germany and the Diaoyu Island incident of 1996. Other 
(• 
indicators for the frame of essentialized nationalism are the usage of foul 
fT 
language and humiliating labels for the original residents of Indonesia because 
an extreme position of essentialized nationalism in China is to regard non-
Chinese as non-humans. 
% 
(2) State nationalism: Articles in this category are expressions of opinions within 
the framework of the nation-state system. Different from essentialized 
nationalism, this perspective regards Indonesian Chinese as Indonesians in the 
first place. It criticizes the mobs but not the Jarkata government. It supports 
cooperation with the Harbibie administration that succeeded the rule of 
‘Suharto. Consequently, articles with state nationalistic frame of attribution do 
一 j_ » • 
not blame the Chinese authorities. They propose that the solution of the 
problem should rely on inter-governmental cooperation. No insulting language 
is used. There is little historical association. This is the frame in agreement 
with the official ideology advocated in Mainland China. 
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The contrast between the two forms of nationalism may be blurred in some 
articles since the distinction between nation and state may not make sense to 
every Chinese Intemet users. Actually, the theoretical differentiation has been a 
prolonged controversy among scholars of nationalism (Townsend, 1996:6). Yet in 
coding, there are two possible solutions if some elements of both frames are 
present in a single article. If there is clear instrumentalization of one frame for the 
other, for instance, using essentialized nationalism to justify state nationalism, the 
article should be coded as adopting the latter frame rather than the 
%* 
instrumentalized one. Otherwise, if the boundary is elusive and there is no 
ff 
manifest justification of one frame in the name of the other, I shall code them in 
both nationalistic frames. 
% 
In addition to nationalistic frames, there are other ways of attribution, most of 
which can be classified in the retrospective frame and the democratic frame as 
specified below. 
(3) Retrospective frame: Opposing to the nationalistic frames, articles in this 
category hold that the Chinese are at least partly responsible for the tragedy in 
‘Indonesia. Some of them are written by Chinese users who had lived in the 
. ‘ - ‘ . 
t • 
country or the Southeast Asian region. They argue that ethnic Chinese might 
have avoided the misfortune had they treated the original residents equally 
before the riots, had they cared more about politics rather than mere economy, 
had they got a stronger sense of unity and self-defense. Others represent the 
negative evaluation of China's diplomatic policy concerning oversea Chinese 
126 
emigrants. Still others blame traditional Chinese culture such as Confucianism 
for its timidity and lack of valor. The associations employed are multiple and 
with large historical span, range from the pedagogues of Confucius and 
Menfucius to the policies of Ming and Qing Dynasties towards oversea 
Chinese, from the failures of the People's Republic in dealing with anti-
Chinese movements in Southeast Asia ever since its establishment to the filthy 




(4) Democratic frame: The last major frame is the democratic frame, which 
attribute at least part of the responsibility for the riots to authoritarian rule and 
totalitarian tyranny, especially their tendency to use military means against 
、 
armless civilian dissidents. This frame was most salient in May and after 
China's suppression of online discussion about the Indonesian riots on August 
17'h. In the second period of the OPC process concerning the riots, it was also 
an important orientation for users' expression. Different from all other frames, 
the interpretation of events within the democratic frame is from the perspective 
of human rights and democracy and directed against dictatorship, racism, 
• militarism, and the political status quo of authoritarian societies. And the most 
- ；. ‘ 
frequently utilized historical association is the June Fourth Movement in 
Beijing. 
VI. Mobilizing messages 
Online mobilization of political actions, as defined in this chapter, refers to the 
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appeals made by some users asking for responses to the riots with certain 
behaviors or activities in the real world or in cyberspace. They include 
(1) Alert: to inform other people, governmental agencies, international 
organizations and mass media organizations of the persecution against 
Indonesian Chinese in the May riots without specific reference to the Intemet 
as a special channel. 
(2) Sanction: these are the requests for economic sanctions to be imposed upon 
Indonesia, including the suspension of trade and all forms of financial aid on 
I* 
the governmental level. Major appeals for actions taken by individuals include 
r 
refusal to buy Indonesian products and services, to travel in the country and to 
employ Indonesian domestic helpers. 
(3) Donation: requests for users to donate money to organizations for the solution 
、 
of problems in Indonesia and the prevention of more riots. 
(4) Demonstration: appeals for users to demonstrate to press the Indonesian 
government to punish the riotists. 
(5) Violence: some posts propose that violent actions be taken against Indonesia, 
such as the formation of guerrilla forces among ethnic Chinese, terrorist 
assaults against governmental and religious leaders in Indonesia, missile test or 
‘other forms of military threats in South China Sea，and military intervention in 
‘ 、 ‘ 
» 
the name of the United Nations or the "global unity of all Chinese authorities，’： 
While some appeal for actions in the real world, others request actions in 
cyberspace, including 
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(6) View online contents: several homepages were created to denounce the May 
riots and muster popular support in the virtual world. Related photo files were 
also transmitted through ftp servers into Mainland China. As a result, many 
articles contain http and ftp addresses and urge users to browse the online 
content and/or sign online petition letters. 
(7) Alert via the Internet: some articles ask Chinese Intemet users to alert their 
fellow netizens about the riots by means of CMC channels. Email addresses of 
political figures and governmental agencies are listed in some appeals so that 
»• 
users can send petition emails to them directly. 
ff 
(8) Destructive online reactions: If an article contains explicit message requesting 
other users to hack Indonesian websites or destroy parts of its Intemet system 
such as sending email bombs, it is coded as an appeal for destrictive online 
% 
reactions. 
Multiple coding of the same article is allowed as for the three types of articles 
(exposure, expression and mobilization) since the three processes of mediation 
should be taken into consideration no matter they appear independently in 
different posts orjointly in the same message. Similarly, one message may contain 
several narrative issues, multiple attributive frames and different mobilizing 
- -— ‘ 
requests. It is especially so when the posts are conceived not as standardized 
messages in TV news report but as highly personalized talks among individuals. 
• In some cases, inconsistent evidences and contradictory viewpoints co-exist in the 
same article. And it would be too subjective if only single coding is permitted. In 
some other cases, the content becomes either too brief to be identified as one of 
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the coding items or too personalized that the reports, opinions and appeals go 
beyond the coding scheme. In this situation, the articles are coded as "others". 
Coding was conducted by the author in March 1999 according to the above 
coding scheme. On 30 May 1999, the inter-coder reliability was tested. The 
second coder is also a former student in Peking University and currently a M.Phil, 
student in Communication at the Chinese University. The basic information and 
physical attributes of the messages were not recoded because they are relatively 
u 
objective. 43 articles were selected for recoding using systematic random 
ff 
sampling. The overall inter-coder reliability is 95.1%. As for the three sections 
about narrative issues, attributive frames and mobilizing messages in specific, the 
results are 96.3%，90.2% and 97.2%, respectively. 
、 
Findings 
The unit of analysis for the evaluation of mediation consequences is the three 
selected arenas. During June 17th and August 3rd, a total number of 430 articles 
related to the Indonesian riots were identified in the online arenas including 132 
on News Board, 44 on PKU Board, and 254 in Zaobao Forum. 85 per cent of 
them are written in Chinese, 10 per cent in English, 5 per cent in both languages. _ 
The ratio of English articles is the highest in the Forum, where there are also a 
more diverse group of users from different countries. 
On the average, each user publishes about four articles in their participation in the 
discussion. There is little domination by a few heavy users. Articles written by 
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those who publish more than once each week, or more than six posts in the one 
and a half months, account for only 9.7 percent of the total number of articles. 
Since the number of articles on the PKU Board is relatively small, I merge it with 
the News Board and compare the Shanghai BBS as a whole with the Zaobao 
Forum. This reduction of categories is particularly helpful when the objective in 
this chapter is to evaluate the democratizing effects of the Intemet in China's 
cyberspace as contrasted to the nation's mainstream propaganda on the one hand 
•t 
and the external forum with little virtual censorship on the.other. The internal 
ff 
variances between the two electronic bulletins certainly deserve exploration. But 
they are beyond the objectives of the present chapter. 
、 
In the following sections, I will first demonstrate the indicators of virtual 
censorship and then evaluate the consequences in four aspects: the narrative issues, 
the attributive frames, the mobilizing messages, and the overall evolution of OPC. 
My basic assumption in evaluating the consequences is that the OPC patterns are 
influenced by different regulatory measures in the online arenas. 
The Relics of Virtual Censorship 
Data gathering was conducted in the middle of August during the third phase of 
— u 
online discussions about the Indonesian riots. This period between August 3'^  and 
i7th was characterized by the temporary support from the mass media and the 
Chinese party-state. As a result, suppression of OPC concerning the issue was 
halted. And the articles I collected in the Shanghai BBS are the remnants of 
virtual censorship. 
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Shanghai B B S Zaobao Forum 
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Length (number of words) ~ ~ 4 ^ ~ ~ 9 1 0 . 6 2^i~~223.8 
Number of complete sentences 1 3 . 4 28.1 8 . 0 7.8 
Number of exclamation marks 1 . 6 3 4.5 1 . 0 0 2.1 
Table 5.1. Writing styles in the OPC arenas 
Articles in the three arenas have discernible differences in terms of their length. 
The length of articles in Shanghai BBS is 460, and the standard deviation is 910.6， 
whereas the figures in Zaobao Forum are 217 and 223.8 respectively. A T test 
shows that the mean difference is significant at .001 level. The average numbers 
of complete sentences and exclamation marks also vary significantly in the online 
arenas. T tests for the mean differences of these variables yield significant results 
at .001 level too. Again, users tend to post more sentences with more exclamation 
marks in the domestic arena than in the extemal one. These differences provide� 
physical clues showing that the netizens, although communicating about the same 
issue, assume different writing styles. With regard to these stylistic features, 
articles in the Shanghai BBS are more unpredictable, while those in the Forum are 
more consistent with each other. 
The difference occurs between the arenas because in the Shanghai BBS there is a 
nominal ban against unofficial political content, and subsequently, there is no 
board assigned specially for OPC. The discussions about the May riots have to 
take place in the arenas for the Peking University alumni and the exchange of 
International news, which means there must be some amalgamation between 
messages concerning the riots and those about other events, between the news 
reports and the online discussions. In contrast, the Zaobao Forum is designed for 
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the specific purpose of fostering discussions about the Indonesian riots. It is 
separated from other topics of discussion and from the news coverage of the riots, 
which is displayed in another section of Zaobao Online. 
It is the difference in cyberspatial arrangements caused by virtual censorship that 
gives rise to the relatively more unpredictable writing styles in the domestic arena. 
For example, in both boards of the Shanghai BBS, there are large number of news 
reports cut and pasted from external websites mixed up with short comments and 
I* 
slogans. While the range of length is from 10 words to 1976 words in the Zaobao 
ff 
Forum, both boards in the Shanghai BBS have articles as short as one word. The 
maximum length is a post consisting of 11 news clippings on the PKU Board. It 
contains approximately 7820 Chinese characters and English words. 
、 
The vestige of virtual censorship is also discernible when the temporal 
distribution of articles in the arenas is analyzed (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 The distribution of posts in the three arenas over time. 
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As can be expected, the number of posts waxed and waned each week because 
users have more time for OPC in weekends than in weekdays. Therefore, on the 
Fridays such as July 17 and July 31，there are obvious increases of articles in all 
the arenas followed by a rapid decline. The weekend of July 24 is somewhat 
different. Due to the temporary decrease of media coverage on the Indonesian 
riots and the flood all over China, there was a decline of messages in all of the 
three online public arenas. 
»• 
A 
Yet despite the similarity among the three OPC forums, the two BBS boards in 
Shanghai share some distinct pattem of chronological distribution. The PKU 
Board has articles about the persecution of Indonesian Chinese in June. But 
、 
between June 26 and July 21，there is not a single article about the issue for nearly 
an entire month. And on July 28 (Tuesday), there is another absence of article. 
The News Board has no article until July 17，when it suddenly carries 5 related 
reports and comments. The number of articles on News Board also dropped 
significantly on July 28, when articles in the Forum were still increasing. 
Obviously, the rise and fall were more abrupt in Shanghai BBS. And the pattem is 
sometimes not on a weekly basis. 
‘ '.._ . 一 - •. ‘ • 
It was the scissors of virtual censorship in mainland Chinese Intemet communities 
• that contributed to such patterns of article distribution over time. The gap between 
articles in June and those in late July was because several users talking about the 
riots during this period were celebrating the fall of Suharto as a success of 
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democracy". The activities of overseas Chinese dissidents expressing support for 
the demonstrations of Indonesian students also appeared on the bulletin boards. 
These articles were deleted without a trace. The imposed silence was prolonged 
due to the closure of the Shanghai BBS during Bill Clinton's visit to the city in 
early July, a presumably "sensitive" period in the eyes of the network regulators. 
Although uncertainty remains as no system operators in the BBS confirmed my 
estimation, the reduction of articles on July 28 might still be a result of China's 
stance concerning the Indonesian issue at the time. On the second day, July 29, 
1» 
China lent an interest-free loan ofUS$300 million to the Indonesian government". 
/r 
Unlike their counterparts in the Shanghai BBS, articles in Zaobao Forum 
increases continuously despite the weekly fluctuations. Since the Forum was open 
、 
on July 16，there has been no break in the chronological distribution of articles for 
any single day. Again, this indicates that, although the Forum is not completely 
free from regulation, it is nevertheless free from the kind of virtual censorship 
imposed systematically upon OPC in the Shanghai BBS. 
The Exposure Effect 
Articles from Lianhe Zaobao are frequently cut and pasted into the Shanghai BBS 
because domestic users could visit the website directly. However, external users 
also repost news stories about the riots from foreign websites banned within the 
national firewall, such as Ming Pao, Apple Daily and South China Morning Post 
“ I saw these articles and posted my responses to them in June. 
“J ie Fang Ri Bao (Liberation Daily). 30 July 1998. 
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in Hong Kong, China Times, Central News Agency and Central Daily in Taiwan, 
the Voice of America and even newspapers in Indonesia. Despite the multiplicity 
of news sources, the two boards in Shanghai still share more similarity with the 
Forum in Singapore than with People 's Daily. 
Shanghai B B S Zaobao Forum People 's Daily 
(n=67) % (n=50) % (n=3) % 
Rapes 47 70.1 39 78.0 2 66.6 
Looting 28 41.8 19 38.0 2 66.6 
Killing 27 40.3 17 34.0 -- � 
Organized crime 2 8 41.8 2 0 « 40.0 -- 一 
Others 10 14.9 8 16.0 . - � 
r 
Table 5.2 Narrative issues about the May riots 
The "exposure" articles in the BBS, the Forum and People 's Daily are 67，50 and 
3, respectively. Since some comments and appeals also contain one or more o f t h e � 
narrative issues when users express themselves and mobilize others, they are also 
counted as an integral part of the consequences concerning the Exposure Effect 
resulted from the mediating factors. Therefore, posts with descriptions of the riots 
in the Shanghai BBS reflect both media content in the traditional sense and users' 
cognitive changes resulted from the stimuli they had received. The percentages in 
each column do not add up to a hundred because most articles include more than 
one of the narrative issues. . ； 
~ — — 
> . . 
The website of People 's Daily contains only three articles about the anti-Chinese 
persecutions during the May riots. The sample size is very small. Nevertheless, 
the official website failed to mention the death of Indonesian Chinese and the 
possible intervention of organized riotist forces. In contrast, both online arenas 
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contain the narrative issues ignored in People 's Daily. Thus in terms of audience 
exposure, the contextual divergence between China's virtual community and its 
mainstream propaganda apparatus is clear. 
The most salient issue is the raping of ethnic Chinese women, accounting for 
more than 70.1% in the Shanghai BBS and 78.0% in the Zaobao Forum. Both 
figures are higher than the ratio in People 's Daily. However, the emphasis on 
looting or the damage of peoperty is lower than in People 's Daily, perhaps 
K 
because it was perceived to be a relatively "minor" crime. 
/r 
Meanwhile, the democratization effect in terms of message quantity is manifest, 
because the number of posts with descriptive information in the Shanghai BBS 
、 
exceeds that in the Forum, although the total number of articles are higher in the 
latter arena. 
As for content diversity, the Shanghai BBS and Zaobao Forum are also similar, 
meaning that the potency of virtual censorship is not that constraining in this 
regard. Both of them carry considerable amount of articles about the four main 
narrative issues. Articles in the category of "others" are those reports describing 
the riots and related events in ways other than the four identified issues. The 
proportion and internal variance of articles in this category is also similar in the 
• BBS and the Forum. 
In brief, the Exposure Effect of the Intemet is evident in the case of online 
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discussion about the Indonesian riots. The portraits of the riots in the Shanghai 
BBS clearly differ from those in People 's Daily and share observable similarities 
with those in the arena outside China. The content diversity is comparable to 
Zaobao Forum. And in terms of the total quantity of reports, the domestic arena 
even exceeds the external one. 
The Expression Effect 
Shanghai B B S Zaobao Forum 
( n = l l l ) % (n=203) % 
Essentialized nationalistic frame 65 58.6 102 50.2 
State nationalistic frame 31 27,9 56 27.6 
Retrospective frame 17 / 5 . J 33 16.3 
Democratic frame 14 12,6 11 5,4 
Others 12 10.8 41 20.2 
Table 5.3 Attributive frames in OPC expressions � 
In Table 5.3 the number of cases in each column represents the frequencies of 
articles in an arena to carry the opinions of the users in terms of who to blame, all 
non-Chinese in Indonesia or the riotists only, the Chinese themselves or the non-
democratic rule. And in both arenas, some articles cannot be coded because they 
may either express users' opinions without specifically attributing the 
responsibility to anyone or blame some party aside from the four major frames. 
:_ _ 二 
This is why there are quite several articles belonging to the category of"others". 
-Nationalism is the dominant frame in both arenas. Yet the distinction between two 
forms of nationalism allow us to gauge to what extent the users hold their 
opinions in line with official ideology. Since state nationalism is the expressions 
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of opinions within the framework of the nation-state system, it stands for the 
stance of Chinese government concerning the May riots, i.e. the separation 
between the mobs and the Indonesian State and the encouragement of inter-
governmental cooperation for the solution of the crisis. As shown in Table 5.3, the 
percentages of state nationalism are rather close in the Shanghai BBS and Zaobao 
Forum. 
Unlike state nationalism, essentialized nationalism supports the Chinese 
II 
government with qualifications. Users holding this opinion side with the state 
ff 
insofar as it is deemed as implementing policies promoting the interests of the 
Chinese nation. Otherwise, the state will be criticized because of its reluctance or 
inability to serve the nation, possibly due to excessive emphasis on its special 
% 
interests that differ from those of the nation. Among the four frames, essentialized 
nationalism is the most prevelant, especially in Shanghai BBS indicating that most 
users do not endorse the official stance unconditionally. 
The retrospecive and democratic frames are two forms of oppositional reading of 
the Indonesian riots that censure the Chinese themselves including their cultural 
heritages, their weaknesses or their government. The ratio of retrospective frame 
is similar in both arenas, whereas there are more articles criticizing totalitarian 
rule in the Shanghai BBS. Splitting the two bulletin boards from each other, I find 
• that the ratios are especially high among articles on PKU Board. The proportions 
for retrospective frame and democratic frame are 27.6% and 20.7%, respectively. 
Meanwhile, these figures drop significantly on the News Board, whose ratio of 
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retrospective frame (12.9%) is even below the level of Zaobao Forum (16.3%). 
The high proportion of oppositional frames on PKU Board may result from the 
university's tradition ofholding different opinions with mainstream ideology. This 
is also why the Untitled BBS was closed since 1996 and why the two real-world 
demonstrations with online mobilization were both initiated in the university. 
However, ordinary users attending the News Board tend to be less critical against 




The proportion of "other" articles in the Forum is nearly twice as much as in the 
BBS, indicating that content diversity among user expression is higher in the 
Zaobao Forum. Among the twelve BBS articles in this category, most reveal 
% 
authors' emotions without attribution. There are more diverse opinions concerning 
origins of the riots in the Forum. For example, a feminist user blames the raping 
as a result from patriarchism, which holds a natural symbiosis with military 
aggression. Some attribute the responsibility to the degeneration of the entire 
mankind rather than any specific group of people. On an even more macro level, a 
few users also raise their criticism from a Buddhist perspective and argue that the 
tribulations in Indonesia are rooted in the inherent “evil desires" of human beings. ‘ ‘ • 
All these attributive frames cannot be found in the Shanghai BBS. 
• Despite its inadequacy of content diversity compared with the Forum, the 
Shanghai BBS should nevertheless be assessed as by and large an alternative 
arena in Mainland China, where political communication is dominated by party 
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press. Articles in People 's Daily belong exclusively to the state nationalistic frame. 
There is therefore obvious contextual divergence between the BBS articles and 
those in official propaganda. Yet one reservation is that state nationalism, the 
frame in line with the official ideology, nevertheless accounts for nearly 30 
percent of the articles in the arenas. 
Meanwhile, the proportion of expressive messages are also lower in Shanghai 
BBS (59.1%) than in the Forum (78.3%). It is manifest that users in the Shanghai 
It 
BBS are less enthusiatic than those in the Forum to express themselves. The 
ff 
Expression Effect in terms of message quantity is therefore not particularly strong. 
The Mobilization Effect 
% 
Data collection for the analysis of the consequences of mediation is limited to the 
second phase of development in the OPC process concerning the Indonesian riots.'' 
This is of course a drawback for the evaluation of the Mobilization Effect since 
the climax of online appeals emerged after the 3 August Editorial of People 's 
Daily. Yet the examination of mobilizing messages before 3 August also has its 
advantages. With little interaction with traditional forms of mediated 
• 
communication, the manners in which users appeal for collective action in -
• . 
cyberspace offer a clearer indication of the political impacts of the Intemet 
isolated from the influence of the mass media. 
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Shanghai B B S Zaobao Forum 
(n=63) (n=98) 
Real-world actions requested 
Economic sanction to Indonesia 4 .8 23 .5 
Alert in real world 9.5 1 9 . 4 
Donation to related organizations 9 . 5 6 .1 
Protest and demostrations 2 0 . 6 1 1 . 2 
Violent reactions 14.3 3 2 . 7 
Subtotal 58.7% 92.9% 
Online actions requested 
Visit and sign online protest pages 39.7 1 0 . 2 
Alert others through online means 11.1 1 . 0 
Destructive reactions 1 1 . 1 — 
Subtotal 61.9% ,. 11.2% 
Others 9.5% . 16,3% 
ff 
Table 5.4 Mobilization messages in the arenas 
Table 5.4 demonstrates the distribution of mobilizing messages on the BBS boards 
and the Forum. The ratios of mobilization for real-world actions and online� 
actions are summed separately for the two arenas. Again, the addition of the 
subtotals exceeds a hundred percent because the inclusion of several requested 
actions in one article is a common practice among the users. And there are other 
articles, which request for actions not included in the coding sheme. 
Since all articles on the website of People 's Daily contain no requests for actions 
‘ i n the part of the audience, it is manifest-that the new medium has provided users 
with a new chance to muster collectively for the pursuit of interests other than 
those of the political elite. The divergence between BBS and official media in 
mobilization messages is therefore unequivocal. 
Yet a closer look at the figures discloses more about the consequences of 
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mediation. There are more mobilizing messages in the Forum (n=98) than in the 
BBS (n=63). Dividing the counts of mobilizing messages by the total number of 
articles in the two arenas, I find the percentages are rather close (38.6% and 
35.8% for the Forum and the BBS, respectively), which means the proportions of 
mobilization articles in the arenas are at the same level. Thus in terms of message 
quantity, the democratizing effect for public mobilization is stronger than that for 
opinion expression but weaker than that for OPC exposure. 
u 
Moreover, the subtotals for the two kinds of mobilizing messages show a 
fT 
conspicuous preference for online actions among users in the domestic arena. 
While only 11.2% of posts in Zaobao Fomm propose for reactions to the May 
riots via the Intemet, the figure rises to 61.9% in the BBS. Meanwhile, 92.9% of 
% 
articles in the Forum appeal for collective actions in the real world such as 
economic sanction, protest and violent reactions, whereas the corresponding 
figure in the Shanghai BBS is merely 58.7%. 
The more one appeals for real-world actions, the less sAie is likely to post articles 
calling for reactions in the cyberspace, and vice versa. This relationship is even 
more explicit with regard to the most aggressive mobilizing messages, i.e. appeals 
\ � 
for violent reactions in the real world and destructive attacks on the Indonesians in 
cyberspace. As for violent suggestions such as military intervention to the country 
• or terrorist assaults to its embassies, the ratio in the Forum (32.7%) more than 
doubles the figure for the BBS (14.3%). In contrast, there is no appeal for 
destructive online reaction in the Forum, whereas the number of such requests is 
143 
seven or 11.1% of all the mobilization messages in the Shanghai BBS. 
Among the 32 articles with suggestions for violent real-world actions in Zaobao 
Fomm, flve are from outside China, eleven are written by domestic Chinese users. 
Although the remaining sixteen posts are written by authors with unspecified 
national affiliation, quite a few of them demonstrates patterns of expression 
distinct to Mainland China. This shows that domestic Chinese users are actually 
not so disinclined to appeal for real-world actions. They are just hesitant to do so 
it 
in the Intemet communities under China's virtual censorship". 
fT 
The general assessment of the Mobilization Effect based on the analysis of 
mobilizing messages should be at best a mixed one. While OPC facilitates 
% 
political mobilization beyond the control of the Chinese party-state, the pressure 
of virtual censorship pushes ordinary Intemet users to websites outside the 
country to appeal for real-life reactions. And if they hope to mobilize within 
cyberspace communities located in the authoritarian regime, requests for actions 
in the virtual space become a more possible choice. Li both occasions, direct real-
world challenges to non-democratic rule as a consequence of the Intemet tum out 
to be less likely. 
、 < * • 
, . 
Overall Evolution of OPC and Content Diversity 
Table 5.7 displays the overall evolution of OPC in the selected arenas in 
“Another possibility is that most appeals for real-world actions were deleted, which is also a result of virtual 
censorship. 
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correspondence to the three processes of mediation, namely exposure, expression 
and mobilization. The percentages show articles in these categories as 
proportionate to the total number of articles in the BBS and the Forum. 
Shanghai B B S Zaobao Forum 
(n=176) % (n=254) % 
Exposure ^ 1^1 ^ 19.7 
Expression 111 63.1 203 79,9 
Mobilization 63 35,8 98 38.6 
Table 5.7 The overall evolution of OPC in the arenas 
I* 
The general trajectory of evolution in the arenas is a rise of the percentages from 
fT 
exposure to expression followed by a decline from expression to mobilization. 
The portion of articles containing mobilizing messages is nearly equal, whereas in 
the two previous phases, the differences among the three arenas are more 
* 
perceptible. 
38.1% of articles in the Shanghai BBS contain narrative accounts of the riots, 
whereas Zaobao Forum contains much fewer proportion of articles (19.7%) in this 
category. Interestingly, at the stage of OPC expression, the relationship is reversed. 
With a percentage of 79.9%, Zaobao Forum becomes higher than the proportion 
of comments in the BBS (63.1%). - � ‘ 
t 
Undeniably, the transmission of news through the global computer network is the 
first step for Chinese netizens to become informed of events they may not know 
otherwise. And the function of the new medium in this aspect is quite powerful 
during the discussions about the May riots, though still checked by the deletion of 
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articles and the closure of cyberspace communities. 
However, treating the cyberspacial allocation of electronic bulletin boards and 
other forms of online political arenas as limited public resources in an 
authoritarian country, I find that the Exposure Effect and the Expression Effect 
may have contradictory relationship with each other, despite their presumable 
positive correlation. The more descriptive a board is, the less probably it may 
foster an arena of large number of diverse opinions. This distribution pattem of 
fti 
articles at the stage of exposure and expression results from the absence of 
/r 
Specialized OPC arena in China's cyberspace, where nonofFicial political 
information is outlawed. Reports, comments and appeals concerning the 
persecution of Indonesian Chinese thus have to be juxtaposed with each other 
、 
among discussions about a plethora of topics on the News Board and the PKU 
Board. On the contrary, Zaobao Forum is designed for users to have OPC 
dialogues. There are not much descriptive accounts because news reports about 
the riots have been exhibited separately in another section on the same website of 
Zaobao Online. Subsequently, users in the Forum become less obsessed with 
posting narratives and more enthusiastic in expressing themselves. 
^ • ‘；-
The mechanisms of punishment agamst OPC in Mainland Chinese virtual 
communities may also contribute to the reluctance of Chinese Intemet users to 
voice their opinions in domestic arenas. The fear of being punished personally or 
leading to penalties against the bulletin boards or the BBS station as a whole is an 
effective obstacle in deterring free expressions of opinions in a pluralistic manner. 
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Meanwhile, users do not face such punishments in Zaobao Forum, where there is 
a concentration on opinion exchange. As a result, the proportion of articles with 
comments about the riots rises to nearly 80% in the Forum. 
Concluding remarks 
The conclusion drawn from the case of online discussion about the Indonesian 
riots is that the democratizing effects of the Intemet among mainland Chinese 
Intemet users are limited. In this chapter, three yardsticks of democratization are 
utilized to evaluate the democratizing effects including contextual divergence, 
message quantity and content diversity. Table 5.8 is a summation of the 
comparison among online messages in the Shanghai BBS, the Zaobao Forum and 
the website of People 's Daily. ^ 
Exposure Expression Mobilization 
Real-world Online 
actions 
Contextual divergence + + + + 
Message quantity + - - + 
Content diversity + 0 1 - + 
‘ +: strong effect 0 : medium effect - : weak^ effect 
* » 
Table 5.8 The evaluation of the democratizing effects 
Contextual divergence is the evaluation of whether the domestic OPC arena 
provides new content that are absent in the mass media controlled by the Chinese 
party-state. In this respect, all the mediation processes involve alternative political 
messages, meaning the Intemet does give rise to a new and relatively open arena 
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for public discussion among the Chinese netizens. 
Strong democratizing effect also occurs in the process of exposure to online 
narrative issues about the Indonesian riots. Articles in Shanghai BBS share more 
similarity with the Forum than with the People 's Daily. The content diversity is 
comparable between the domestic and the extemal forums. Moreover, the quantity 
of reports in the BBS exceeds that in the Forum in terms of both the numbers of 
articles and their proportions in the OPC arenas at large. Were there no eradication 
ti 
of oppositional posts and other forms of virtual censorship, .the Exposure Effect 
r 
must have been even stronger. 
The potency of the constraining factors increases when the democratizing impacts 
、 
in terms of expression are evaluated. For sure, comparing with mainstream party-
line propaganda, articles in domestic online arenas nevertheless provide 
considerable alternative and oppositional opinions. However, as many as 30% of 
articles concerning the riots still endorse state nationalism or the attributive frame 
in People 's Daily. And the overwhelming force of essentialized nationalism 
reduces the content diversity of opinion expressions in the Shanghai BBS to a 
level much lower than that in the Zaobao Forum. Moreover, in terms of message 
‘ - ' , 
quantity, the proportion of expressive messages is smaller in the domestic arena, 
too. 
The democratizing effect in terms of mobilization is also limited. Although there 
is no appeal for action in China's official media, many domestic users refrain 
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from requesting real-world actions in domestic virtual communities. They either 
appeal for reactions via the Net or put the mobilizing messages in a forum hosted 
by the extemal website. The result is that very few articles requesting real-world 
political actions appear in the domestic fomm, signified by the low quantity and 
low diversity of messages in this category. On the contrary, there is an observable 
increase of opportunities for the Chinese users to act in cyberspace upon a 
political event in ways unauthorized by the power elite. • 
u 
Again, it is necessary to stress that the evaluation of mediation consequences is 
/r 
within the contextual circumscriptions such as the economic threshold and the 
demographic constraints. Because of the unavailability of data, the assessment is 
confined to the evaluation of democratizing results as represented by the 
% 
ineffectiveness of virtual censorship. As a result, the evaluation is far from 
complete. 
Another pitfall is that many extemal users and domestic users are mixed up in the 
Zaobao Forum, whose technological settings do not allow me to make necessary 
separation as in the BBS. And it is uncertain whether those who participate the 
Forum from inside China has any distinct characteristics not possessed by other 
- I. 
. * —Chinese netizens. 
.Moreover, it remains questionable as to what extent the Indonesian case, or the 
online nationalistic movements, can represent the processes and consequences of 
OPC in China's cyberspace. However, due to the pervasiveness of nationalistic 
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activities and their unique capability of mobilization, the kidonesian case deserves 
evaluation on its own merit. And the political impacts of the Intemet in this 
specific case is a cluster of liberalizing effects with various intensity, which add 
up to a general conclusion that the new medium leads to but limited 




^ • - • 
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Chapter 6 Discussions 
China's Intemet does not develop in the ways we think it should. Age-old debates 
about the political impacts of new media are heuristic and inspiring. However, 
based predominantly on westem experiences and expectations, the existing 
literature does not provide full comprehension of the relationship between the 
Intemet and authoritarian countries. By proposing the concept of mediation and 
the mediationist perspective with reference to the empirical context of China's 
cyberspace, I hope that this thesis has addressed a theoretical alternative and 




The concept of mediation is proposed in this thesis to account for the manifold 
processes by which the stamina of the new medium and the inertia of the old 
regime are intermingled in the making of a new political arena. It refers to the 
actual utilization of the Intemet in an authoritarian country, which fosters special 
OPC pattems operating at the cyberspatial interface between the democratic 
global space and authoritarian local space ofpolitical communication. The kind of 
democratizing effects illuminated by the mediationist perspective is contextual, 
一 » » 
moderate and limited. And the relationship between technology and its political 
functions is interactive. 
The hallmark of the mediationist perspective is to subsume multiple potential 
factors, from the technological attributes to the context of utilization, from human 
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agency to institutional constraints, as constitutive elements in the shaping of the 
political outcomes of new technology. By applying this perspective to the current 
state of Intemet in China, this thesis illustrates the concept of mediation in three 
aspects. 
First, I identify the incentive and constraining factors that jointly shape the 
political impacts of the Intemet. The technological attributes of the new medium 
encourage open interaction across traditional boundaries. And the charm of these 
it 
democratizing properties is magnified in the authoritarian context where political 
tf 
communication is tightly controlled. However, not everyone can become a netizen 
because in doing so they have to meet certain social economic standards. And the 
threshold becomes much higher as the state intervenes into the cyberspace 
legislatively, administratively and technologically. Although China's Intemet 
regulation is less suppressive than that of its mass media, OPC activities of 
ordinary users are nevertheless constrained under the hierarchical structure of 
virtual censorship. 
Second, an analytical framework is developed for the measurement ofthe political 
impacts of new media. The technological outputs, including the devices, the 
t . 
services and physical existence of the users, are separated from the democratizing 
impacts, i.e. the Diffusion Effect, the Exposure Effect, the Expression Effect and 
• the Mobilization Effect. The distinction facilitates the investigation of the 
interplay between various mediation factors. It also helps evaluate the 
consequences of such interplay in the case of online responses to the Indonesian 
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riots. It is found that, although with circumscriptions, the Intemet has incorporated 
users far beyond the boundaries of the party-state and, users are exposed less to 
CCP's online propaganda than to external websites, which describe political 
events differently. New opportunities also exist for the expression of personal 
opinions and the mobilization of political movements through the Intemet. 
However, when users attend OPC arenas, dominant ideologies in authoritarian 
countries may accumulate and alternative voices may shrink due to the "online 
sociopolitical arrangements under virtual censorship. Online mobilization for 
i* 
political actions in the real world is least likely to be successful because so far 
t< 
collective force mustered in the virtual space does not constitute real challenge to 
the state and, therefore, virtual reactions in cyberspace appear to be more 
preferable to average domestic users. 
’ 
Third, the overall conclusion drawn from the analytical assessments is that the 
Intemet has but limited democratizing impacts upon a nondemocratic country like 
China. As for the mediation processes, the Diffusion Effect and Exposure Effect 
are strong, whereas the Expression Effect and Mobilization Effect are relatively 
weak. With regard to the yardsticks of the democratization of political 
communication, the contextual divergence between online messages ^ d party 
- � ‘ 
line propaganda is visible. Yet users' expression of personal opinions and their 
requests for collective actions still lag behind comparing with those in an external 
• website in terms of message quantity and content diversity. The demobilizing 
force of the party-state remains suffocating. It is in this sense that I shall admit the 
moderate capacity of the new medium to fulfill its alleged function of 
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communicative democratization. 
Yes, the Intemet is influential in giving rise to a freer mode of political 
communication. But it has empowered little more than the willpower of the 
powerless in some aspect to certain degree. The democratizing effects take place 
only within the circumscriptions of contextual constraints such as local economy 
and literacy. Authoritarian institutions are still functional in restricting online 
activities. And their domination in the real world is far from being seriously 
書| 
threatened by the vigor ofIntemet users assembled in the virtual world. 
ff 
Methodological Issues 
Theoretically, the concept of mediation and the mediationist perspective should be 
、 
regarded as an additional entry point to the understanding of the relationship 
between new media and nondemocratic rule. Yet methodologically, this thesis has 
fathomed only a small fraction of the vast field of mediation. And in doing so, it 
has raised more questions than solved. Thus a discussion of the unsolved 
problems is indispensable in the end of this thesis, which is a comma rather than a 
period in my study of the topic. 
. ‘ • 
i 
A distinct feature of the thesis is the amalgamation of multiple methods including 
the analysis of existing documents and statistics, online interviews and participant 
‘observation, and quantitative evaluation of messages in cyberspace arenas. The 
combination is necessary because each of them suits analysis at a certain level of 
abstraction for a special purpose such as the identification of variables, the 
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generation ofhypotheses and the assessment of the effects. 
Online Documents 
However, each of them also has its own insufficiencies especially when most of 
them are conducted through the Intemet, whose technological properties both 
facilitate and impede the research in a way similar to the manner they affect 
democratization. While several regulations issued by the Chinese government and • 
hundreds of news articles about the development of China's Intemet are 
t> 
conveniently accessible on the Net, these sources of information have their 
ff 
drawbacks. Since there is no standard for system operators to create the 
homepages for governmental regulations, the format of presentation differs: some 
with no indication ofthe date of issuing and the name of the responsible agencies， 
、 
some with incomplete sentences 一 perhaps because few people view these pages. 
And most regulations at the level of national/regional networks are not available 
online. News stories are generally better at providing basic information. But it 
occurs in a couple of cases that reports may differ with each other in some detail. 
This is especially so before China Network Information Center (CNNIC) was 
established in 1996. Another problem is that some news stories exist online for a 
brief period of time, adding to the difficulties to maintain stable acce,ss to the 
— ^ i 
documents. Nonobtrusive data collected in cyberspace are thus less accessible 
than traditional channels of document analysis based on newspapers or printed 
- o f f i c i a l announcements. Setting up a website to store and display the most 
complete and authoritative documents about China's regulation ofthe Intemet is 
perhaps a way to improve the quality of online data. And if possible, the 
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regulations and news articles should contain versions in GB Chinese and BIG5 
Chinese coding as well as in English. 
Online Statistics 
Statistical reports about China's Intemet used in this thesis are from two surveys, 
one by CNNIC, the other by Sohu, a popular commercial ISP in mainland China. 
Both surveys use voluteer sampling, in which users' self selection is an obvious 
problem. The problem of sampling for online survey is certainly not unique in 
1» 
China but a challenge to methodologist worldwide. But these surveys share some 
/r 
Other problems. Due to formal prohibition of online political discussion, both 
survey questionnaires contain no special item corresponding to users' attitudes 
and behaviors related to OPC. Moreover, although descriptive statistics of the 
’ 
surveys are shown in the websites, the raw data are not accessible even after the 
author had made various attempts. The unavailability of raw data and the 
exclusion of questions about OPC in survey questionnaires lead to inadequate 
discussion concerning the implications of user demographics. 
Existing online data reports have clearly demonstrated the concentration of users 
to a certain age, gender, education level, income level, and geographical region. 
I 
Yet does the concentration mean that users are not likely to become influential 
pressure group because they include only a small fraction of the population or 
users may unite to pursue their goals more easily because most of them belong to 
the same social stratum? Discussions on the pure conceptual level may not be 
helpful. Surveys about users' OPC behavior and attitudes are therefore very 
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necessary to juxtapose the demographics with the variation among users' on the 
cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral level so that the relationship between 
demographics and the political impacts of the Intemet can be explored in a more 
specific and precise manner. 
Interviews in Cyberspace 
Conducting interviews and observing activities in Chinese virtual communities 
offer another example of extending traditional research methods into the 
cyberspace. Like the analysis of online documents and statistics, doing interviews 
and participant observation through the Intemet are convenient - sitting in my 
dormitory and "speaking" to the netizens with my fingertips, I can get dynamic 
qualitative data as if I were physically back to the mainland. I do not have to care 
about what to dress, what facial expression I shall wear and whether I shall talk tcT 
my informants over a cup of tea. The only thitig matters is the words I type. In the 
meantime, notebook and casette recorder are not necessary, either. When an 
interview finishes, the transcript is already typed and I need only to save it. 
However, online interviews and participant observation are more likely than 
online documents to have internal inconsistency. Ordinary users usually tend to 
talk to each other very casually. If I^do not disclose my identity and purposes of 
attending their chat, it is very likely that my questions will not be taken seriously. 
It happens several times that the person who criticizes an viewpoint three minutes 
ago shifts to support it three minutes later. And when I ask why, s/he refuses to 
give any explanation or simply log off. On the other hand, when I tell them who I 
am and what I am doing in a more formal tone, the interviewee tends to become 
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too cautious and defensive just like the one who doubted that I might be a 
cyberpolice. In a word, it is hard to strike a balance between formality and 
informality during the interactions with mainland Chinese Internet users in the 
online environment. The reason is the virtuality of CMC. While new technologies 
facilitate direct communication with people in the field, they also deprived 
interviews and participant observation of the richness of interaction and the sense 
of mutual trust through face-to-face channel. This shortage is especially serious 
when the informants are new users who are unfamiliar with typing either Chinese 
1» 
or English. The slow speed resulted from China's limited network bandwidth may 
also be a constraint. And consequently, it is usually difficult to obtain the depth of 
online interviews comparable to that of traditional methods. To solve this problem, 
one may need to maintain friendship with the selected interviewee for a few 
、 
months before the interview about the research topic is carried out. This proves to 
be helpful when I conduct interviews with lower-rank regulators in the virtual 
communities. 
The selection of informants may be a pitfall. Ifone chooses only his or her friends 
in virtual communities as sources of information, the results may very probably 
become biased. However, random sampling is generally not feasible since most of � * 
the users may be either not interested in the researcher's topic, such as OPC in this 
thesis, or unwilling to be interviewed by a stranger. Thus to identify people with 
• different opinions pertaining to the subject matter, the researcher should first 
classify users under different categories according to the analytical framework of 
the research or actual differentiation among users. For instance, in retrospect of 
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the online interviews I did for this thesis, I think I should have divided users in the 
Shanghai BBS into non-OPC-lovers, OPC-watchers, OPC-reporters, OPC-
opinion-makers and OPC-mobilizers. Users in the last three categories can be 
identified through the narrative, commentary and mobilizing messages posted in 
the BBS respectively", whereas non-OPC-lovers and OPC-watchers can only be 
differentiated in the course of interviews. Different interview questions should be 
developed for different categories. Since those who post reports, comments and 
mobilization messages are more familiar with topics related to OPC than common 
II 
users, they should be presented with more questions in more detail, and ifpossible, 
with adjustments to the arguments s/he raised in the online arenas. And those who 
publish most frequently about the topic of discussion should be interviewed more 
than once. Interview data of higher quality could have been collected had I� 
followed this logic of purposive sampling from the beginning ofmy fieldwork. 
Online Participant Observation 
As for participant observation there also exist similar problems in the selection of 
virtual communities. From a more specific perspective, the Shanghai BBS should 
be regarded as the best representative of virtual communities in CERNET, the 
« • • 
national network for education and research. Although the CSTNET for science 
and technology research institutes may be accepted as non-profit making as the 
CERNET, the representativeness of the Shanghai BBS for commercial networks is 
rather weak. Certainly, the four national Intemet IAPs are not completely 
“Every message posted in BBS stations display the author's membership ID, which makes it possible to 
identify who wrote the message. And since every BBS has an intemal email system, we can contact the 
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separated from each other. And I know numerous people in the Shanghai BBS 
have jobs outside campuses and research institutes. Yet user demographics in a 
certain virtual community is not the only thing we care. More importantly, we 
hope to examine how the regulatory measures in the communities may influence 
the OPC patterns among their users. Thus it remains questionable whether the 
kind of virtual censorship delineated in this thesis varies greatly in different kinds 
of networks. For this reason, more attention needs to be devoted to commercial 
websites. And it is important to compare them with forums in academic networks 
ii 
to see if there is significant difference. A good choice for this purpose is the 
r 
cyberspace community hosted by Netease in Guangzhou�which is the most 
popular domestic website according to the latest CNNIC report. 
% 
There are also qualifications about selecting Zaobao Forum as a reference for the 
comparative evaluation of the democratizing effects in mainland Chinese Intemet 
communities. Although Zaobao Forum might be the best choice for the case of 
Indonesian riots since many users in China attended this arena, which is free from 
Chinese virtual censorship, this forum is certainly not the best choice for other 
cases all the time. One of its shortcomings is that editors in Zaobao Online do not 
publish all the messages by readers. As being discussed earlier, this is an agceptable 
- • •- • ‘ 
insufficiency since every virtual community has its own rules and deleting articles 
is a common practice among system operators. Therefore, as long as the managerial 
• measures are not produced in accordance with China's national regulations to 
suppress OPC in general and defend the status quo ofpolitical communication in 
author to make arrangement for interviews. 
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an authoritarian context, the online arena with these managerial measures can be 
accepted as a reference for comparison. Still some may argue that Zaobao Forum 
can be regarded at best as a contaminated reference because it is also hosted in an 
authoritarian country. This argument is erroneous since now that our conclusion is 
limited democratization effect of the Intemet in China, it does not matter if the 
Forum is essentially less open to diverse opinions than average virtual communities 
in West Europe and North America. If China's cyberspace is more closed than that 
of Singapore, the myth of the new medium as an omnipotent democratizer should 
%* 
be discredited with more certainty. 
Another problem is the insufficient information about user's nationality in Zaobao 
Forum. In Shanghai BBS and other bulletin board systems, user's IP address is, 
automatically recorded and displayed in the heading of each message if the user is 
-using netterm, sptnet or other telnet software. It is for this reason that more than 
ninety percent of articles in the Shanghai BBS are from known geographical 
sources. While on the contrary, there is no such function in the Forum, which is 
mostly viewed through http. Yet since November 1998，a better choice of 
comparison between the domestic and external arenas has been available with the 
establishment of the Untitled BBS by overseas Chinese students at the 
• 一 ‘ » 
Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology {hhs.mit.edu). Although not a direct copy of 
the Untitled BBS of Peking University that has been closed since 1996，this new 
• BBS is operated mostly by students from Peking University. Its interface is similar 
to those of domestic BBS stations. There is also a board named “Democracy 
^ Accessible at http://www.netease.com/ 
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Saloon" in the Untitled BBS. Most users attending bbs.mit.edu are from Mainland 
China. And their IP addresses are displayed as in domestic arenas. I should thus use 
the Untitled BBS as a comparative reference, if I have the chance to assess the 
consequences of mediation again. 
The Selection of Cases 
Another aspect deserving more attention is the cases other than discussions about 
the Indonesian riots in 1998 and the anti-Japanese movement of 1996. Certainly 
the rationale of case study is to pursue certain case not ofily because they are 
representative of other cases but also because they have distinct values. And the 
cases discussed in this thesis are unique since no other online discussions have led 
to mobilization in the real world until the recent ambiguous cases of Falun Gong� 
and the anti-Nato demonstrations". In this sense, they are the best cases to start 
with for the inquiry into the political influences of the new medium in an 
authoritarian milieu because no other case is so complete in terms ofthe processes 
and consequences of mediation. 
However, the two cases are both nationalist responses stimulated by the perceived 
challenges to China's security and dignity from China's neigbhourhood. The 
~ l- * 
stimuli originated from outside the country. Both cases pertained to diplomatic 
affairs rather than domestic politics and economy. Both involved the perceived 
• benefits of the nation as an entirety rather than the practical interests of each 
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individual netizens in China's cyberspace. It is because of these reasons that in 
both cases, the OPC processes are not regarded as a direct challenge to the 
existing political order and therefore not prohibited completely. And during the 
actual processes of online discussion, there are indeed a significant portion of 
participants expressing viewpoints in line with the propaganda of the party-state. 
This boundary position of the nationalism must be admitted since it is possible 
that other OPC discussions containing no nationalistic element may have different 
patterns of mediation. 
t« 
ff 
The uniqueness of the cases in illustrating the processes of mediation does not 
mean that other cases without heated online mobilization and subsequent real-
world assembly should not be studied. There are nevertheless large number o f� 
OPC discussions pertaining to issues occurred inside China, obtrusive to domestic 
users andy'or with direct influences upon the practical needs ofeach individual, for 
example, discussions about corruption, unemployment, natural disasters, and 
Intemet regulatory policies. To what extent are these discussions different from 
the nationalist movements? Why these issues fail to lead to collective actions? Is 
the nature ofOPC issues also a contingency for the consequences ofmediation? If 
so, how7 And why? These questions may lead to another intriguing terrain of 
‘ . - u ‘ 
exploration. 
• There may be two strategies for the analysis of the additional cases. One is to 
“ I t remains unclear whether the Intemet played an indispensable role in the mobilization of these 
demonstrations because, in both cases, organizational forces, traditional means of interpersonal 
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select more cases of different attributes such as domestic issues versus 
international ones, and issues influencing different aspects of the life of the 
netizens. The other solution is to choose cases best illustrative for each stage of 
mediation including exposure, expression and mobilization. And the overarching 
concern during discussions about the specific cases is the relationship between the 
nature of the issues and the mode of discussion: why some kind of cases can lead 
to mobilization whereas others cannot? Why some can foster a plethora of 
opinions whereas others produce large quantity of narrative descriptions? And 
most importantly, under wjiat conditions may the discussions migrate from mere 
Exposure Effect to Expression Effect to Mobilization Effect towards stronger 
democratization impacts of the Intemet in the context of China and other 
authoriarian regimes? � 
一 
Broader Implications 
This thesis is an unfinished exploration in the rarely visited field of China's OPC 
arenas in light of the mediation concept. With the limits of time and resources I 
have fathomed merely parts of the entire process of mediation with an analytical 
framework yet to be refmed. If I can acquire ftirther information about user 
demographics and their relations with OPC activities, more data about different 
online arenas and various OPC cases, specifications and modifications of the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis will become very likely. But I believe additional 
data will only add to the concept of mediation rather than falsify it. The essence of 
communication and other telecommunications technologies such as mobile phone were all involved. As for 
the anti-Nato protests, state-sponsored mass media seemed to be the most important drive for mobilization. 
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the mediationist perspective is a call to be more holistic in considering the 
political impacts of the new technologies. If this thesis has overlooked some 
factors at work in the empirical context or mishandled some of the mediation 
processes and consequences, it is due to the operational limitations instead ofthe 
theoretical orientation. 
The proposal of the mediation concept and the mediationist perspective is an 
attempt to subsume existing arguments concerning technology and democracy, 
globalization and localization, human agency and political institution. The 
analyses of mediation in the Chinese context are in part confirmatory to all the 
aforementioned academic traditions. Technology has some political potentialities. 
So does human agency. Globalization is taking place in cyberspace. And as in t he� 
real space and the mass-mediated space, it is a twofold process extending to 
localization simultaneously. Moreover, institutional changes, even in authoritarian 
countries as responses to new technology, are incremental and under the 
constraints of existing reign over the old media. 
However, while confirming some basic tenets ofthe various academic traditions, 
the mediationist perspective .opposes the canonization of any single theoretical 
approach. The conceptual spectacles are valuable instruments only because they 
facilitate induction based on observations. Thus the ultimate commitment of the 
• mediationist perspective is to empirical reality rather than any of the tools with 
which the reality is watched. Along this line ofthinking, it is necessary to use the 
concept of mediation to integrate the existing arguments in a flexible way to 
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account for the complexity, fluidity and even paradoxes emerging in the processes 
by which the introduction of new technology leads to political impacts. 
Besides fostering the concept of mediation, this thesis also adds to present 
dialogues by bringing in the case of China and raising questions in the Chinese 
context. The cardinal contribution is to fill in the theoretical gap between 
technological utopianism and pessimism. It is demonstrated that the technological 
attributes of the Internet are not the only set of factors that influence the political 
tt 
outcomes. They may not lead to pre-designed political objectives such as 
r 
democratization because the technological potentialities only function in the 
context where other factors are present and interacting with each other. And the 
results of the interactions may vary in different dimension of the mediation 
、 
process with different intensity, leading to limited impact as the overall political 
outcome. 
Meanwhile, this thesis describes a globalization process that extends from 
conventional mass-mediated spaces to the virtual world, where national boundary 
still matters to some extent. The remaining potency of local authorities, as 
exemplified by the measures of virtual censorship, points to a question yet to be 
folly discussed: now that there is China's cyberspace, is there a Singaporean 
cyberspace, or a French cyberspace? What is emerging over there, the cyberspace 
• or the cyberspacesl Answers to such questions may need to be built on 
distinctions between different types of national regulation concerning OPC, which 
entails not only cross-media comparison but also cross-national analyses. 
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As for the study of political institutions, there is a small but notable addition to the 
research tradition. Besides formal legislative and administrative arrangements, 
this thesis also highlights technological factors as both stimuli pressing for 
incremental changes and a response to the challenges from outside the polity. The 
competition between nondemocracy and democracy on the institutional level is 
therefore not only a competition between the human agents but also one between 




There are other questions emitting from this case study. Now that there is 
mediation in terms of online political communication, is there mediation in other 
aspects of CMC, such as economy, culture and entertainment? Is there mediation 
during the spread of other media? To what extent are the patterns of mediation in 
China similar or not similar to other authoritarian countries, totalitarian countries, 
and developing countries? Can the mediation concept be extended to be 
meaningful even under the contexts of westem democratic countries? These 
questions all deserve further discussion. 
« • 
The most unpredictable and yet crucial question is concerning time. This thesis 
demonstrates how the new medium has achieved but finite democratizing effects 
• so far in China's online political arenas. But will this conclusion be valid for the 
future? Will the wind of new technologies sweep away totalitarian and 
authoritarian rule in two years, one decade, or a longer period oftime? Or will it 
； 
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subside into a breeze that shakes the nondemocracies a little bit but leaves them 
intact and viable? Or will IT's darker side, such as the firewall technology, 
outweighs the liberalizing potentialities and fortify the inequality of political 
communication? 
Based on empirical data about the history and current state of the Intemet in China, 
this thesis contains inadequate evidence to make predictions. The Intemet is 
burgeoning. The virtual communities are maturing. And the consequences of 
II 
mediation are mutable in the long run. It is therefore too ambitious to make 
� 
concrete predictions about tomorrow at present. However, there is one thing for 
sure: the new medium is giving rise to a new geography of political 
communication in the virtual space and calling for new concepts, new methods 
and new perspectives in the academia. It is in these regards that this thesis may 
add to the debates about technology and democracy. And although with various 
weaknesses, this periodical conclusion of my research about the political impacts 
of the Intemet is, for studies in the future, at least a target soliciting critiques, a 
draft to be verified, and a foundation to be built up upon. 
‘ 
‘ ； 
. - ：- ‘ 
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